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ABSTRACT
I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche provides us with a political philosophy that deserves 
serious consideration as a uniquely anti-democratic position within the canon of modem 
political theory. Beyond recent attempts to democratise Nietzsche’s thoughts on power 
and self-creation, I provide an analysis of Nietzsche’s anti-democratic impulse that 
demonstrates how the elements of hierarchy and philosophy form the core of an anti­
democratic and anti-universalist political project in Nietzsche’s mature thought. Hitherto, 
many of Nietzsche’s interpreters have assumed that his thought yields no unambiguous 
political philosophy because he fails to present his ideas in a systematic way. Yet it may be 
argued that Nietzsche’s political thought does reveal a significant, if skeletal, structure that 
is built upon consistent ideas, however unsystematically presented.
The overall aim of this thesis is to determine the best way to characterize what is uniquely 
political in Nietzsche. I claim that the political in Nietzsche has to do with the relationship 
between politics as hierarchy and philosophy as independent value creation. I present my 
thesis in three parts. Firstly, I develop my argument within a critique of recent democratic 
interpretations of Nietzsche. Secondly, I illustrate the relationship between hierarchy and 
philosophy through an original exegesis of Nietzsche’s texts. And finally, by engaging in a 
comparative analysis of Hannah Arendt’s political theory, I offer an example of how 
Nietzsche’s anti-democratic project may be employed as a tool in the ongoing 
consideration of important issues in political theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The Anglo-American discourse on Nietzsche’s relevance to political theory has 
developed gradually since the 1970s. Early efforts by theorists like Tracy Strong and Mark 
Warren began the project of re-thinking Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker in terms of 
how the different elements of his thought might be used as democratic building blocks in 
the service of a radical or postmodern political vision.1 But these early attempts were 
eventually opposed by other efforts to remind us of Nietzsche’s anti-democratic 
sentiments.2
The controversy over Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker continued to divide 
political theory interpretations of Nietzsche throughout the 1990s.3 Therefore, what 
remains an ever-present point of contention in Nietzsche studies is the question of the 
suitability and plausibility of his philosophy within democratic and egalitarian structures of 
thought. Are his ideas available to us as democratic building blocks or is Nietzsche a 
fundamentally anti-democratic thinker?
Of course one might suggest innocently that both of these characterizations are true. 
There is noprima facie reason why Nietzsche’s ideas should not be used for democratic
]Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1975); Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press, 1988).
2Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990).
3Other books which present arguments for the “democratic” Nietzsche include the following: William 
Connolly, Identity/Difference (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991); David 
Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1995); Dan Conway, 
Nietzsche and the political (London: Routledge, 1997). The following recent efforts attempt to 
remind us of the anti-democratic Nietzsche: Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: the Ethics o f an Immoralist 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche contra 
Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). For a useful introduction to 
Nietzsche’s reception in political theory see Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as 
Political Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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purposes and at the same time it seems rather obvious that he is an anti-democratic 
thinker. Nevertheless, the controversy dividing these positions reflects a deeper conflict 
over the relationship between politics and philosophy in Nietzsche. If Nietzsche’s thoughts 
are available to us as democratic building blocks it is because these building blocks do not 
fit neatly together as an integrated and self-contained Nietzschean political philosophy.4 On 
this view, Nietzsche’s philosophy must be privileged over his politics because his 
“political” thought represents an under-determined vision. Thus, Mark Warren, in an early 
article, characterizes the relationship between philosophy and politics in Nietzsche as 
expressing a fundamental “political indeterminacy”.5
An important aspect of this approach, the approach represented in Warren’s 
characterization, is that it developed out of a less formal and less specific project to 
overcome the “embarrassingly political Nietzsche” that Walter Kaufmann’s seminal post­
war study first inaugurated.6 Although the proto-fascist Nietzsche has been discredited, the 
effort to establish a democratic Nietzsche has been greatly aided by the desire to overcome 
the stigma of a proto-fascist Nietzsche whose philosophy needed to be bracketed out from 
his crude or “overt” politics. In turn, this approach was intensified and given greater 
legitimacy by the poststructuralist readings that sanctioned the creative appropriation of 
Nietzsche’s ideas over and against traditional exegetical interpretations of his texts.7
4In a review of political readings of Nietzsche Mark Warren re-asserts this position where he writes: 
“[NJietzsche’s challenges are just that: challenges that remain unfinished, at least from the 
perspective of political thought. However suggestive, they do not add up to a political philosophy. It 
will not do to rely on Nietzsche’s own politics, since the implications of his thinking far outstrip 
what he takes to be political.” Mark Warren, “Political Readings of Nietzsche” Political Theory vol.
26, no. 1 (1998): 92.
5Mark Warren, “Nietzsche and Political Philosophy” Political Theory vol. 13, no. 2 (1985): 187.
6Walter Sokel, “Political Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in Walter Kaufmann’s Image of Nietzsche” 
Nietzsche-Studien 12 (1983): 441. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
Antichrist (New York: Meridian Books, 1966).
7See David Allison (ed), The New Nietzsche (Cambridge Mass: The MIT Press, 1995). See also the 
works of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze for the most influential
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The following remarks by Keith Ansell-Pearson, in an article that documents these 
developments, illustrates clearly the changing approach to the relationship between 
philosophy and politics in Nietzsche studies:
An impasse on the question of Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker was reached by 
commentators adopting the practice of reading his neo-conservative politics back into his 
philosophy of power in an effort to discredit the philosophical site on which he had constructed 
his political edifice. Yet for anyone aware of the pivotal role that Nietzsche’s writings have come 
to play in contemporary debates in critical theoiy, poststructuralism and deconstruction, his status 
as a political thinker poses an enigma in need of explanation and enlightenment.8
In this summary Ansell-Pearson ushers in a period of interpretation that establishes an
appropriation-based approach to the political in Nietzsche. And this emerging approach is
justified, in part, on the claim that Nietzsche’s texts are uniquely open to appropriation
because Nietzsche’s philosophy is presented in a very unsystematic way.
However, in the wake of this emerging discourse, I argue that the appropriation-based 
approach ironically narrows the field of Nietzsche studies in political theory by 
pigeonholing Nietzsche as a thinker who has no political philosophy of his own. What is 
significant about this pigeonholing is that it often amounts to reading a democratic 
Nietzsche back into Nietzsche in the same way that, as Ansell-Pearson puts it, 
commentators have read Nietzsche’s neo-conservative politics “back into his philosophy of 
power”. And, in this way, an impasse may be acknowledged on both sides of the argument 
concerning the relationship between politics and philosophy in Nietzsche’s thought.
In an effort to move beyond this impasse I suggest that constructing an anti-democratic 
Nietzschean philosophy is a much needed contribution. Therefore, I take up the challenge 
of piecing together an anti-democratic Nietzsche. The reason for embarking on such a 
project is to help uncover the limitations of the democratic Nietzsche and, at the same
poststructuralist readings of Nietzsche.
8Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche: A Radical Challenge to Political Theory” Radical Philosophy 54 
(1990): 10.
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time, extend the relevance of Nietzsche’s political thought to new areas of analysis.
In a polemical article on Nietzsche’s relevance to political theory, Martha Nussbaum 
argues that Nietzsche almost completely fails to rate as a political theorist according to the 
aims and requirements of political thought that most Enlightenment and contemporary 
thinkers conform to.9 What is clear in Nussbaum’s attack is that she is frustrated by the 
limitations of Nietzsche as a democratic thinker. In a similar but less polemical vein Diana 
Coole has suggested that recent attempts to define Nietzsche’s relevance to contemporary 
politics are circumscribed narrowly by the inability to assimilate his ideas within a truly 
inter subjective framework of political theorizing:
Serious attention to a Nietzschean politics always seems to collapse into an ethics which 
envisages at best a politics internal to the subject, rather than intersubjective processes. If 
Nietzsche is to inspire politics, it is thus important to derive some sense of transformative 
collective action from his work and not merely edifying values. There is, however, little evidence 
from recent interpretations that this can be done, and if we need a political response to our 
current situation, it might be preferable to look elsewhere.10
What these observations and frustrations may be interpreted to represent is the view that
the attempt to force Nietzsche into a democratic framework of the political has significant
limitations. Indeed, a more appropriate framework for the political in Nietzsche is likely to
be an anti-democratic framework.
My approach to the political in Nietzsche is very much a product of this ongoing debate, 
the impasse that Ansell-Pearson identifies, and the frustrations expressed by Nussbaum and 
Coole. Although I agree that there are important limitations to the democratic Nietzsche, I 
believe that this need not limit Nietzsche’s relevance to our democratic arguments. I 
accept the political indeterminacy of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and that there is no “real” 
Nietzsche to be discovered in the text, but this need not prevent us from constructing an
9Martha Nussbaum, “Is Nietzsche a Political Thinker?” International Journal o f Philosophical 
Studies vol. 5, no. 1 (1997).
10Diana Coole, “The Politics of Reading Nietzsche” Political Studies 46 (1998): 363.
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anti-democratic reading that pays close attention to the atypical elitist arguments Nietzsche 
does make. Indeed, once we have acknowledged the unique openness of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy all that is required is to demonstrate the relevance of the positions we wish to 
construct.
In this way, I accept that my thesis must meet certain criteria as a contribution to 
Nietzsche studies in political theory. I agree with Mark Warren where he states that he 
“would prefer to see the appropriators of Nietzsche judged according to whether they have 
revealed anything interesting about Nietzsche, and whether they can use Nietzsche to 
reveal anything interesting about politics today.”11 Therefore, I accept that an anti­
democratic reading of Nietzsche must move beyond the attempt simply to remind us of 
Nietzsche’s crude, “neo-conservative”, or “proto-fascist” politics.
I develop a thesis on the political in Nietzsche that cultivates an anti-democratic 
framework outlining a self-contained Nietzschean political philosophy. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that my reason for developing such a thesis is not simply to up the 
ante in a polemical contest with Nietzsche’s democratic interpreters. Instead, I wish to 
explore further Nietzsche’s relevance to democratic theorizing by presenting his thought as 
a unique anti-democratic model of autonomy. Therefore, in constructing a more 
sophisticated anti-democratic Nietzsche, I take from both sides of the debate as it has 
played itself out in the literature since the 1970s. Although I pay close attention to 
Nietzsche’s texts, and therefore set out on a scholarly project, I do so ironically to the 
degree that I acknowledge the unique openness of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In this way, my 
approach may be best described as a “creative” exegesis of Nietzsche’s political philosophy 
that, nevertheless, makes certain claims about what Nietzsche’s aims are.
This approach requires that I launch a critique of recent democratic interpretations of
1 barren, “Political Readings of Nietzsche,” p. 99.
Nietzsche. Although I describe many of these readings as “misrepresentations” of what is 
uniquely political in Nietzsche, I do so only to the degree that they appear to foreclose on 
the anti-democratic Nietzsche and inspire theorists to read a democratic Nietzsche back 
into his politically indeterminate philosophy of power. I do not deny that Nietzsche’s ideas 
may be used as “democratic building blocks” but merely suggest that there is also an 
important and sophisticated conception of the political in Nietzsche that is both anti­
democratic and of serious interest to us.
Obviously I do not set out to address the concerns of commentators like Nussbaum and 
Coole directly since I agree with them where they suggest that Nietzsche’s relevance as a 
democratic thinker is limited. Instead, I argue that an anti-democratic Nietzsche offers us a 
comparative tool with which to improve our political theories of autonomy and 
universality. What is implicit in my approach is that Nietzsche’s critique of democracy and 
modernity is as strong as it is because it informs a self-contained anti-democratic 
philosophy. Although I argue that Nietzsche’s Ubermensch ideal is obscure and enigmatic, 
and therefore incomprehensible to a significant degree, I elaborate a relationship between 
politics and philosophy in Nietzsche that offers us a political vision of the self-creating 
subject of power. I argue, furthermore, that this conception of autonomy has been ignored 
and obscured by recent attempts to force Nietzschean ideas into egalitarian and universalist 
structures of thought.
I define the political in Nietzsche as the relationship between politics as hierarchy and 
philosophy as independent value creation. I illustrate how the relationship between 
philosophy and hierarchy in Nietzsche offers us an interesting conception of autonomy that 
elides traditional democratic and aristocratic structures of universality and posits instead 
an anti-universalist ontology of power relations. Therefore, I argue that what is uniquely 
political in Nietzsche is the role of philosophy and hierarchy. In emphasizing the
significance of hierarchy in Nietzsche, I elaborate a vision of the political that takes 
seriously his notion of a rank-ordering of individuals. In this way, I try to account for what 
the will to power hypothesis means with respect to willing greater divisions between 
human beings.12
It is important to emphasize that I define “politics” in Nietzsche as “hierarchy” because 
of his apparent view that political values are synonymous with moral values. Therefore, 
since Nietzsche’s will to power hypothesis establishes a hierarchy of moral psychologies, it 
stands to reason that “politics” for Nietzsche must be a matter of hierarchy as well. 
Another important point to emphasize is that I refer to “philosophy” incorporating several 
different descriptions throughout the thesis. For my purposes, Nietzsche’s conception of 
philosophy may be described as “extra-moral autonomy”, “political-philosophical 
autonomy”, and/or “independent value-creation”. Although I do not offer a lengthy 
explanation of philosophy as autonomy until part two, I do introduce the idea of 
philosophy as “autonomy” in the first chapter and continue to refer to it as such 
throughout the thesis.
Amother important point that needs to be acknowledged is that I am not concerned with 
whether or not Nietzsche’s political philosophy, as I construct it in this thesis, is 
practicable or not. I assume that as egalitarians and democrats we are not interested in 
seeing an anti-democratic and anti-universalist philosophy turned into a blueprint for social 
engineering on the scale that Nietzsche’s project would certainly demand. Nevertheless, if 
we can get past the unsavoury nature of such a project, it may be possible to uncover a 
new vision of the relationship between politics and philosophy that might help us re-think 
some of the problems plaguing our more “acceptable” models of autonomy.
12See Eric Parens, “From philosophy to politics: On Nietzsche’s ironic metaphysics of will to power” 
Man and World 24 (1991): 178.
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It is also necessary to introduce my ontological and epistemological positions on 
Nietzsche. Although my thesis is a political philosophy interpretation of Nietzsche, no 
thesis on Nietzsche can avoid saying something about his ontological and epistemological 
claims. And yet, I do not have the space to say all that I want to say about his political 
thought and at the same time explore the ambiguities of his ontological and 
epistemological stages of development. Thus, in an effort to establish as consistent and 
clear a position as possible, I rely on a selective interpretation of Gilles Deleuze’s reading 
of Nietzsche to establish Nietzsche’s ontology and I rely on elements of Maudemarie 
Clark’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s approach to truth to establish his epistemological 
development. It is important to stress the fact that neither Deleuze nor Clark provide me 
with the thesis I construct. The interpretations of Nietzsche’s claims that are available in 
the work of Deleuze and Clark simply lend support to my thesis. Therefore, I introduce the 
significance of Deleuze and Clark in the first chapter and re-assert certain elements of their 
interpretations, periodically, throughout the thesis.
My thesis is presented in three parts. In the first part I introduce the role of philosophy 
and hierarchy within the context of the current debate on the democratic Nietzsche. In this 
section I establish my argument over and against democratic interpretations while at the 
same time employing many of the assumptions these arguments themselves rely on 
including certain anti-foundationalist claims about subjectivity and power that help support 
my overall claims and which may be originally attributed to Nietzsche anyway. I also 
develop my thesis in part one amidst Nietzsche’s critique of democracy which I outline in 
the first chapter. The first part of the thesis however includes chapters one through four.13
13A version of chapter one was published as an article in the following journal: “Nietzsche and the 
democratic order of things” De Philosophia vol. 13, no. 2 (1998): pp 227-248 (referees: Will 
Kymlicka and Andre Gombay). Chapter two was presented as a panel paper at the Political Studies 
Association annual conference, April 2000 (discussant: Iain MacKenzie).
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In the second part, which includes chapters five and six, I trace the development of 
Nietzsche’s revaluation of philosophy from The Birth o f Tragedy to the conclusion of his 
written life in 1888. In this section I develop a reading of Nietzsche’s texts that illustrates 
the integrity of what I refer to as the uniquely political in Nietzsche. I define the uniquely 
political in Nietzsche as an anti-democratic and anti-universalist conception of political- 
philosophical autonomy that is an “active”, as opposed to “contemplative”, conception of 
the philosophical life. I focus on the role of philosophy in chapter five and in chapter six I 
illustrate how this emerging conception is structured according to Nietzsche’s notion of 
hierarchy in his mature books.
The third part of the thesis is presented in chapters seven and eight.14 In chapter seven I 
demonstrate the relevance of my thesis to democratic issues in political theory by 
articulating a framework of analysis that compares the integrated elements of my position 
alongside Hannah Arendt’s effort to theorize a new conception of political action and 
judgment in terms of political “conscience”. As an anti-democratic and anti-universalist 
approach to political-philosophical autonomy, I demonstrate how Nietzsche’s political 
project challenges many of Arendt’s ideas. I argue that this comparative analysis compels 
us to acknowledge that Nietzsche’s unique political position offers an important re­
configuration of the relationship between politics and philosophy that questions many of 
our assumptions and demands that we think more deeply about the philosophical principles 
we employ to ground many of our democratic arguments. In chapter eight I briefly 
summarize the central claims of the thesis and offer some afterthoughts on the 
performative model of the self that may be derived from Nietzsche’s philosophy.
14A version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the American Political Science Association 
annual conference, September 1999 and won a best paper nomination (discussant: Dana Villa).
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PARTI
CHAPTER ONE - NIETZSCHE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE ELEMENTS OF A 
NEW POLITICAL INTERPRETATION
Nietzsche claims that there are two fundamental expressions of life: a life-affirming or 
“noble“ expression and a life-denying or “slave” expression. This dualism constitutes 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis of power which I refer to as his ontology of the will to power. I 
argue that this dualism serves as the foundation for his conception of extra-moral 
(ubersittlich) autonomy and that it precludes the possibility that extra-moral autonomy 
may be transmissible within “the democratic order of things” (BGE 261). By referring to 
“the democratic order of things” I do not intend to explore whether or not Nietzschean 
autonomy is compatible with any system of democracy. Instead, I am interested in what is 
problematic about interpreting Nietzsche as a democratic thinker where modem 
democratic conditions, broadly speaking, may be understood to exist.
In fleshing out these tensions I deal with two conflicting approaches to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. The first approach acknowledges the qualitative difference between noble and 
slave expressions of life. This is the approach that I defend and elaborate. The second 
approach is the one I attribute to Nietzsche’s democratic interpreters who appear to have, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, advanced the position that it is entirely plausible to 
collapse slave will to power into noble will to power and theorize Nietzsche’s conception 
of autonomy within a universalist framework of modern political values. Thus, I make two 
claims with regard to democratic conditions. Firstly, I argue that where Nietzsche 
considers his ontological hypothesis of power within a modern democratic context he 
never loses sight of the qualitative difference between noble and slave expressions of life. 
And secondly, I argue that on the basis of this first point it is misleading to make use of
16
Nietzsche’s conception of extra-moral autonomy within a contemporary democratic 
context where making use of that conception requires denying, overlooking, or obscuring 
the qualitative difference between noble and slave will to power.
Nietzsche’s typology of “noble”, or “master”, and “slave” represents his psychological 
and ontological hypothesis (in terms of an ontology of human types) that the “moral 
discrimination of values has originated either among the ruling group whose consciousness 
of its difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight - or among the ruled, 
the slaves and dependents of every degree” (BGE 260). My argument in this chapter will 
draw substantially on Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s typology which is 
articulated in terms of “active” and “reactive” force.15 Although I am critical of Deleuze’s 
interpretation later in chapter two for its inconsistencies, his general approach to noble and 
slave will to power as active and reactive force, respectively, may be helpful for several 
reasons. Firstly, it often makes more sense to think of Nietzsche’s typology in terms of 
forces rather than types since, as Nietzsche himself claims, both psychologies may exist 
within a single person (BGE 260). In fact, Nietzsche describes the democratic order of 
things as the result of “the intermarriage of masters and slaves” (BGE 261). Thus, 
Deleuze’s interpretation captures the idea of an intermarriage, or relation, of forces 
without reducing Nietzsche’s position to one wherein each individual is to be understood 
at all times as constituting both active and reactive force. Nietzsche never reduces the 
difference between types to a unified and universally knowable conception of the self. The 
implication here is that Nietzsche’s typology belies any claim affirming the fixed nature of 
being that others might attempt to read into his philosophy and yet at the same time he 
does posit an ontology of types based on his theory of active and reactive, or positive and
15Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: The Athlone Press, 
1983), pp. 39-72. Active force represents noble instinct and reactive force represents slave instinct.
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negative, moral psychology. The specific ontological nature of Nietzsche’s typology lies in 
the relation of forces rather than in any unified and fixed conception of “being” behind 
“doing” (GM I, 13).
Deleuze’s interpretation is also useful for the specific reason that his rendering of will to 
power as active and reactive force makes it possible to consider more efficiently the 
manifestation of said forces within a modem political framework broadly speaking. In 
other words, Deleuze offers a philosophical rendering of Nietzsche’s psychological claims 
about noble and slave types and as a result his presentation of Nietzsche’s typology may 
prove instrumental in making sense of Nietzsche amidst the more substantive concerns of 
political theory. Nevertheless, I refer to both “type” and “force” where appropriate and it 
should be recognized that I make use of Deleuze’s interpretation to arrive at a 
characterization of the political in Nietzsche that Deleuze himself would not endorse. It is 
also important to point out that what I refer to as Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis, the 
hypothesis that life is will to power, is something I refer to consistently throughout the 
thesis to help illustrate the political in Nietzsche which I describe in terms of Nietzsche’s 
unique approach to philosophy and hierarchy. Although a protracted discussion of the 
political is taken up in chapter two, I summarize what I mean by the political at the end of 
this chapter.
I begin by introducing the elements of the discussion in terms of how Nietzsche 
articulates his ontology under democratic conditions. In doing so I focus on the most 
important elements of the democratic conditions Nietzsche has something to say about, 
namely, equality and autonomy. In the first sections of the chapter I introduce Nietzsche’s 
view of the democratic order of things, the hierarchical nature of the will to power 
hypothesis and his epistemological position. In the middle sections of the chapter I discuss 
various elements of Nietzsche’s thought that lead to his visionary notion of the sovereign
individual who may be thought to exercise a unique philosophical autonomy in a future- 
based extra-moral period of mankind. In the penultimate section of the chapter I briefly 
discuss the claims of two of Nietzsche’s democratic interpreters. I conclude the chapter 
with a summary introduction of my main argument concerning philosophy and hierarchy as 
the axiomatic elements of a new political interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought.
It should be noted that I present the central aspects of Nietzsche’s political thought in a 
cursory way here in chapter one for the purpose of introducing all the elements that will be 
discussed again in detail. Therefore, my claims in this chapter will be given greater textual 
support in later chapters. And this is especially true of chapters five, six, and seven where I 
concentrate on the development of Nietzsche’s ideas from the early 1870s to the late 
1880s as well as the applicability of those ideas to the work of Hannah Arendt and the 
issues addressed in her political theory.
Throughout part one of the thesis I integrate an introductory consideration of the central 
elements of the thesis within a focus on what is problematic in recent democratic 
interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought. I also make an attempt to distinguish Nietzsche’s 
position apart from various other philosophers in order to offer a better illustration of 
Nietzsche’s uniqueness. In this way, part one is made up of a combination of elements that 
should be seen to offer both a critique of democratic interpretations of Nietzsche and at 
the same time an introduction to my characterization of Nietzsche as an atypical, anti­
democratic political philosopher.
pathos and the non-equilibrium of forces
Amidst developing democratic conditions, Nietzsche identifies a tension between what 
he calls slave vanity (Eitelkeit) and a noble instinct "to ascribe value to oneself on one's 
own" (BGE 261). Rather than characterize this tension in terms of an equilibrium of
instincts he claims that slave vanity, or the propensity to accede in one’s self-estimations to 
the opinion of others, prevails over any impulse to a spontaneously generated self-opinion. 
It seems that whatever noble instincts exist are effectively displaced, in terms of their 
immediate expression, by the influence of slave vanity. Nietzsche describes this vanity as 
an atavism insofar as it amounts to a “residue of the slave’s craftiness” (BGE 261). Here, 
slave vanity serves as a prelude to Nietzsche’s later thoughts in On the Genealogy o f  
Morals where he describes how the slave type brought about the “most spiritual revenge” 
against the noble type (GM I, 7). The feeling of revenge, or ressentiment, represents the 
motivating instinct behind the slave revolt in morality: the weak, due to their inability to 
react in deed, resort to a kind of spiritual warfare wherein the spontaneous affirmation of 
their identity ceases to occur and they define themselves in direct opposition to the strong. 
Thus, Nietzsche understands the weak to have directed their view outward in a negative 
way rather than spontaneously and non-comparatively the way that the strong or noble 
type was able to (GM I, 10). On this view the slave type suffers from a negatively acquired 
self-opinion whereas the self-opinion of the noble type may be thought of as positively 
formed in its non-comparative and immediate affirmation.
From a position of acute social weakness values tend to reflect that which is most useful 
to basic survival and the alleviation of suffering. In this way, Nietzsche describes slave 
morality as the “morality of utility” (BGE 260). He explains that “those qualities are 
brought out and flooded with light which serve to ease existence for those who suffer: here 
pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and 
friendliness are honoured - for here these are the most useful qualities” (BGE 260). On 
Nietzsche’s view such virtues are developed out of necessity, fear, and ressentiment. He 
concludes that “according to slave morality, those who are ‘evil’ thus inspire fear; 
according to master morality it is precisely those who are ‘good’ that inspire, and wish to
inspire, fear, while the ‘bad’ are felt to be contemptible” (BGE 260).
Nietzsche describes both the noble and slave expressions of life as will to power (BGE 
259; GM III, 14). This means that one cannot speak of will to power without 
distinguishing what type of will to power is being expressed. An ontology of active and 
reactive forces exist in relational opposition to one another and this means that either 
active or reactive force enjoys hegemony over the other depending on the specific cultural 
conditions that order these forces. This “relationality” may be best described in terms of 
hierarchy. Thus, Gilles Deleuze writes:
In Nietzsche the word hierarchy has two senses. It signifies, firstly, the difference between active 
and reactive forces, the superiority of active to reactive forces ... But hierarchy also designates the 
triumph of reactive forces, the contagion of reactive forces and the complex organisation which 
results - where the weak have conquered, where the strong are contaminated, where the slave who 
has not stopped being a slave prevails over the master who has stopped being one...16
Nietzsche claims that “[t]he will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a p a th o s
(WP 635). As a pathos, or “feeling”, the will to power may be said to take both an active
and reactive form. The active pathos suggests the very real and immediate feeling of
inequality between strata or rather between higher and lower types in terms of a
hierarchically segregated society. A reactive pathos would suggest the opposite with
respect to feeling, namely, the feeling of equality that is imagined and idealized in terms of
a non-hierarchical myth of universal equality.
The interesting thing to realize is that a reactive pathos can still be hegemonic within a 
caste-ridden society, like that of the early Christian and Medieval societies or even the 
class-based societies of the 19th Century, but the difference between that type of hierarchy 
and the hierarchy of an active pathos is that the latter imposes a pathos of equality, the 
equality before God, onto the community and represses the nobler instincts in favour of the 
priestly or reactive instincts (cf. GM I, 15). In an opposite and very different way, the
I6Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 60.
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structure of active hierarchy separates types from one another in a way that allows the 
lower orders of society to maintain their communities while in an opposite higher realm the 
active or noble instincts are expressed. The point is not that reactive hierarchy eliminates 
all differences which lead to inequalities amongst people but simply that any feeling of 
social or economic inequality within a reactive hierarchy will be countered by a 
fundamental doctrine of equality at the moral level which trumps earthly, circumstantial 
differences in an important spiritual sense. In this way, it may be accurate to say that for 
Nietzsche there is an active hierarchy of relations that expresses an active pathos with 
respect to equality and there is a reactive hierarchy of relations that expresses a reactive 
pathos with respect to equality.
In an active hierarchy the spontaneous affirmation of self which the noble individual is 
said to enjoy constitutes a view from above which enhances the distance between strata 
and emphasizes the feeling ofpower over the weak. In The Gay Science Nietzsche 
observes that:
We lack the classical colouring of nobility because our feelings no longer know the slaves of 
classical antiquity. A Greek of noble descent found such tremendous intermediary stages and 
such distance between his own height and that ultimate baseness that he could scarcely see the 
slave clearly ... It is different with us, who are accustomed to the doctrine of human equality, 
though not to equality itself. (GS 18)
We can interpret Nietzsche, in this passage, to be contrasting the modern feeling  that all
individuals are or ought to be considered equal in some essential way to the ancient Greek
feeling  that equality exists inter pares11 More importantly, however, Nietzsche posits this
typology of relations over time and makes an effort to articulate the difference between
noble and slave under modern conditions.18 And this is evident, as mentioned above, in his
17See Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche contra Democracy, p. 7. Appel asserts the importance of Nietzsche as 
a critic of the “broad egalitarian consensus” which informs contemporary political theory in all its 
categories and manifestations.
18In the foregoing passage cited from The Gay Science, Nietzsche is obviously referring to the formal 
slave of Greek society specifically whereas elsewhere and most pervasively he refers to the slave as a
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attempt to distinguish between slave vanity and its noble counterpart in Beyond Good and 
Evil
Nietzsche’s conception of vanity reflects an inverted rendering of the Hegelian formula 
for relations between master and slave. James Read addresses Nietzsche’s controversial 
inversion of the analysis of vanity where he considers Nietzsche’s fascination with 
distance, in his concept of the pathos o f distance, alongside what has more traditionally 
been recognized as the conditions in which vanity occurs.19 Read wonders, along Hegelian 
lines, whether or not the pathos of distance might simply be one more attempt on the part 
of a “‘master’ to draw his ‘sense of self from the slave’s recognition of him as master”.20 
Although Read dismisses such conjecture, he does question Nietzsche’s apparent inversion 
of the Hegelian model:
[VJanity is a notoriously self-defeating passion: it depends entirely on the recognition granted to 
one by those one considers inferior, yet the recognition accorded by an inferior can never be as 
satisfying as the recognition of an equal (This is a point made, in different ways, by both 
Rousseau and Hegel).21
Nietzsche posits vanity as a symptom of reactive force or rather as a symptom of the 
slave’s negative mode of acquiring a self-opinion whereas, on the Hegelian view, vanity is 
the weakness of the master and it must be overcome in an attempt to reach an equality of 
recognition with the slave.
I suggest that Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s model provides an answer to 
Read’s concerns. Deleuze offers a valuable rendering of Nietzsche’s position contrasting it 
with the traditional Hegelian outlook on the master/slave dialectic. He claims that on
type.
19James Read, “Nietzsche: Power as Oppression” Praxis International 9, (1989): 72-87. Nietzsche 
describes the pathos of distance as the feeling of enhancement which grows “out of the ingrained 
difference between strata” (BGE 257).
20Read, “Nietzsche: Power as Oppression,” p. 81.
21Ibid.
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Nietzsche’s account of the narrative it is a symptom of slave morality at work to actually 
conceive of relations between master and slave the way Hegel does.22 On Deleuze’s 
interpretation, Nietzsche’s position is anti-dialectical insofar as he sees the difference 
between master and slave as one which may not be reduced to an historical synthesis of 
forces resulting in an equality of recognition or a recognition of universal equality between 
master and slave types. In part, this has to do with the fact that Nietzsche does not posit 
recognition as a universal desire. Instead, he posits will to power as a desire or instinct but 
will to power is an hypothesis of ontological dualism with its relational opposition between 
active and reactive, or positive and negative, force. Thus, master/slave relations are to be 
understood as the concrete expression of active and reactive difference with no further 
mention of a desire for recognition in the Hegelian sense.
The Hegelian view suggests that “difference” is always negatively defined insofar as no 
positive essence can be said to exist except as the result of a negative movement or 
relation.23 The movement of the dialectic through history eventually comes to an end when 
the process of negative dialectics produces the reciprocal recognition of both types as 
equals. This is of course the only way that their otherwise negatively defined identities can 
be turned into a positive identity in terms of the recognition of universal equality.24 Thus, 
Hegel’s model assumes a contradiction, from the start, in the original expression of 
master/slave relations that needs to be brought to a specific teleological resolution at some 
future point in history. This future point is the point at which the reciprocal recognition of 
self-conscious moral subjects living in an ethical community may be actualized. For Hegel, 
this point is arrived at under the conditions of the modern state.
22Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 8-10.
23G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977), §50, p. 29.
24Ibid, §79, p. 51.
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On Nietzsche’s view existence is simply affirmed through the expression of active 
difference without further mention of any conceptual contradictions or historical 
resolutions. For Nietzsche master/slave relations are given immediate and non- 
contradictory expression as hierarchy and the expression of difference is not guided by the 
need for an historical resolution of active and reactive difference in terms of the 
recognition of universal equality. Thus, Deleuze states:
Nietzsche’s “yes” is opposed to the dialectical “no”; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference 
to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical 
responsibilities. The empirical feeling of difference, in short hierarchy, is the essential motor of 
the concept, deeper and more effective than all thought about contradiction.25
According to this framework, it is clear that the question of equality is something that
Nietzsche is acutely concerned about and something for which he has developed an
answer. For Nietzsche, equality is not possible in the sense that active and reactive
difference can ever be reduced to the equality or equilibrium of forces. Nietzsche’s
ontology dictates the non-equilibrium of forces. Of course this does not mean that there
can be no equality amongst similar types. Indeed, we know that Nietzsche is frustrated by
the notion of democratic equality where he promotes the idea of equality inter pares over
and against what he refers to as the modern doctrine of human equality.
Under democratic conditions, Nietzsche does suggest that the noble instinct to ‘“ think 
well’ of oneself will actually be encouraged and spread more and more now” (BGE 261). 
Yet, as mentioned above, the force of slave vanity is expected to displace this instinct to a 
great extent. It seems that slave vanity is akin to the negative/comparative perspective the 
weak adopted under the conditions of Nietzsche’s original hierarchy and following from 
this idea, under democratic conditions, “[tjhe vain person is delighted by every good 
opinion he hears of himself... just as every bad opinion of him pains him: for he submits to
25Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 9.
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both, he feels subjected to them in accordance with that oldest instinct of submission that 
breaks out in him” (BGE 261).
Nietzsche explains that the noble type should find such slave vanity very difficult to 
understand. Of the noble type, Nietzsche suggests that, “[t]he problem for him is to 
imagine people who seek to create a good opinion of themselves which they do not have 
of themselves - and thus also do not ‘deserve’ - and who nevertheless end up believing this 
good opinion themselves” (BGE 261). And yet, as mentioned above, Nietzsche clearly 
thinks that the noble instinct will be effectively displaced or re-directed by the slave instinct 
under democratic conditions. Therefore, Nietzsche has identified two irreconcilable 
perspectives and expressions of life and we need to be able to understand how the reactive 
force of the slave enjoys hegemony over the active force of the noble without bringing 
about either a complete dissolution of the latter type’s force or some kind of Hegelian 
recognition of equality between the two.
According to Gilles Deleuze an equilibrium of forces is never possible since Nietzsche’s 
typology is conceived in terms of the qualitative difference between types. On Deleuze’s 
interpretation reactive force does not come to enjoy hegemonic reign over active force in 
simple quantitative terms but, rather, achieves dominance by denying the qualitative 
difference of active force and thereby, in operating to effect a displacement of active force, 
renders such force effectively reactive or, as Deleuze puts it, “becoming-reactive” ,26 In the 
context of Nietzsche’s observations on the emerging democratic conditions he witnesses, it 
seems that active force is effectively separated from the affirmation of its difference by the 
continued subjection of the individual’s self-opinion to the opinion of others. One’s 
dependence on the opinion of others should not be taken to mean the prostration of one’s 
opinion before the whim of another but something akin to the original outward and
26lbid, p. 64.
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negative gaze of the slave type. One’s virtues are developed in accordance with their 
usefulness to the preservation of the reactive community and, indeed, there is an Hegelian- 
like process of recognition that obtains as the hierarchy of reactive force over active force 
plays itself out. In this way, the forces of slave vanity bring about a recognition of 
universal equality that does not translate as a recognition of equality at the ontological 
level. There is no contradiction that needs to be worked out dialectically nor does this 
hierarchy reflect the historically achieved leveling of active force to that of reactive force. 
As Fredrick Appel puts it:
All too often, superior types have been led away from their instincts into beliefs and practices that 
are objectively bad for them. Having been raised in modem herd society and inculcated in its 
erroneous post-Christian democratic values, superior men no longer experience and revel in their 
authentic corporeal instincts. Their rational part - “spirit” [Geist] - claims Zarathustra, often 
“tells lies about the soul” (Z, O f the Spirit o f Gravity, 2 ).27
Thus, the utilitarian values of the community are merely symptomatic of reactive hierarchy.
Along these lines Nietzsche explains how the praise of one’s virtues comes to depend on 
whether or not the consequences of such virtues are good for “us” rather than whether 
they are good for the individual who performs them. It often matters very little to “us” 
whether or not an individual displays extreme behaviour in exercising his virtues, even to 
the point of personal harm, so long as his actions are useful to society. Thus, Nietzsche 
observes that “the praise of virtues has always been far from ‘selfless,’ far from 
‘unegoistic’”(GS 21). Nietzsche traces the evolution of the morality of utility and explains 
how, despite superficial changes, it continues to represent a morality motivated by fear. He 
claims that “strong and dangerous drives” which may once have been encouraged because 
they helped to protect a community from its external enemies come to be “branded as 
immoral and abandoned to slander” once they are no longer effective in that capacity 
(BGE 201). Since, on Nietzsche’s view, the so-called herd instinct, under democratic
27Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche contra Democracy, p. 38.
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conditions, is expressed as the doctrine of human equality, he concludes that “[h]ow much 
or how little is dangerous to the community, dangerous to equality, in an opinion, in a 
state or affect, in a will, in a talent - that now constitutes the moral perspective” (BGE 
201).
Nietzsche’s argument, if I may reason out a conclusion from Deleuze’s rendering o f it, is 
that the advent of democratic conditions does not bring about the eradication of the noble 
instinct but merely its increasing displacement. Therefore, active force or the noble instinct 
to “ascribe value to oneself on one’s own” always exists as a potential force under the 
right circumstances. In conclusion, the doctrine of human equality as the hegemonic 
feeling  underlying the democratic order of things neither translates for Nietzsche as the 
equilibrium of active and reactive forces nor as the simple disintegration of active force 
but, rather, as the pathos of reactive hierarchy.
Having established the nature of Nietzsche’s ontological claims it is important to see 
how they follow from the emerging epistemological realizations of his mature books. The 
crucial link between Nietzsche’s ontology and his epistemology is the meaning of what 
may be referred to as “falsification”. Slave vanity, for Nietzsche, represents a “false” self­
opinion and although we know that this has to do with his claims about will to power and 
ressentiment we need to be able to identify how he arrives at this judgment in cognitive 
terms. In other words, we need to know what Nietzsche considers to be “true” in order to 
fully understand what he means by describing something as “false”.
epistemology and ontology
In Twilight o f the Idols Nietzsche documents “How the ‘Real World’ at last Became a 
Myth” (TIIV). What he outlines in this section is the evolution of what may be referred to 
variously as metaphysical realism, the correspondence theory of truth, or the two world
theory. Therefore, in this section I want to introduce Nietzsche’s changing attitude toward 
truth and how his eventual overcoming of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth 
legitimizes his ontological claims.
Maudemarie Clark defines metaphysical realism as “the doctrine that reality is 
something-in-itself, that its nature is determinately constituted independently of us.”28 
Nietzsche documents the first comprehensive appearance of metaphysical realism 
according to Plato’s doctrine of the Forms wherein reality is “attainable to the wise, the 
pious, the virtuous man - he dwells in it, he is it (Oldest form of the idea, relatively 
sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.’)” (TI 
IV). In this passage, for Nietzsche, the doctrine of metaphysical realism is linked to Plato’s 
very own self-afFirming ideal. In other words, the doctrine of metaphysical realism is 
understood, by Nietzsche, to represent Plato’s will to power. And in this way we see how 
Nietzsche’s ontological claims are associated with his attitude toward truth in an important 
way.
However, what needs to be revealed is how Nietzsche arrived at this position and what 
he ends up claiming with respect to “reality” if, as it appears in Twilight o f the Idols, he 
ends up simply characterizing the doctrine of metaphysical realism itself in terms of his 
own ontological claims. What needs to be traced, therefore, is the development of 
Nietzsche’s changing approach to truth. Yet I do not have the space in this thesis to offer a 
comprehensive account of Nietzsche’s epistemological development. Therefore, I will 
summarize the position that best supports my thesis by referring to Maudemarie Clark’s 
presentation of the key stages of Nietzsche’s formulations with respect to metaphysical 
realism and metaphysical correspondence.
28Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 40-41.
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Clark describes Nietzsche’s stages of scepticism in the following way:
Nietzsche agrees with Kant that we cannot know things-in-themselves, and thus that, contrary to 
Descartes, the truth we are capable of discovering does not satisfy the metaphysical 
correspondence theory. Nietzsche is anti-Kantian, however, in that he denies the very 
conceivability of the thing-in-itself.29
According to Clark’s two stage summary, Nietzsche struggles to work through his
scepticism before he finds a way to get past the metaphysical correspondence theory of
truth altogether. Clark goes on to explain how the first stage establishes a form of
scepticism that allows Nietzsche to overcome the immature metaphysics of his first book
The Birth o f Tragedy. Yet during his early and middle periods, up to and including The
Gay Science, Nietzsche fails to progress to the second, “anti-Kantian”, stage which would
allow him to move beyond foundationalism and representationalism altogether. In other
words, Nietzsche cannot affirm the truth of the will to power until he finds a way of
making it a truth claim that is not simply neo-Kantian. What it means to remain neo-
Kantian is to remain within the conceptual framework of correspondence and
representation by denying knowledge of objective reality but philosophizing as though
there were such a reality.
But Clark claims, with respect to the first stage of his development, that “Nietzsche
needed the Kantian belief in the conceivability of transcendent truth to have a basis for
devaluing human truths as illusions.”30 Nietzsche would later document this Kantian stage
in the following way:
The real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought 
of a consolation, a duty, an imperative. (Fundamentally the same old sun, but shining through 
mist and scepticism; the idea grown sublime, pale, northerly, Konigsbergian). (TI IV)
Therefore, at an early stage, Nietzsche launches his critique of metaphysical realism




corresponds to something-in-itself determinately constituted independently of us. And in 
this way his own thought remains circumscribed within a limited foundational/anti- 
foundational framework until his mature period, beginning with Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Nietzsche’s struggle to reach this second, anti-Kantian, stage really takes off where he 
begins to question the nature of consciousness (GS 3 54).31 What he establishes in his 
formulations about human consciousness is the idea that consciousness falsifies the 
“knowledge” of the senses and in this way he links “reality” to the sensual, physical world 
that is known as the world of appearances according to metaphysical correspondence. As 
Clark puts it:
When Nietzsche then concludes that consciousness involves corruption and “falsification,” the 
most natural interpretation is that consciousness falsifies precisely sense impressions, which can 
enter consciousness only in communicable, or “logicized” (universal), and therefore falsified, 
form.32
Now this would appear to commit Nietzsche to an empirical theory of knowledge 
grounded in human physiology and it also might appear to take him a step beyond the 
Kantian position since it allows him to deny the so-called “real” world and yet insist on 
“the illusory character of the empirical world.”33 
At this stage, however, Nietzsche is still not free of a foundational/anti-foundational 
framework of thought because he has yet to escape the problem of causality with respect 
to the sense organs that must now be thought of as the fixed objects of “being” or 
“reality”, the “first cause”, that is falsified by human consciousness. Clark states that 
Nietzsche admits this problem in the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil where 
he writes:
31I discuss the development of Nietzsche’s thoughts on “illusion” and “consciousness” at greater 
length in chapters 5 and 6.
32Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, pp. 120-121.
33Ibid, pp. 122-123.
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What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, 
as part of this external world would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves 
would be - the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum, 
assuming that the concept of a causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the 
external world is not the work of our organs - ? (BGE 15)
What his remarks reveal is that an empirical theory of knowledge per se does not
overcome the problem of the two world theory by simply uniting an “external” world with
an “internal” world that is also “external”. The problem is a conceptual one that makes it
difficult for us to make sense of something that is its own first cause. Therefore, the task
Nietzsche still faces is how to overcome representationalism.34
Clark explains that Nietzsche does this where he posits the claim that all knowledge is 
perspectival (GM III, 12). Thus, she interprets “perspectivism” as Nietzsche’s way of 
getting beyond the “falsification thesis”.35 The falsification thesis assumes that Nietzsche’s 
claims about consciousness falsifying the knowledge of the senses commit him to the 
metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. Since I do not have the space to reproduce 
her full explanation of how perspectivism saves Nietzsche from metaphysical realism, I will 
summarize her interpretation as succinctly as possible.
Against many other attempts to explain perspectivism as a substantive epistemological 
claim that is central to Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole, Clark simply asserts that it is “a 
rhetorical device designed to help us overcome the devaluation of human knowledge 
involved in the falsification thesis.”36 On this view the key element of perspectivism, for 
Nietzsche, is that it helps him escape the problem of self-reference with respect to his will 
to power hypothesis. Indeed, without some way of characterizing his will to power 





realism his ontology flounders somewhere between these two unacceptable poles.
Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” is presented as follows:
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual 
fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject”; let us guard against the 
snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in 
itself’: these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye 
turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone 
seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an 
absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and 
the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to 
observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But 
to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of 
this - what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? (GM III, 12)
Clark sees the first part of this passage as Nietzsche’s attempt to describe metaphysical
realism in terms of an inconceivable, non-perspectival perspective. Thus, the “pure, will-
less, painless, timeless knowing subject”, “pure reason”, “absolute spirituality”, and
“knowledge-in-itself ’ are all expressions of a non-perspectival metaphysical realism.37
In the next part of the passage Nietzsche describes knowledge as perspectival rather than 
non-perspectival and uses the metaphor of “seeing” from an embodied perspective as a 
way of arguing against the absurdity of a non-perspectival position with respect to 
knowing. And this allows him to separate human knowledge from the logic of the 
falsification thesis which claims that the truth must correspond to a thing-in-itself 
determinately constituted independently of us. Clark interprets this in the following way:
Nietzsche uses the metaphor of perspective to encourage us to draw the parallel conclusion about 
knowledge, namely, that its “subjective” character (the fact that how things are interpreted always 
reflects something about the constitution, beliefs, and/or interests of the interpreter) places no 
limit on what we can know. Since things have no “objective” character - no intelligible character 
that is independent of how they can appear - the perspectival or “subjective” character of 
knowledge cannot deprive us of anything we could reasonably want or for which we could have 
any cognitive use.38
What the metaphor of perspective overcomes is the Kantian stage wherein objective 




must be understood according to the falsification thesis. By denying the very idea of 
something-in-itself, therefore, perspectivism appears to overcome the falsification thesis by 
seeing “reality” as something constituted by us. However, this does not save Nietzsche 
from the charge that perspectivism may be reduced to a relativist theory of subjective 
idealism.
At this point, Clark claims that Nietzsche gets past the charge of subjective idealism by 
claiming that there is a certain “objectivity” to perspectivism as an epistemological position 
because perspectivism involves seeing things from various perspectives to a certain extent. 
Clark offers an excellent account of Nietzsche’s manoeuvring here where she writes:
If we recognize the perspectival character of knowledge, our only alternative is to think of 
objectivity as an openness to perspectives other than our own. Such openness need not imply that 
one’s own perspective distorts matters. It might distort, of course, and being “objective” involves 
admitting that, thereby considering seriously the possibility that some other perspective is 
superior to one’s own ... We can thus take Nietzsche’s praise of seeing things from other 
perspectives as a claim that objectivity requires the ability to take seriously other perspectives 
without committing him to characterizing truth as omniperspectival or to accepting the 
falsification thesis. 9
From these observations, Clark concludes that:
[T]he perspectival character of knowing is perfectly compatible with some interpretations being 
true, and it introduces no paradoxes of self-reference. Perspectivism is, of course, a perspectival 
truth, but this does not imply that any competing claim is also true.40
What this means with respect to the truth status of Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis is
that he is free to posit it in terms of a claim he believes to be superior to other ontological
claims but it represents neither a purely self-referential truth claim nor a truth claim that is
the product of the falsification thesis. This is made possible according to the truth of
“perspectivism” as a cognitively superior position to the falsification thesis because the




Importantly, many commentators try to integrate perspectivism into Nietzsche’s 
ontology in misleading ways. Clark states that:
Some radical interpreters insist that the reason to accept Nietzsche’s perspective is not cognitive 
superiority - its greater truth - but its superiority in serving a noncognitive end, for example, that 
it is more life-affirming or that it reflects the active rather than the reactive position (Deleuze).41
Unlike these commentators, Clark makes no effort to interpret perspectivism according to
Nietzsche’s ontological claims first and foremost. Instead, she sees it as a rhetorical device
that helps Nietzsche buoy himself above the turbulent waters of self-reference and
metaphysical realism. Perspectivism does not, in other words, follow from Nietzsche’s
ontology but, instead, it is a rhetorical move Nietzsche makes in order to make room, so to
speak, for his ontological claims.
What this means with respect to my concerns is that I see Nietzsche’s ontological
hypothesis in terms of a claim that follows from his superior cognitive position of
perspectivism. On this view, I claim that in Twilight o f the Idols, where he lists the final
stages of overcoming the falsification thesis, his conclusion represents his position that the
will to power hypothesis, as it is represented in the meaning of the figure Zarathustra in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, exists as an ontological claim made possible by perspectivism.
The device of perspectivism overcomes the falsification thesis on the basis of its cognitive
superiority to the falsification thesis which supports the two world theory:
We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? ... But no! with 
the real world we have also abolished the apparent world! (Mid-day; moment of the shortest 
shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) (TI IV)
Once it has been established that Nietzsche sees his position as cognitively superior to the
falsification thesis it is possible to present his claims about what is “false” and what is
“true” straightforwardly, according to his ontology, and without further comment on what
Nietzsche means by such terms.
41Ibid, p. 151.
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Returning, therefore, to Nietzsche’s characterization of slave vanity as a “false” self­
opinion, it is possible to say that the slave will to power “falsifies” simply because it 
operates according to the falsification thesis that insists on the absurd notion of a non- 
perspectival perspective. What Nietzsche establishes, therefore, is the validity of describing 
the slave will to truth, which is a product of the metaphysical correspondence theory, as a 
will to falsification. This framework of truth is only then described as “life-denying” as 
well but, importantly, it is not deemed “false” in the first place because it is life-denying.
Jacob Golomb captures the nature of Nietzsche’s emerging philosophical attitude in the 
following analogy comparing the will to power to Husserl’s phenomenological approach:
Whereas Husserl, by means of his phenomenological analysis, strives to attain the scientific ideal 
of the apodictic and “pure” consciousness, Nietzsche regards his philosophical enterprise as an 
activity, which is not directed toward any scientific ideal. The scientific ideal, according to 
Nietzsche, is just another, and redundant “shadow” of the dead God. Philosophy, in Nietzsche’s 
opinion, must assist us in attaining a specific pattern of life by exposing our personal power and 
helping us in overcoming its obstacles. Nietzsche's ideal is not rational but existential. He does 
not wish to achieve “pure knowledge”, he does not believe there is such a thing, but to attain a 
way of life and a special moral pathos which I have called the pathos of positive power.42
What Golomb makes clear in this comparison is that, unlike Husserl, Nietzsche abandons a
link to foundationalism altogether. Further, Golomb’s “pathos of positive power”
corresponds to the active pathos outlined above. What is interesting to consider therefore,
given the pathos of active or positive power, is whether or not the existential framework of
truth-seeking Nietzsche appears to develop translates for him as a new conception of
“active” or “positive” philosophical autonomy. It is my claim that this is in fact what
Nietzsche tries to piece together where he envisions his famous Ubermensch ideal.43
Therefore, having introduced Nietzsche’s ontological framework according to his mature 
epistemological position, I now turn to a four part presentation of various Nietzschean 
ideas that lead to his conception of the Ubermensch, or “sovereign individual”, as a future
42Jacob Golomb, “Nietzsche’s Phenomenology of Power” Nietzsche-Studien 15 (1986): 298.
43I discuss Nietzsche’s ideal at greater length in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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type capable of a new philosophical autonomy. Following these middle sections of the 
chapter I conclude with a brief look at two democratic characterizations of Nietzsche’s 
thought and a summary of my main claims about developing a new anti-democratic 
framework of the political in Nietzsche.
Hobbes, egoism, and ressentiment 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche illustrates the difference between active and reactive 
pathos where he considers the nature of our virtues and how they come to be formed. As 
introduced above, he is sceptical of the supposed unegoistic nature of praise. He goes on 
to remark that:
[F]or educational purposes and to lead men to incorporate virtuous habits one emphasizes effects 
of virtue that make it appear as if virtue and private advantage were sisters; and some such 
relationship actually exists ... That is how education always proceeds: one tries to condition an 
individual by various attractions and advantages to adopt a way of thinking and behaving that, 
once it has become a habit, instinct, and passion* will dominate him to his own ultimate 
disadvantage but “for the general good.” (GS 21)
In this passage Nietzsche may be interpreted as describing the psychology of the reactive
recognition of universal equality. Where he identifies the habituation of passion or instinct
under the morality of utility he distinguishes “the unreason in virtue that leads the
individual to allow himself to be transformed into a mere function of the whole”(GS 21; Z,
O f Joys and Passions). As a function of the whole the individual succumbs to a levelling
equality.
Alternatively, in his criticism of slave vanity Nietzsche points to a different type of 
selfishness or rather a selfishness that is not to be associated with the simple praise of 
utilitarian values. Thus, in The Gay Science, he points to a critique which directs us toward 
the liberation of an active selfishness or “egoism” from the reactive pathos. Nietzsche 
suggests that “[t]he praise of virtue is the praise of something that is privately harmful- the 
praise of instincts that deprive a human being of his noblest selfishness and the strength for
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the highest autonom y”(GS 21). This “highest autonomy” is associated with active 
hierarchy and thus may be described as a new conception of active or positive autonomy.
In an effort to make better sense of Nietzschean autonomy it may help to compare 
Nietzsche’s critique of slave egoism alongside Hobbes’s attempt to ground egoism in the 
Sovereign Will.44 Hobbes’s argument directs the movement of atomized and purely self- 
interested individuals into a commonwealth. This position is somewhat related to 
Nietzsche’s insight that our virtues are symptomatic of the morality of utility (i.e. “the 
unreason in virtue that leads the individual to allow himself to be transformed into a mere 
function of the whole” GS 21, my emphasis). However, a crucial difference between 
Hobbes and Nietzsche is that the former seeks to identify the reason leading to community 
where the latter identifies the unreason leading to community. Hobbes is close to 
Nietzsche where they both maintain a disbelief in the possibility of unegoistic motivations 
but they have significantly different conceptions of egoism.
Hobbes’s argument issues from an extreme egoism he attributes to his contractual 
subjects. Such egoism may be considered extreme due to the radically atomized character 
of the individual in the state of nature. Such individuals are expected to agree to the 
conditions of the Hobbesian social contract from an extremely asocial position. However, 
despite the asocial nature of relations, egoism in Hobbes is a universal condition.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, understands “slave” egoism as having something to do with 
a particular community, within a larger community, from its archetypal beginning. In other 
words, for example, where Hobbes posits fear of violent death as an egoistic motivation in 
the state of nature Nietzsche posits the same motivation as a shared fear or a fear first felt 
in association with others as a community of “slaves”. On Nietzsche’s view this motivation 
is expressed no less egoistically than it is on Hobbes’s view since it may be easily
44Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 227.
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categorized in terms of the simple desire for the preservation of life. Yet the difference, in 
Nietzsche’s model, is that the slave type has at all times associated self-preservation with 
the preservation of the reactive community. In this way, the ressentiment of the reactive 
community is a communal egoism first felt within a larger community which included a 
noble caste that knew a qualitatively different form of egoism. Thus, where Nietzsche 
considers the nature of slave morality in its modem political form he is concerned with the 
nature of liberal institutions in terms of the effect that the so-called “doctrine of human 
equality”, as an expression of slave egoism or ressentiment, will have on the noble instinct 
for a courageous and independent egoism.
ressentiment as falsification
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche devotes a chapter to those he names “the 
tarantulas”. The tarantulas, or “preachers of equality”, are the inheritors of ressentiment 
and their primary motivation is revenge against all who are strong and powerful. 
Nietzsche’s tarantulas cry “‘will to equality’ - that itself shall henceforth be the name of 
virtue; and we shall raise outcry against everything that has power!” (Z, O f the 
Tarantulas) What Nietzsche suggests is that the “will to equality” as a virtue is merely an 
instmment in the service of slave ressentiment. Equality, as an ideal value, is always 
deployed as a way of increasing the feeling of power on the part of the reactive type over 
the active type. Given this understanding of things it would be fair to say that the noble 
instinct represents a force that strives for an increase in its feeling of power without having 
to rely on the moral ideal of universal equality. However, the noble instinct in no way 
represents any less of an attempt to enhance the feeling of power over others (i.e. over the 
weak). Power, in Nietzsche, is always exploitative.45 The pivotal aspects of power as
45I discuss this at the end of chapter 6.
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exploitation in the changing manifestations of the will to power are the conditions which 
lead to either an active or reactive hierarchy. The hierarchy of reactive force over active 
force results in the “becoming-reactive” of active force and this is a hierarchy of relations 
of power that is given expression in the egalitarian ideals and principles of modem 
democratic society. In an opposite but related way the hierarchy of active force over 
reactive force would be given expression in the form of a hierarchy of relations separating 
out and dividing members of society along concrete anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic 
lines.
For Nietzsche it seems that active hierarchy is a more honest expression of hierarchy 
because in the active expression of will to power the noble type does not need to falsify his 
view of the “object” (i.e. the slave type) before him in expressing his strength and value 
judgments. In other words a mode of falsification is particular to the reactive instinct (cf 
GM II, 11). Therefore, what Nietzsche has to say about autonomy is comparable to what 
he has to say about equality where liberal institutions bring about “the leveling of mountain 
and valley exalted to a moral principle” (TI IX, 38). His argument is that freedom is not 
ultimately the goal but rather the moral means to the goal which is the enhancement of the 
reactive feeling of power.
“honesty” and the movement of Nietzsche’s thought
The opposite of falsification is the instinct for honesty (Redlichkeit) and honesty is an 
important trait for Nietzsche (D preface, 4; Z, O f the Higher Man, 8; WP 404). But it is 
important to emphasize that Nietzsche never associates “honesty” with “perspectivism”. 
Therefore, honesty must be seen as an approach or attitude that follows from Nietzsche’s 
ontology rather than something that makes his ontology “valid” in the first place.
Nietzsche discredits the notion of universal freedom or autonomy just as he discredits
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the notion of universal equality and he does so for virtually the same reasons. The 
qualitative difference between the expression of noble instinct and slave instinct precludes 
the possibility that there may be some universal notion or expression of autonomy. The 
ideal of universal autonomy is, like the ideal of universal human equality, a symptom of the 
reactive pathos. Moreover, the mode of falsification typical of the reactive type, with 
respect to the ideal of human equality, is just as applicable to the ideal of universal 
autonomy and therefore Nietzsche sees a certain honesty in the active instinct to freedom 
that he does not see in the reactive attitude. Thus, honesty is associated with the active 
pathos and this includes an honest attitude toward one’s self-opinion, as implicated in the 
discussion of vanity above, as much as it includes an honest approach to one’s true 
motives for positing value judgments. The idea is that for Nietzsche value-positing is an 
expression of the will to power and the active type is able to be honest about such a truth 
whereas the reactive type continues to rely on “falsifications” like the doctrines of 
universal freedom and equality.
The issue of honesty is central to Nietzsche’s concerns and it may be helpful to make 
better sense of the difference between reactive falsification and active honesty. What we 
know is that the highest autonomy is something Nietzsche projects into the future and it 
appears to constitute a new set of relations of force insofar as the reactive influence in 
world history, to create the self-conscious moral subject, will be linked to an active instinct 
to express one’s affirmation of life in an extra-moral fashion. Thus, Nietzsche imagines a 
process of self-creation in the context of an unrealized but anticipated extra-moral period 
of mankind (BGE 32; D 9, 18; GMII, 16). He describes this process of self-creation as the 
process of “how one becomes what one is” (GS 370; EH II, 9). In Ecce Homo Nietzsche 
refers to the art of how one becomes what one is as the art of “selfishness” (EH II, 9).
This re-introduces what has been hinted at earlier in The Gay Science where he mentions
the idea of a “noblest selfishness”(GS 21). It seems that the will to self-responsibility which 
is representative of the highest autonomy involves a noble selfishness insofar as a will to 
honesty is exercised over and against the moral falsifications of the reactive community.
On Nietzsche’s view moral and religious “errors” are affirmed to create the illusion 
either that man does not suffer or that suffering has a higher, i.e. divine, meaning (GM III, 
28). It is this approach to suffering that Nietzsche calls life-denying and nihilistic. The 
modem will to alleviate human suffering, and thus “improve” mankind, Nietzsche 
considers life-denying insofar as it represents the reactive instinct to falsify existence in an 
effort to increase the feeling of power of the reactive community.
The reactive pathos is heightened at the expense of the active instinct to affirm life and 
human suffering. Thus, Nietzsche rails against the ascetic priest and theologian. He sees 
the ascetic priest as one of the great falsifying figures in European history and the one 
whose perspective denies and seeks to destroy all other perspectives:
Whoever has theologian blood in his veins has a wrong and dishonest attitude towards all things 
from the very first. The pathos that develops out of this is called faith: closing one’s eyes with 
respect to oneself for good and all so as not to suffer from the sight of incurable falsity. Out of this 
erroneous perspective on all things one makes a morality, a virtue, a holiness for oneself, one that 
unites the good conscience with seeing falsely - one demands that no other kind of perspective 
shall be accorded any value after one has rendered one’s own sacrosanct with the names ‘God’, 
‘redemption’, ‘eternity’. I have dug out the theologian instinct everywhere: it is the most 
widespread, peculiarly subterranean form of falsity that exists on earth. (AC 9)
Elsewhere, Nietzsche describes this will to falsification as “the will to ignorance, to the
uncertain, to the untrue” (BGE 24). In The Gay Science Nietzsche declares that “the great
majority of people lack an intellectual conscience” (GS 2). By this he means that they do
not “consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly, without first
having given themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con, and
without even troubling themselves about such reasons afterwards” (GS 2).
At this point Nietzsche separates himself out from the great majority of people on the 
basis of his own so-called intellectual conscience which he describes as a “desire for
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certainty” (GS 2). He concludes his observations by declaring that the desire for certainty 
“separates the higher human beings from the lower” (GS 2). Thus, Nietzsche invokes the 
idea of hierarchy with respect to a will to honesty differentiating types of individuals.
Later, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes the will to honesty as a quality of the 
strong as opposed to the weak and something which distinguishes a philosopher from both 
“the people” and the people’s scholars:
Perhaps hardness and cunning furnish more favorable conditions for the origin of the strong, 
independent spirit and philosopher than that gentle, fine, conciliatory good-naturedness and art of 
taking things lightly which people prize, and prize rightly, in a scholar. Assuming first of all that 
the concept “philosopher” is not restricted to the philosopher who writes books - or makes books 
of his philosophy. (BG E 39)
This marks a change in Nietzsche’s attitude from an earlier incredulity at the willful
ignorance of the many to a later classification of honesty and ignorance in terms of a
corresponding judgement of honesty as courage and ignorance as cowardice. Even later, in
Ecce Homo, Nietzsche states that:
How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare! More and more that became 
for me the real measure of value. Error (faith in the ideal) is not blindness, error is cowardice. 
(EH, preface, 3; cf. WP 1041)
This movement from the early Nietzsche who questions the innocence of truth to the later 
Nietzsche who explicitly proclaims a hierarchy of truth-seeking reflects the movement 
from an early contemplative attitude toward the nature of extra-moral truth-seeking to a 
later strategy for actually producing the type of truth-seeker who might exercise extra­
moral autonomy. In this process The Gay Science represents a midpoint between periods 
and I discuss this evolution at greater length in chapters five and six.
In the earlier work Daybreak Nietzsche has yet to fully introduce the language of 
hierarchy within a consideration of the extra-moral conscience. In Daybreak Nietzsche 
simply refers to those “men of conscience” who do not wish to return to that which is 
outlived, namely, the moral framework of values. At this point he calls for a self­
sublimation of morality and associates this with a life of experimentation in which the
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actual truth-seeker, or philosophical type, becomes the experiment himself (D, preface, 4; 
cf. D 453). But it is not until much later in Beyond Good and Evil that we find the 
philosophical type consistently embedded in hierarchical comparisons. At this later stage 
the philosophical type is repeatedly distinguished in contrast to a lower type of man:
What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison for a 
very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man might perhaps signify vices and 
weaknesses in a philosopher. (BGE 30)
Therefore, what emerges in the later period is the direct association of a will to truth with
will to power.
The difference between the early Nietzsche and the later one is that the early Nietzsche is 
experimenting with inherited philosophical and moral prejudices and working to undermine 
their capacity to maintain a hold on his, and our, imagination whereas the later Nietzsche is 
developing an ontological hypothesis that will support and help bring about the kind of 
philosophical mode of existence or philosophical autonomy that would represent the self­
overcoming of man into a higher species of truth-seeker. Hence, the early Nietzsche 
employs no obvious hierarchical framework but the philosophical adventurer of this 
period, the “free spirit”, becomes the “active” philosopher of the future in Beyond Good 
and Evil. It is in Beyond Good and Evil that Nietzsche separates genuine philosophers 
from mere philosophical labourers and he does so in terms of the will to power:
Those philosophical laborers after the model of Kant and Hegel have to determine and press into 
formulas, whether in the realm of logic or political (moral) thought or art, some great data of 
valuations - that is, former positings of values, creations of value which have become dominant 
and are for a time called “truths”. It is for these investigators to make everything that has 
happened and been esteemed so far easy to look over, easy to think over, intelligible and 
manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time,” and to overcome the entire past - an 
enormous and wonderful task in whose service every subtle pride, every tough will can certainly 
find satisfaction. Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say,
“thus it shall be/” They first determine the Whither and For What of man, and in so doing have 
at their disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical laborers, all who have overcome the 
past. With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been becomes a means 
for them, an instrument, a hammer. Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a legislation, 
their will to truth is - will to power. (BG E 211)
In this passage Nietzsche explicitly links the moral to the political and implicitly links the
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extra-moral to active hierarchy and the life of philosophy as a legislating or commanding
mode of existence. More importantly, it is in this passage that Nietzsche describes reactive
philosophy as a process of justifying and rationalizing established moral values. With
respect to democratic conditions and philosophy, Nietzsche describes the philosophical
labourers of the day as “eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste
and its ‘modem ideas”’(BGE 44). He goes on to claim that:
What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness 
of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone; the two songs 
and doctrines which they repeat most often are “equality of rights” and “sympathy for all that 
suffers” - and suffering itself they take for something that must be abolished. (BGE 44 )
Thus, Nietzsche clearly associates a reactive will to truth and reactive philosophical mode
with a reactive pathos and he attempts to introduce an active will to tmth and an active
philosophical mode within the future context of a re-configured active pathos and
hierarchy. This active will to truth constitutes a new conception of philosophical autonomy
and it may help to illustrate Nietzsche’s specific formulations of this conception.
philosophical autonomy and the sovereign individual
In On the Genealogy o f Morals Nietzsche describes the extra-moral actor as a 
“sovereign individual”: “like only to himself, liberated again from morality of custom, 
autonomous and supramoral (for ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive), in 
short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the right to make 
promises” (GMII, 2). On my reading of Nietzsche’s conception of the highest autonomy 
the so-called “right to make promises” means that the extra-moral subject is distinguished 
apart from the reactive community by virtue of his ability to see his own unique actions 
and judgments as a radically individual aesthetic of existence. As a self-conscious extra­
moral individual he has, so to speak, the “selfishness” to make promises to himself in a 
unique existential sense because he is driven by an active will to power that operates so as
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to affirm suffering and the contingencies of life without experiencing or giving in to 
ressentiment. In this way, a will to self-responsibility is invoked and enacted but it is 
particular to a future-based active pathos. In other words, it is not the kind of forced 
responsibility that obtains under the rule of law or in the social contract as we understand 
these concepts. Indeed, this will to self-responsibility or the right to make promises is a 
self-mastery that as Nietzsche puts it, “gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, 
and over all short-willed and unreliable creatures” (GMII, 2). Nietzsche does not mean 
direct control over circumstances and nature but rather a will to affirmation in the face of 
life’s contingencies, the effects of one’s actions, and the effects of others’ actions that one 
might suffer from. Thus, the sovereign individual does not, in a sense, need the law and the 
social contract the way the reactive type does since his will to self-responsibility accepts 
and affirms the burden of suffering and demands that he renounce ressentiment toward life 
and others as a result. This places the sovereign individual in an extra-moral realm above 
the common morality of present-day democratic values and it means that he is “self- 
legislating”.46
What is clear in this active hierarchy is that the moral and extra-moral are being ordered 
according to rank:
None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences (who undertake to advocate 
the cause of egoism as the cause of the general welfare) wants to know or even sense that “the 
general welfare” is no ideal, no goal, no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic - that 
what is fair for one cannot by any means for that reason alone also be fair for others; that the 
demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men; in short, that there is an order 
of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality. (BGE 2 2 8 )
What is also evident, however, is that the sovereign individual is conscious of his extra­
moral perspective and this is something that the original noble type does not experience. In 
other words, Nietzsche has re-introduced a noble or aristocratic framework of castes, so 
to speak, where he ranks moralities according to the active pathos but the highest
46I explore this difficult idea at greater length in chapters 4, 5, and 7.
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autonomy is a philosophical autonomy based on an extra-moral self-consciousness that is 
future-based as opposed to something originally present in the master morality. What this 
means is that the particular self-consciousness of extra-moral autonomy is the potential 
product of the historical process of internalization or “bad conscience” as he describes it in 
On the Genealogy or Morals (GMII). Overcoming the bad conscience, yet maintaining a 
reflective nature, is a kind of “evolutionary” possibility for Nietzsche given the right 
cultural conditions for a re-configured hierarchy.
Therefore, it is important to point out that Nietzsche re-thinks the idea of conscience and 
self-consciousness with respect to a noble instinct at the level of extra-moral philosophical 
autonomy. As just mentioned, this represents an overcoming of the bad conscience which 
the slave revolt in morality originally introduced. Thus, what Nietzsche imagines, is the 
overcoming of a “reactive” conscience and the production of an “active” conscience by 
way of a revaluation of values. Where the reactive pathos created guilt and the bad 
conscience as the vehicle for their spiritual revenge against the strong, Nietzsche sees this 
conscience as something that has become incorporated into the species over time and he 
envisions its overcoming in terms of an advancement and further transfiguration into an 
extra-moral conscience:
The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this 
rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his [the sovereign individual’s] case 
penetrated to the profoundest depths and becomes instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he 
[the sovereign individual] call this dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a 
name? The answer is beyond doubt: this sovereign man calls it his conscience. (GM II, 2)
With respect to philosophy therefore this extra-moral conscience represents the self-
conscious awareness on the part of the philosophical type that the will to truth operating
within a moral interpretation of the world has exhausted itself for that individual. What is
hopeful for Nietzsche is that a self-consciousness of the will to truth as will to power will
usher in a period in which the philosophical instinct may develop according to a re­
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configured active pathos.
Nietzsche’s politics of active hierarchy provides the setting for the philosopher of the 
future’s adventures across an extra-moral landscape but this political philosophy is skeletal 
insofar as it fails to deliver a fully comprehensible account of how such a vision might 
become a reality. As Peter Berkowitz points out:
Nietzsche’s image of the philosopher of the future is a hypothetical and utopian extension of his 
ideas about knowledge, freedom, and mastery, a verbal formula that identifies the requirements 
and defines the task of the highest type but does little to show that the requirements can be met or 
the task accomplished.47
Indeed, Nietzsche offers no clear plan for rendering his anti-democratic philosophy
practicable. Nevertheless, in identifying the skeletal nature of his political philosophy and
its obvious limitations it is important not to lose sight of the fact that Nietzsche’s
philosophy does have a unique and self-contained political framework that follows from his
radical critique of western religious and philosophical prejudices. Making better sense of
this framework is essential to understanding what may be referred to as Nietzsche’s unified
political philosophy. Therefore, I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of the western
philosophical tradition, including its modern democratic strains, informs an anti-democratic
political philosophy of the self-creating subject of power. Fredrick Appel describes
Nietzsche’s accomplishment in a similar vein:
Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he provides a 
detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather because his sweeping 
denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, and other offshoots of modernity 
leads him to formulate (albeit in a sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically 
aristocratic model of politics that bears serious examination.48
I argue that in order to begin exploring this new way of thinking about Nietzsche’s
relevance to political theory we must consider in more depth the role of philosophy and
hierarchy in his thought. At the same time, re-focussing a discussion of Nietzsche’s
47Berkowitz, Nietzsche: the Ethics o f an Immoralist, p. 258.
48Appel, Nietzsche contra Democracy, p. 15.
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relevance to political theory, according to the framework I have just introduced, requires a 
critique of the so-called “democratic Nietzsche” in order to establish its limitations with 
respect to identifying what is uniquely political in Nietzsche.
democratic interpretations
Mark Warren suggests that Nietzsche’s hypothesis that exploitation is both necessary 
and desirable in society forms what ought to be considered an “ideology”. As an ideology 
he suggests that Nietzsche’s political sentiments ought to be characterized as “neo- 
aristocratic conservatism”.49 Warren hopes to liberate Nietzsche’s philosophy from this 
ideology and reinvent it as postmodern political thought.50 This is evident where Warren 
suggests that Nietzsche’s political ideas “stem primarily from erroneous assumptions about 
the nature and limits of modem institutions, assumptions that impoverished his thinking 
about social structures, caused him to mistake their historical limitations for ontological 
ones.”51 Yet Warren’s approach largely overlooks the pivotal nature of Nietzsche’s 
ontological hypothesis to the rest of his thought. What authors like Warren fail to consider 
is the likelihood that Nietzsche’s so-called ideology both complements and justifies his 
conception of philosophy as active and extra-moral and should not therefore be 
characterized as either extraneous to it or separate from it.
In this way, Warren’s interpretation may be described as misleading where it obscures 
what is uniquely political in Nietzsche. Warren suggests that we all “desire subjectivity, the 
experience of being an effective subject in the world, the experience of transforming what




one was into what one will be.”52 There are two confusing elements in this rendering of 
Nietzschean autonomy. Firstly, Nietzschean autonomy is given a universal application that 
fails to account for how the qualitative difference between active and reactive is to be 
resolved along such lines. And secondly, this description of “how one becomes what one 
is” seems to suggest that individuals may have self-knowledge based on the reflective 
capability to imagine agency in terms of some future capacity, role, or mode of being. 
Warren’s suggestion is that individuals somehow guide their own transformation in terms 
of willing agency in a way that actualizes an imagined or desired mode of subjectivity.
In an attempt to address this second characterization of Warren’s, it is important to 
make better sense of what Nietzsche means where he describes the process of self-creation 
as “becoming what one is”. As mentioned above, the art of becoming what one is is 
described as “selfishness” (EH II, 9). And Nietzsche goes on to make the following 
qualifications:
For let us assume that the task, the destiny, the fate of the task transcends the average very 
significantly: in that case, nothing could be more dangerous than catching sight of oneself with 
this task. To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is. From this 
point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning and value - the occasional side 
roads and wrong roads, the delays, “modesties,” seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from 
the task. All this can express a great prudence, even the supreme prudence: where nosce te ipsum 
(know thyself) would be the recipe for ruin ... [t]he whole surface of consciousness - 
consciousness is a surface - must be kept clear of all great imperatives. Beware even of every 
great word, every great pose! So many dangers that the instinct comes too soon to “understand 
itself’ -. Meanwhile the organizing “idea” that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down - it 
begins to command; slowly it leads us back from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares single 
qualities and fitnesses that will one day prove to be indispensable as means toward a whole - one 
by one, it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, “goal,” 
“aim,” or “meaning.” (EH  II, 9)
In this passage from Ecce Homo Nietzsche’s description seems significantly removed from
Warren’s characterization of effective agency with its sense of what one wants to become.
On Warren’s view a certain idea of autonomy is possible because it is conceivable.
According to Warren’s characterization it would be accurate to say that the idea of
52Ibid, p. 9.
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autonomy in question is grounded in the realm of intentionality and therefore deemed 
possible as a universal measure of autonomy in the sense that it is communicable in theory.
Of course one might object to my criticisms here. It may seem that I have confused 
things in light of what was said above concerning the self-conscious extra-moral individual. 
Indeed, it could be argued that Nietzsche is being self-contradictory where he imagines an 
individual who is aware of his extra-moral autonomy but has no idea of it as a goal in 
terms of becoming what he is. At this point it must be admitted that there is something 
enigmatic about Nietzsche’s vision of extra-moral autonomy or “becoming what one is”.
In later chapters I address the limitations of this enigmatic quality, as well as Nietzsche’s 
rather obscure remarks on the nature of consciousness as a “surface”, but at this point I 
argue simply that it is a question of hierarchy and individuality. Self-conscious extra-moral 
autonomy is something that an active hierarchy may produce and yet the process of self­
creation wherein the extra-moral individual actualizes his strength in the form of 
independent value legislation is something which cannot be reduced to a universally 
communicable notion of autonomy grounded in the objective realm of “intentions”. The 
growth of the individual into “what he is” is a matter of self-overcoming as Nietzsche puts 
it and this unfolds in an opposite way to the Socratic maxim “know thyself’ since for 
Nietzsche “who we are” is ultimately determined by our will as will to power rather than in 
terms of our will as a knowable “first cause” (cf. BGE 16).53 The difference between these 
two conceptions of the will is the difference between a will that is “becoming” versus a will 
that is a fixed “being” (BGE 16-19). Warren’s interpretation, or at least the interpretation 
Warren appears to suggest, is that “what one is” maybe pursued by the fixed “will” as 
“first cause”. However, Nietzsche’s conception of willing does not allow for such a 
framework of autonomy or at least Nietzsche’s framework denigrates this type of
53This is a very important point and I address it more fully in chapter 5.
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conception as a slave conception.
Keith Ansell-Pearson describes Warren’s interpretation of Nietzschean autonomy as “a 
universal need for self-expression and self-determination.”54 In doing so Ansell-Pearson 
appears to recognize the fact that it is problematic to universalize Nietzschean autonomy. 
However, it turns out that Ansell-Pearson is critical of Warren for the way he seeks to 
universalize Nietzschean autonomy. In other words, he criticizes Warren more for failing 
to theorize the rationale for such an ethical community than he criticizes him for 
attempting to universalize Nietzschean autonomy in the first place . Thus, Ansell-Pearson 
worries that Warren’s interpretation might be reduced to a Hobbesian war of all against 
all.
In light of what I have written above on the obvious differences between Nietzsche and 
Hobbes this seems to be a misleading characterization as well. What makes it misleading is 
Ansell-Pearson’s reduction of Nietzsche’s ontological dualism to the pre-political universal 
egoism of the Hobbesian state of nature. The will to power hypothesis, unlike Hobbes’s 
state of nature, is not a pre-political or pre-ethical supposition about man’s original 
condition. As mentioned above, Nietzsche grounds his ontology within a community of 
hierarchically ranked moral psychologies and, therefore, the will to power could never be 
reduced to a war of all against all. The difference between noble and slave, or active and 
reactive force, makes such universality impossible at the ontological level of relations of 
force. Yet reducing the will to power to a Hobbesian model allows one to characterize 
Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis as politically under-determined like Hobbes’s state of 
nature. In other words, the comparison allows Ansell-Pearson to think about Nietzschean 
autonomy along traditional contractarian lines. As Ansell-Pearson puts it himself:
54Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality: the Challenge to Political Theory,” 
Political Studies 39 (1991): 284.
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[T]he fundamental puzzle of political theory is the problem of breeding a political animal, that is, 
a sovereign individual who can make promises and thus be bound by obligations and to social 
contracts on account of its possession of a free will.55
Here Ansell-Pearson removes the reactive type from the scenario altogether and interprets
the sovereign individual’s “right to make promises” as an opportunity to map Nietzschean
autonomy onto a democratic system of equal political rights.
In attempting to theorize this move he transforms the notion of hierarchy or rank-order 
(Rangordnung) from a moral/political order of rank to a purely aesthetic order of rank 
amongst sovereign individuals:
It could be argued that there is no reason why an aristocratic emphasis on aesthetic distinction, on 
the inequality of creative greatness, could not exist within the framework of a democratic 
constitution established on the basis of equal political rights. For Nietzsche it is essentially a 
question of an order of rank, of conceiving society in such a way that the emphasis on formal 
legal equality does not result in a culture where creativity and individuality become stifled.56
In this passage Ansell-Pearson is working within the framework of liberal democratic
autonomy that Nietzsche explicitly rejects. It would be more appropriate to say that for
Nietzsche life-affirming creativity and individuality is inextricably linked to the radical
autonomy of extra-moral value legislation and since formal legal equality is symptomatic of
the influence of the reactive pathos it amounts to the denial of a typological order of rank.
Therefore, the implications of the extra-moral nature of creativity are bracketed out by 
Ansell-Pearson. He attempts this disassociation on the grounds that “extra-moral” does 
not necessarily mean “extra-political” but such a characterization would be truly accurate 
only if Nietzsche’s will to power hypothesis were unambiguously non-political or pre­
political to begin with. In the next chapter I discuss the status of the political in Nietzsche 
at greater length and acknowledge that Ansell-Pearson’s approach is an important 




chapter is that Nietzsche clearly associates democratic values with the reactive pathos and 
such a view, within the framework of Nietzsche’s power ontology, suggests that he has an 
anti-democratic politics which precludes the possibility that his notion of self-creation is 
assimilable within a “social contract” framework of autonomy. Political values are moral 
values for Nietzsche because they are part of the same general framework of values that 
inform the hegemonic pathos of a community. The aesthetic nature of Nietzsche’s vision is 
not simply apolitical and amoral but tied to a uniquely anti-democratic and extra-moral 
framework.57
I argue that it is the idea of being extra-moral that distinguishes self-creation as a 
uniquely Nietzschean project and not simply the affirmation of a plurality of “aesthetic” or 
“social” identities. Nevertheless, Ansell-Pearson suggests that:
The importance of this notion of the subject in terms of the creation of the self is that it shows 
that self-identity is always a social construct determined by relations of difference. It thus opens 
up genuine possibilities for thinking about forms of political community in which otherness can 
be affirmed and difference celebrated.58
Although this reading of Nietzsche has been extremely influential, as a result of the work
of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, I suggest that it is unsustainable as a position
directly attributable to Nietzsche insofar as what is uniquely political in Nietzsche does not
support this approach to “difference”. I take this argument up at greater length in the next
chapter but for my immediate purposes it is enough simply to conclude that on Nietzsche’s
view it is a reactive pathos that attempts to bring about a levelling of active and reactive
“difference”. To argue for the celebration of “difference” under democratic conditions is
not a truly Nietzschean venture because doing so implies a levelling of hierarchy and
Nietzsche wants to promote hierarchy not reduce it or resist it. Ansell-Pearson’s approach
to difference is un-Nietzschean in this crucial sense.
57Cf. Berkowitz, Nietzsche: the Ethics o f an Immoralist, pp. 48-9.
58Ansell-Pearson, “Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality”, pp. 285-6.
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the political
Interpreters that attempt to subvert Nietzsche’s ontology in an effort to appropriate a 
new conception of autonomy for democratic theory consistently run up against the tension 
between what “extra-moral” entails on the one hand and what “autonomy” demands within 
a democratic framework on the other hand. This tension may be best brought out in terms 
of Nietzsche’s opposition to Kant. As Richard White explains:
Kant is the one who attempts to explicate and justify individual autonomy by offering a systematic 
reconstruction of ordinary morality which has autonomy as its basis ... Nietzsche, on the other 
hand, is not simply concerned to explain what autonomy is or to describe its essential features. As 
a “philosopher of the future,” his writing is itself a sustained attempt to provoke and produce the 
autonomy of the individual, and so effect a complete revaluation of values.59
Since political values reflect moral values they constitute “ordinary morality”, or present-
day values, for Nietzsche. This means, with respect to democratic values, that Nietzsche is
attempting a revaluation of all political values as we know them. Moreover, he views such
a revaluation as an aesthetic mode of independent value creation. Nietzsche attributes this
kind of value legislation to the philosopher of the future but he appears to conceive of this
future philosophical type as the product of a re-configured active hierarchy and pathos. I
argue that we should view a shift in the nature of force relations, from a reactive hierarchy
to an active hierarchy, as something that might produce a value legislating subject of
power who may, in turn, be described as a self-creating type living an extra-moral life
beyond the ordinary morality of present-day values. Indeed, this is the way in which I seek
to construct a more integrated political philosophy in Nietzsche.
However, it is important to acknowledge, with respect to Nietzsche’s opposition to 
Kant, that for Nietzsche Kant’s approach to aesthetics is just as symptomatic of a reactive
59Richard White, “Nietzsche contra Kant and the Problem of Autonomy,” International Studies in 
Philosophy XXII vol. 2 (1990): 9.
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pathos as his categorical imperative.60 On my view, for Nietzsche, the aesthetic, the moral, 
and the political, just as in the case of the philosophical, are all symptomatic of either an 
active or reactive pathos. In other words, these categories do not enjoy a status that may 
be bracketed out and separated from the will to power framework. Thus, in The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche mocks Kant’s categorical imperative as an example of reactive 
selfishness:
You admire the categorical imperative within you? This “firmness” of your so-called moral 
judgment? This “unconditional” feeling that “here everyone must judge as I do”? Rather admire 
your selfishness at this point. And the blindness, pettiness, and frugality of your selfishness. For it 
is selfish to experience one’s own judgment as a universal law; and this selfishness is blind, petty, 
and frugal because it betrays that you have not yet discovered yourself nor created for yourself an 
ideal of your own, your very own - for that could never be somebody else’s and much less that of 
all, all!(GS 335)
In the Kantian will to the universality of judgment, Nietzsche pinpoints the reactive instinct 
and against it he affirms the idea of judgment as individual value creation - the 
philosopher’s autonomy.
In a related way he attacks Kant’s aesthetic formula in On the Genealogy o f  Morals:
Kant thought he was honouring art when among the predicates of beauty he emphasized and gave 
prominence to those which establish the honour of knowledge: impersonality and universality. 
This is not the place to inquire whether this was essentially a mistake; all I wish to underline is 
that Kant, like all philosophers, instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem from the point of 
view of the artist (the creator), considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the 
“spectator,” and unconsciously introduced the “spectator” into the concept “beautiful.” It would 
not have been so bad if this “spectator” had at least been sufficiently familiar to the philosophers 
of beauty - namely, as a great personal fact and experience, as an abundance of vivid authentic 
experiences, desires, surprises, and delights in the realm of the beautiful! But I fear that the 
reverse has always been the case; and so they have offered us, from the beginning, definitions in 
which, as in Kant’s famous definition of the beautiful, a lack of any refined first-hand experience 
reposes in the shape of a fat worm of error. “That is beautiful,” said Kant, “which gives us 
pleasure without interest.” Without interest! (GM III, 6)
What is revealed in Nietzsche’s criticisms of Kant’s aesthetic and practical philosophy alike
is the problem of the difference between the active and reactive philosophical mode. Kant,
as a mere philosophical labourer, operates in the service of the many and in the service of
“ordinary morality”. In doing so he fails to launch a total critique of all values and falls
60I explore this at greater length in chapter 7 where it is more relevant to my discussion of Nietzsche 
and Arendt.
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significantly short of attaining the level of commanding that defines the genuine 
philosopher (cf. BGE 9). Kant’s critiques are judged by Nietzsche according to the 
reactive perspective of the philosopher Kant himself. This method of assessment is 
consistent, in its reversal of the non-perspectival approach Kant employed to determine his 
aesthetic and moral formulas, with Nietzsche’s focus on the “personal fact” of the 
philosopher or rather his will to power.
In this way, Nietzsche compares Schopenhauer to Kant and reveals how the Kantian 
version of contemplation without interest is given a slightly different interpretation based 
on Schopenhauer’s own individual “interestedness” (GM III, 6). This ironic and ad  
hominem strategy is deployed to illustrate the point that ascetic (reactive) ideals of art and 
morality are masks the philosopher employs in providing for himself the optimal conditions 
to do philosophy and be a philosopher. Thus, Nietzsche claims that “[ejvery animal - 
therefore la bete philosophe (the philosophical animal), too - instinctively strives for an 
optimum of favourable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its 
maximal feeling of power” (GM III, 7). What Nietzsche laments is the fact that this is 
something the philosopher has yet to become fully conscious of.
Nietzsche’s ad hominem strategy directs attention back to his own ideal and the 
conditions for its enhancement. As Maudemarie Clark puts it:
The cosmological doctrine of the will to power is the kind of construction of the world Nietzsche 
claims philosophers have self-deceptively engaged in. The difference is that Nietzsche knows 
perfectly well it is not the truth and that he gives us the clues we need to figure out that it is 
actually a projection of his life-affirming (and self-affirming) ideal.61
Of course what Clark means by stating that Nietzsche “knows perfectly well it is not the
truth” is that Nietzsche does not posit will to power as a metaphysical truth claim. By
linking the will to power back to Nietzsche himself it becomes clear that he needs to
project the hypothesis onto the world as an ideal in the form of a re-configured active
61 Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, p. 240.
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hierarchy and pathos. He needs to do this because the will to truth has, for him, destroyed 
the ascetic framework in which philosophers have hitherto operated.62 Given Nietzsche’s 
position, therefore, I suggest that the political in his thought is the idea of active hierarchy 
or, rather, a hierarchy separating an extra-moral realm from the realm of ordinary morality 
which may produce the new value legislating philosopher of the future. On my reading of 
Nietzsche’s political thought the political involves the relationship between hierarchy and 
philosophy in terms of transforming a present-day relationship of reactive hierarchy and 
reactive philosophy into a relationship of active hierarchy and active philosophy. Active 
hierarchy distinguishes the extra-moral from ordinary morality and active philosophy 
distinguishes extra-moral value legislation from philosophical labouring in the service of 
democratic values.
conclusion
It might be helpful to summarize Nietzsche’s ontology in terms of the relationship 
between democracy and aristocracy. For Nietzsche, aristocracy and democracy do not 
represent binary opposites in the sense that aristocracy simply implies the absence of any 
impulse to democracy or vice versa. In the same way that the noble/slave relationship may 
not be reduced to a simple opposition, democracy and aristocracy represent a similar 
political relationality in Nietzsche’s formulations. Mark Blitz summarizes this point 
succinctly in the following way:
The fundamental distinction between aristocracy and democracy does not mean that they are 
opposites. It could not: Nietzsche’s understanding of the difference in power, in instincts, in 
ability to grow from obstacles, problems, is always in terms of more or less, stronger or weaker, 
ascending and descending. In particular, there is something necessarily common about all 
political life: Nietzsche, we remember, speaks of the necessary dirt of all politics; there is
62Ibid, p. 242.
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something common even about aristocracies.63 
What is “common about all political life” is the need for the moral communicability of 
ideals across society. This communicability is the communicability of ideals which serve to 
preserve the community as a whole. I described this above with reference to the morality 
of utility and the ever-increasing suppression of strong and dangerous drives as a 
community “turns inward” and strives to attain greater equality (BGE 201). The point here 
is that aristocracies, even though they may encourage strong and dangerous drives among 
their highest ranks, in order to protect the greater community from external threats and 
enemies, nevertheless embody the need for universally communicable moral ideals in the 
same way that democracies do. And this, in part, is what Nietzsche refers to as “herd 
instinct”. Therefore, it is important to note that there is a “herd instinct” operating in the 
so-called master or noble morality of antiquity as well as the slave morality of the Christian 
period Nietzsche attacks in On the Genealogy o f Morals.
Of course, this may seem to contradict what I have referred to as an ontological dualism 
since it appears that I am now claiming a universal framework for the self-preservation of 
all political communities. But, importantly, the impulse to self-preservation which all 
political communities have in common does not exhaust the will to power’s meaning for 
Nietzsche. And this is crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s goal. Where Nietzsche refers to 
the highest autonomy he is referring to an ideal which actually explodes this framework of 
democracy and aristocracy with respect to the universality of moral ideals. What he 
proposes is a framework of hierarchy that increases the distance between strata to the 
point where any residue of the universality of value is destroyed at the upper end of that 
hierarchy. Clearly, Nietzsche admires the life-affirming instincts of antiquity’s noble types
63Mark Blitz, “Nietzsche and Political Science: the Problem of Politics” Symposium vol. 18, no. 1 
(1974): 83.
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as well as the basic structure of an aristocratic community but his anti-democratic 
framework for producing the highest autonomy is “new” in the specific sense that it 
produces a hierarchy of active will to power which posits a fundamental anti-universalism 
of independent value creation.
I acknowledge that “anti-universalism” is an obscure concept but it is the best way to 
describe extra-moral autonomy. The uniqueness of Nietzsche’s political philosophy is thus 
marked by both an anti-democratic and an anti-universalist element. It is this political 
framework that will be discussed at many different points throughout the remaining 
chapters. However, I turn now to a critique of the poststructuralist position that has 
inspired many recent democratic interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought.
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CHAPTER TWO - FOUCAULT, DELEUZE AND POWER RELATIONS
At the most general level, what is political in Nietzsche might appear to fall within the 
broad category of the power conception of politics. As Andrew Mason puts it, 
“[a]ccording to the power conception, ‘politics’ should be defined in terms of power 
relations, and any phenomenon which is significantly structured by power is political.”64 
But the idea that any phenomenon which is significantly structured by power is political is 
a contested definition of the political within the broad discourse on power itself:
Those who defend a state conception of politics understand the role of the term differently. They 
think it important to mark off kinds of power relationships between people that are not political 
and kinds of relationships between people that are merely social. This is because the point of the 
term ‘politics’ on the state conception is to identity the specific process by which government 
decisions are made and influenced and converted into law or policy in the face of conflicting 
interests.65
For Nietzsche, it might appear accurate to say that his conception of power is not limited 
to a state conception. Indeed, the will to power ontology might be said to exceed the state 
conception because it includes the social as well as the political according to the terms 
Mason highlights.
However, since Nietzsche’s ontology of the will to power follows directly from his 
theory of moral psychology the categories of the political and the social which inform the 
distinction between the state conception of power and what I refer to as the non-state 
conception of power (being the more inclusive conception) fail to account adequately for 
his unique approach to power. The political in Nietzsche’s thought must be understood in 
terms of the “moral” since power relations are only ever explained in terms of competing 
moral psychologies. The political in Nietzsche may not be circumscribed within the 
state/non-state distinction because power relations for Nietzsche correspond to the force
64Andrew Mason, “Politics and the State,” Political Studies 37 (1990): 576.
65Ibid, p. 585.
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of moral values and the possibility for future value creation in terms of the revaluation of 
present-day values. Therefore, Nietzsche’s conception may be loosely described as a non­
state conception but the state/non-state framework fails to capture what is unique in 
Nietzsche. The political in Nietzsche exceeds a liberal framework altogether in terms of its 
reference to the modem state, state institutions, and present-day values writ large.
Nevertheless, Michel Foucault praises Nietzsche for thinking about power in a non-state 
way. Characterizing Nietzsche’s approach as a non-state conception is important to 
Foucault because he thinks about force relations beyond the state conception and for him it 
is crucial to articulate and promote resistance to the state, or juridico-discursive, model of 
power. Foucault’s non-state approach may also be described as a “micropowers” approach 
insofar as he concerns himself with force relations, diffuse throughout society, that are 
relations of domination and resistance. Thus, Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche 
suggests that the political in Nietzsche is a non-state or micropowers approach to relations 
that inverts the juridico-discursive model of analysis. I argue that it is misleading to view 
Nietzsche’s approach as a micropowers approach according to the terms of Foucault’s 
conceptualization because doing so fails to capture what is uniquely political in Nietzsche’s 
thought.
As mentioned in the introduction, over the past few decades two basic standpoints on 
the political in Nietzsche have emerged. What separates these two positions fundamentally 
is how they deal with Nietzsche’s anti-democratic or elitist ideas on the formation of 
culture and his interest in hierarchically ranked moralities.66 One position emphasizes the
66It is not difficult to find evidence of the link between Nietzsche’s anti-democratic sentiments and his 
thoughts on hierarchical moral relations. In BGE 202 Nietzsche states that “the democratic movement 
is the heir of the Christian movement”. Since Christian moral psychology must be overcome so, alike, 
democratic values must be overcome (cf. BGE 203). Democratic values, like Christian values, are 
universal values. There really is no getting around this for Nietzsche and thus he advocates a rank- 
ordering of moral psychologies so that his so-called highest types may be produced. Another crucial 
point here is that Nietzsche does not think that the ethical life of the Ubermensch is something 
universalizable but I discuss this at length in chapter four (cf. BGE 211).
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link between Nietzsche’s conception of power and his anti-democratic sentiments 
suggesting a fundamental incompatibility between our narrow political concerns and 
Nietzsche’s hierarchically ordered moral perspectivism. The other position eschews 
hierarchy stressing the protean and “agonistic” nature of power in Nietzsche which is 
thought to be transmissible within our contemporary democratic ethos.67 The term 
“agonistic” comes from the Greek “agon” meaning contest or struggle and is thought to 
refer to relations of domination and resistance as relations of strife. I discuss “agonism” at 
greater length in the next chapter but what must be emphasized in the context of this 
chapter is that taking a position on the political in Nietzsche has come to mean the 
difference between, on the one hand, reading Nietzsche as an anti-democratic thinker and, 
on the other hand, reading him as an under-determined democratic thinker whose thoughts 
on power may be appropriated for use within a modem democratic context.
The basic position of those interpreters who advocate the agonal-democratic Nietzsche 
is that Nietzsche’s thought has no self-contained political philosophy insofar as there is no 
unambiguous conception of hierarchy or moral relations that follows necessarily from his 
ontology of the will to power. Therefore, this position represents the claim that the 
political in Nietzsche involves a conception of power that renders impossible any attempt 
to derive a clear hierarchical framework from it. And this reading of Nietzsche has been 
extremely influential. However, I argue that it obscures the moral axis of power by 
privileging a highly generalized notion of the strife and flux of force relations eschewing a 
concern for the more specific issue of hierarchy that really drives what is uniquely 
“Nietzschean” in his power hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is this agonal-democratic 
interpretation of the political in Nietzsche that connects up nicely with Foucault’s interest
67See my introduction for a brief list of recent contributions to these two positions. I discuss the idea of 
agonistic democracy specifically in the next chapter and add several other commentators’ accounts to 
the list of democratic interpretations of Nietzsche.
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in an analysis of power that exceeds the juridico-discursive model. In other words, the 
agonal-democratic conception rests on a consideration of power relations in terms of a 
non-state approach to power.
In this chapter I explore these different characterizations of power in Nietzsche at a 
certain level. What this requires is a consideration of Michel Foucault’s and Gilles 
Deleuze’s readings of Nietzsche since it is Foucault and Deleuze who offer the most 
influential interpretations of the Nietzsche whose thoughts on power exceed the state 
conception but do not apparently exceed our present-day values altogether. My position is 
that Nietzsche’s power relation conception is not transmissible within our contemporary 
democratic ethos because it is intimately linked to his thoughts on hierarchy. In this way, I 
argue that the shared non-state interpretation of Nietzsche found in the work of Foucault 
and Deleuze amounts to a misrepresentation of what is uniquely political in Nietzsche and 
that this misrepresentation threatens to restrict Nietzsche studies in political theory if it is 
read back into Nietzsche the way it is in the case of the agonal-democratic Nietzsche.
Although I discuss agonal-democratic interpretations per se at greater length in chapter 
three, it is important to state, in this chapter, that the Foucault-inspired reading of 
Nietzsche which underlies agonal-democratic theories has proven to be an interesting and 
influential outgrowth of Nietzsche’s influence. But the point I want to make and follow 
through on in chapters three and four is the idea that the agonal-democratic interpretation 
of Nietzsche has important limitations and that it tends to obscure what is uniquely 
political in Nietzsche. In this way, I argue for two strains of Nietzsche interpretation in 
political theory and in an attempt to establish a new direction for the anti-democratic 
Nietzsche I launch a critique, in this chapter, of the philosophical basis for an agonal- 
democratic Nietzsche. Therefore, in this chapter, I am more concerned with a critique of 
the intellectual lineage which has been established, tentatively, between Nietzsche and
Foucault and Deleuze. And it is not until the next chapter that I turn to a critique o f the 
more explicit political arguments of Nietzsche’s agonal-democratic interpreters.
What I suggest is that Foucault and Deleuze bring about a taming of Nietzsche’s ideas 
by re-aligning the trajectory of his conception of power according to their shared political 
standpoint as it may be loosely defined within the context of our present-day values. I 
acknowledge that Foucault and Deleuze deny trying to get Nietzsche right and that they 
make creative use of his ideas in a relatively explicit way. But what I am pointing to is the 
question of the political in Nietzsche and the dubious integrity of reading a Foucaultian or 
Deleuzean standpoint back into Nietzsche after the fact of appropriation.
I begin the chapter with several sections on Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche as a 
philosopher of power and attempt to address, as briefly as possible, the key differences 
between Foucault and Nietzsche concerning hierarchy and power. In the last few sections I 
focus on some specific aspects ofDeleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. In these sections I attempt to illustrate how Deleuze’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s power hypothesis subverts the pivotal element of hierarchy in Nietzsche’s 
ontology. By acknowledging the significant differences between Nietzsche and Foucault 
and Deleuze I hope it will become clear that we need to keep the political in Nietzsche 
separate and distinct from the political in Foucault and Deleuze.
Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche’s power relation conception
Foucault’s defenders emphasize the fact that he denies trying to get Nietzsche right in 
the first place and any attempt to criticize him for misinterpreting Nietzsche is missing the 
point of Foucault’s overall project. Now if we are either assessing Foucault’s work in and 
of itself or assessing his interpretation of Nietzsche for the sake of pointing out what he
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gets wrong, then I would say that this objection is both valid and uncontroversial. Foucault 
denies the importance of an exegetical reading of Nietzsche’s texts.68 Beyond this fact, 
however, what is at stake in the present analysis is something more than a straightforward 
consideration of Foucault’s project versus Nietzsche’s. What is at stake is the political in 
Nietzsche or rather that which is uniquely political in Nietzsche apart from the concerns of 
Foucault. Therefore, what I am trying to uncover are the aspects of Foucault’s 
appropriation of Nietzsche’s ideas that make it impossible for us, after the fact of that 
appropriation, to return once again to Nietzsche and read a Foucault-like standpoint back 
into Nietzsche’s particular political position.
I assume that Foucault fails to discuss the specifics of what Nietzsche is doing in order 
to develop his micropowers approach. However, the integrity of the link between Foucault 
and Nietzsche rests on the claim that power relations are relations of strife that can never 
be mediated in terms of a fixed and unchanging meaning or identity.691 argue that this 
position makes sense only at a very general level and only against the backdrop of 
Foucault’s attempt to avoid discussing a closer reading of Nietzsche’s texts. Foucault’s 
overly generalized reading of Nietzsche’s power relation conception begs the question of 
what is being obscured by Foucault with respect to what Nietzsche is doing specifically. 
Hence, uncovering that which is being obscured will help us see more clearly the
68Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp.
53-54. Cf. Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Routledge, 1988), pp. 31, 33, 48, 107, 250-251.
69The closest Nietzsche comes to making this kind of generalization about power is in On the 
Genealogy o f  Morals where he traces the genealogy of the meaning of punishment and observes that 
meaning is fluid and therefore the shifting sign or symptom of relations of strife (GM II, 12). But, 
importantly, relations of strife are defined according to Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis of the will 
to power and his description in this section of GM concludes by re-affirming the specificity of that 
particular ontological commitment. Foucault may have been inspired by Nietzsche’s thoughts on the 
meaning of punishment in essay II of GM, especially when it came to writing Discipline and Punish, 
but abstracting a generalized approach to power relations from essay II, without considering 
Nietzsche’s underlying ontological framework, distorts Nietzsche's project.
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misleading basis of the agonal-democratic reading of Nietzsche as a tidy lineage linking 
Foucault to Nietzsche.
To begin, I suggest that what is being obscured is the important link between power 
relations and the rank-ordering of moral psychologies in Nietzsche’s formulations. The 
process of obscuring this link is initiated by describing Nietzsche as a philosopher of power 
first and foremost rather than as a moral psychologist whose thoughts on the ‘‘moral” are 
developed into an ontological hypothesis of “power”. Foucault states that:
Nietzsche is the philosopher of power, a philosopher who managed to think of power without 
having to confine himself within a political theory in order to do so.70
Of course it would be absurd to analyse too closely something Foucault said in an
interview but it is necessary to make better sense of the way Foucault characterizes
Nietzsche as a political thinker in order to understand how he avoids the moral core of
Nietzsche’s argument.
Foucault suggests that Nietzsche’s approach to power is new or different because it does 
not represent a “political theory”. Escaping a political theory in this context has to do with 
escaping the state conception or juridico-discursive model(s) of power. The idea here is 
that the juridico-discursive model sees power purely in terms of restriction wherein a “law 
of truth” is projected onto reality and “difference” is categorized in opposition to the unity 
of identity theoretically grounded in the law of truth in question.71 In an attempt to escape 
the limitations of this approach to power, Foucault employs a “Nietzschean” conception of 
the relationality of forces which is thought to include “difference” within power rather than
70Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 53.
71Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), p. 212. 
Cf. Power/Knowledge, pp. 78-108.
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restricting it or seeing it as external to power.72 On Foucault’s view a micropowers 
approach, which Nietzsche’s conception is said to represent, sees domination and 
resistance, equally, as articulations of power and this view establishes “resistance” within 
power overturning the juridico-discursive approach which restricts power to the unity of 
identity and sees freedom purely in terms of a liberation from power. As Foucault puts it, 
“resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”73
Importantly, Foucault’s framework may be described as broadly democratic due to the 
“levelling” politics of difference his opposition to juridico-discursive hierarchy promotes. 
The state conception sees power purely in terms of the law and state policy which excludes 
the social and public institutional realms from a conception of the political. The juridico- 
discursive model sets up a discourse of binary opposition which sees freedom purely in 
terms of the absence of power and this imposes a hierarchical law of truth, power, and 
subjectivity that denies the omni-presence of power, and the more inclusive view that all 
individuals participate in power relations. It is this comprehensive approach which makes 
Foucault’s politics of difference a levelling one that resists the formation and proliferation 
of hierarchy despite the underlying claim that relations of force or strife are always 
relations of domination and resistance.
Although broadly democratic, it is important to understand Foucault’s approach as non- 
theoretical in the sense that he directs our attention toward a new analysis of the flux of 
relations of force from a standpoint of strategic resistance which cannot be reduced to a 
unified theoretical structure of power:
72Foucault describes Nietzsche’s power relation conception as the view that “the basis of the 
relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces”. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 91.
73Michel Foucault, The History o f Sexuality: Volume 1, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 
1990), p. 95.
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I would like to suggest another way to go further towards a new economy of power relations, a 
way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies 
more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against 
different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists of using this 
resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find 
out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analysing power from the point 
of view of its rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of 
strategies.74
Foucault describes his non-theoretical or “strategic” approach as “genealogical” and he 
explicitly links his genealogical investigations to the standpoint of resistance where he 
characterizes genealogy as that which is intended “to entertain the claims to attention of 
local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary 
body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of some true 
knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.”75 
Therefore, Foucault attributes to Nietzsche the view that the basis of the relationship of 
power is the “strategic” or “agonistic” engagement of forces. Furthermore, the new 
relationship posited between the subject and power suggests that resistance, as a power 
relation, represents, in part, the attempt to promote “difference” or as Foucault puts it 
“new forms of subjectivity”.76 Having established Foucault’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
power relation conception, I now turn to a critique of Foucault’s characterization in an 
effort to distinguish Nietzsche apart from Foucault.
separating Nietzsche from the Foucaultian Nietzsche
Given Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche’s power relation conception as I have 
outlined it thus far, it is important to state explicitly what the Foucault-inspired basis of the 
agonal-democratic Nietzsche is in order to emphasize what is at stake in my analysis of the
74Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, pp. 210-211.
75Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 83.
76Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 216.
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differences separating Nietzsche from Foucault. The underlying position of the agonal- 
democratic interpreters of Nietzsche is that Nietzsche and Foucault share the same 
approach to the self-creating subject of power. Keith Ansell-Pearson provides an excellent 
summary of the philosophical basis for the agonal-democratic position where he offers the 
following characterization of Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche:
On a number of occasions Foucault has openly acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
influenced Foucault in a number of ways, but they can basically be reduced to two. Firstly, 
Nietzsche’s understanding of power in terms of relations of forces had a tremendous influence on 
Foucault’s attempt to think about power in a way which went beyond the juridical understanding 
of power prevalent in political theory. Secondly, Nietzsche’s critique of modem metaphysics and 
its privileging of the subject (a subject that was construed as rational and free but at the same time 
dehistoricised and disembodied) had an enormous impact on Foucault and the way in which he 
came to construe the problem of human freedom and creativity.77
In his efforts not only to study but reverse the objectivizing of the subject, as “rational and
free but at the same time dehistoricised and disembodied”, Foucault is thought to have
employed a Nietzschean power relation conception in order to establish the grounds on
which subjects might think of themselves beyond a restrictive conception of subjectivity
and come to see themselves as self-creating participants in power.
This characterization of Ansell-Pearson’s is crucial to my attempt to separate the 
political in Nietzsche from the political in Foucault. Ansell-Pearson describes Nietzsche’s 
influence on Foucault in terms of the “significance” of Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche for 
political theory. Making use of Nietzsche in terms of the political in Foucault is an exciting 
and promising line of study but it must also be seen to have certain limitations. What is 
objectionable is reading the significance of Foucault’s Nietzsche back into Nietzsche and 
thus denying what is uniquely political in Nietzsche. The standpoint Foucault develops is 
often read back into Nietzsche’s thought and the political in Nietzsche is assumed, 
according to the agonal-democratic reading, to be much more similar to the political in
77Keith Ansell-Pearson, “The Significance of Michel Foucault’s Reading of Nietzsche: Power, The 
Subject, and Political Theory” Nietzsche-Studien 20 (1991): 270.
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Foucault’s work than it actually is. Since I argue that Foucault and Deleuze alter the terms 
and implications of Nietzsche’s power relation conception I devote the remainder of the 
chapter to discrediting the attempt to obscure the differences between Nietzsche and 
Foucault and Deleuze on the issue of hierarchy.
resistance and the status of the slave
At this point we can begin to consider the key differences between the power relation 
conception in Nietzsche’s work and in Foucault. Foucault’s conception of relations of 
strife, his “agonism”, is articulated from the point of view of resistance within power 
relations.78 Within this framework what resistance requires, in order for us to say that 
someone participates in power, is a minimum degree of “liberty”.79 Foucault states:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean 
individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways 
of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized. Where the determining 
factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship 
when man is in chains.80
Since resistance is a “power relation” and may not be described as such from a position 
external to power, the status of the slave is pivotal to our understanding of the limits of 
Foucault’s framework for he clearly thinks that participation in power is beyond the slave’s 
grasp.
However, it is often difficult to pinpoint what Foucault means by “resistance”. He states:
Even though the relation of power may be completely unbalanced or when one can truly say that 
he has “all power” over the other, a power can only be exercised over another to the extent that 
the latter still has the possibility of committing suicide, of jumping out of the window or of killing 
the other. That means that in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of
78See Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, pp. 221-222. Cf. Foucault, The History o f Sexuality:
Volume I, pp. 94-97.
79Michel Foucault, “The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” in The Final 
Foucault, ed. J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), p. 12.
80Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 221.
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resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of 
strategies that reverse the situation - there would be no relations of power.81
In this passage Foucault describes resistance as suicide, murder, violent resistance, escape,
ruse, and strategies to reverse the situation. For Foucault resistance is made up of a
number of possibilities that would be representative of power and yet the figure of the
slave defines the limits of power in Foucault. Thus, the figure of the slave is controversial
with respect to Foucault’s description of resistance for surely the slave would be capable
of some form of resistance. Indeed, the slave would at least be able to kill himself.
In The History o f Sexuality: Volume I  Foucault describes power relations as “intentional 
but non-subjective”.82 What he means by this is that there is no historical subject, as there 
is for Marx in the form of the proletariat, who brings about historical change. And the 
implication of this description of power, in terms of individual action, is that there is no 
“doer” behind the “deed” as Nietzsche puts it in On the Genealogy o f Morals (GM I, 13). 
Now I argue that even though Foucault understands power in “non-subjective” terms, as 
Nietzsche does, the status of the slave in his conception of power is still un-Nietzschean 
since he keeps the slave outside of power and Nietzsche sees the slave as central to power 
relations.
If the slave is able to kill himself he would, according to Foucault, be participating in 
power. This is obviously a problem for Foucault, in light of his description of what 
resistance might entail. But for my purposes what is interesting is that suicide could never 
represent a form of resistance that might also be understood as either a practice of the self, 
as in the “care of the self’, or as “self-creation” in a Nietzschean sense. The point is simply 
that Foucault’s framework is obscure yet clearly un-Nietzschean.
81Foucault, “The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, p. 12.
82Foucault, The History o f Sexuality: Volume I, p. 94.
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the un-Nietzschean nature of Foucault’s project
It is important to note that Foucault admires very specific aspects of Greek ethical life 
but is scornful of Greek culture in a more general sense. He likes the idea of the bios as a 
work of art and he admires the practice of self-rule. However, he is generally dismissive of 
the overall moral climate amongst the Greeks:
The Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, 
an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your energy, and so 
on. All this is quite disgusting!83
What Foucault dislikes the most about Greek society is the institution of slavery and this,
as I have just explained, is reflected in an approach to power that is unable to see the slave
as a participant in power. Therefore, Foucault’s standpoint could be interpreted as one
which seeks to re-introduce certain admirable elements of Greek ethical life in a modem
setting where the problem of slavery does not inhibit individuals from participating in
power within a “resistance” framework.
By conceiving of a resistance standpoint Foucault diverges from Nietzsche’s path and 
abandons the substance and stmcture of Nietzsche’s power ontology as well as 
Nietzsche’s vision of a new self-creating subject of power. Where Foucault and Nietzsche 
part company is over the production of the power relation from the standpoint of 
resistance rather than domination. Nietzsche, unlike Foucault, views the production of 
subjectivity from the perspective of both the strong and the weak but he theorizes an ethic 
of self-creation as “self-overcoming” within a hierarchical moral framework that 
ultimately relegates the perspective of the weak to a lower position within that hierarchy.
Nietzsche’s standpoint is ultimately an extra-moral standpoint that articulates a new self-
83Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: 
Penguin Books, 1984), p. 355.
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creating subject of power above ordinary morality and at the expense of the “agents” of 
ordinary morality. As James Bemauer observes:
Foucault’s notion of self-formation is always in the context of a struggle for freedom within an 
historical situation. It is why he refers to the subject as an “agonism,” a “permanent provocation” 
to the knowledge, power, and subjectivizations which operate on us ... [t]his ecstasy would be 
misunderstood if it was seen as a Nietzschean leap beyond common morality into an elitist 
superhuman status ... [ujnlike Nietzsche, Foucault identified with the weak and the vanquished, 
the mentally ill and the deviant, with the lives of such infamous people as Pierre Riviere and 
Herculine Barbin ... [t]his identification motivated the movement of his thought toward an ever 
expanding embrace of otherness, an expansion that is the condition for any community of moral 
action.84
What we see in Nietzsche’s standpoint is an appreciation and affirmation of exploitation. 
Nietzsche not only admired the Greeks for the same reasons that Foucault admired them 
but he, unlike Foucault, affirmed their overall moral climate of slavery and hierarchy and 
he thought that their unique and inspirational ethical lives were the direct product of 
exploitative institutions.85 Foucault, on the other hand, made a real effort to separate out 
those ascetic practices that he deemed admirable from the overall moral structure of Greek 
society he found so repugnant. And this effort on Foucault’s part reflects his moral 
position within our present-day values despite his efforts to avoid discussing the moral axis 
of power in Nietzsche.
In diverging from Nietzsche’s path Foucault dissolves the moral categories of noble and 
slave along with their corresponding ontological descriptions as life-affirming will to 
power and life-denying will to power respectively. By denying the slave a place in power 
relations Foucault effectively undermines the theory of moral psychology that forms the 
basis of Nietzsche’s so-called power relation conception. For Nietzsche, as he illustrates
84James Bemauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking” in The Final Foucault, eds. J. Bemauer 
and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), p. 71.
85I do no want to emphasize Nietzsche’s appreciation of hierarchy at the expense of his appreciation 
of the slave revolt in morality in which man became “an interesting animal” (cf. GM I, 6). The point 
is that Nietzsche’s future-oriented project appears to involve uniting the advantages of self- 
consciousness, that developed out of the bad conscience, with a re-introduction of the kind of 
hierarchy he admired in Greek society, as a prerequisite for a high culture.
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clearly in On the Genealogy o f Morals, the slave type who is unable to resist, according to 
the terms that Foucault appears to demand as a prerequisite for power, nevertheless brings 
about a “spiritual” revenge that clearly establishes his position within the morally defined 
power relations of Nietzsche’s model.
What is important to note here is that Foucault abandons the framework of moral 
relations that Nietzsche uses to develop his critique of moral agency (GM I, 13). For 
Nietzsche the concept of the rational and free moral agent is derived from an account of 
the subject first posited by slaves and the agents of a slavish moral psychology. But 
Nietzsche never describes the position of the slave the way Foucault does. For Nietzsche, 
not only is the slave a vital part of power from the vantage point of the strong, as the 
necessary “difference” to everything noble, but in fact it is the slave’s lowly standpoint 
with respect to the strong that brings about the moral resistance of the weak leading 
eventually to a revaluation of noble values and the overcoming of noble morality on the 
part of the weak.
At this point Nietzsche documents the development of the notion of the responsible 
moral agent as a product of the inversion of power relations that the slave revolt in 
morality brings about. It is over this long historical process of inversion that the kind of 
noble nature embodied in the classical ethics of the Greeks and Romans is gradually 
subverted and forced to conform to the conditions of moral agency imposed upon it by the 
forces of the Christian moral universe (GM II, 2). In this way, unlike for Foucault, power 
relations for Nietzsche always involve the forces of noble and slave nature, or will to 
power. This is why Nietzsche re-introduces, at the end of this historical process, the 
significance of noble nature to overcoming the slavish ascetic ideal of modernity and its 
doctrine of pity for the weak. He reveals this intention in many parts of his On the
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Genealogy o f  Morals and throughout his other mature works of the 1880's. The re- 
emergence of the noble over the slavish is most evident in the third essay of his genealogy 
where Nietzsche writes:
Away with this “inverted world”! Away with this shameful emasculation of feeling! That the sick 
should not make the healthy sick - and this is what such an emasculation would involve - should 
surely be our supreme concern on earth; but this requires above all that the healthy should be 
segregated from the sick, guarded even from the sight of the sick, that they may not confound 
themselves with the sick. Or is it their task to be nurses and physicians? But no worse 
misunderstanding and denial of their task can be imagined: the higher ought not to degrade itself 
to the status of an instrument of the lower, the pathos of distance ought to keep their tasks 
eternally separate! (GM III, 14)86
This is Nietzsche’s clearest pronunciation in On the Genealogy o f Morals of a call to 
return to hierarchy and it represents something quite different from Foucault’s desire to 
embrace “otherness” as Bemauer puts it. Indeed, Foucault’s attitude might be better 
understood, from a Nietzschean perspective, as contributing to the modem doctrine of pity 
for the weak. Regardless of this characterization, however, it is important to see the re- 
introduction of hierarchy as a serious anti-democratic position and not just under­
developed rhetoric.87
In effect, what Nietzsche is calling for is a revaluation of values after the long process of 
slavish conformity has occurred. Therefore, he is calling for a revaluation of present-day 
values. The purpose of such a revaluation is to produce a new kind of subjectivity that is 
one of self-creation in an extra-moral sense. This is the only kind of “otherness” Nietzsche 
wishes to embrace and it relies on the “difference” of noble will to power entirely. Thus, 
Nietzsche conceives of the new self-creating subject of power within the same framework 
of morally designated will to power that he began with in the first essay of his On the 
Genealogy o f Morals but he is not calling for a simple reversal of values or return to a
86Cf. BGE 44. Here Nietzsche warns his free spirit against becoming the instruments of democracy 
with its doctrine of “equality of rights” and “sympathy for all that suffers”.
87See BGE 258-265; cf. GM III, 25.
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master morality. At the end of the moral (modern) period in history Nietzsche anticipates 
the advent of an extra-moral period of mankind wherein a strong and independent noble 
nature will re-emerge above a weak and slavish one but it will express itself as a value 
creating nature rather than as a nature circumscribed within a noble or master morality per 
s e n  And yet, what Nietzsche’s vision of self-creation still requires is a hierarchy wherein 
the common morality of present-day values is superseded and ranked beneath a so-called 
extra-moral realm wherein the re-emergent noble will to power may establish a re­
configured ethical life. The point here is that a hierarchy of relations is necessary to 
produce a certain type of subjectivity.89 This is how power is productive of the subject on 
Nietzsche’s view.
Foucault abandons the distinction between noble and slave and simply adopts 
Nietzsche’s critique of moral agency after the fact of appropriation. His moral perspective 
remains securely grounded in the common morality of our present-day values rather than 
in the future-based context of Nietzsche’s anti-democratic extra-moral period. And, 
significantly, Foucault divorces the genealogical method from the will to power ontology 
altogether. Benjamin Sax describes this separation of the genealogical method from 
Nietzsche’s power conception in the following way:
The will to power is an interpretation and an experiment in interpretation, designed to allow us to 
rethink our present-day values. The will to power is a hypothetical construct of the genealogical 
method ... In his 1971 essay on Nietzsche, Foucault seemed to be blind to this strategic and 
creative level of Nietzschean genealogy ... he made it seem that genealogy was sufficient unto 
itself; but such a claim would only result in a reversal of values (something Nietzsche clearly 
rejects) and not a transvaluation of all values (the self-proclaimed goal of his thinking). Nietzsche 
sees no such unity of method and in fact structures the whole of On the Genealogy o f  Morals and 
Beyond Good and Evil as incomplete and open-ended works. Both were written in relation to a
88The best description of the process Nietzsche maps, from the pre-moral to the moral and on to the 
anticipated extra-moral period, may be found in BGE.32.
89Cf. “What is Noble” (esp. section 257). Here Nietzsche explicitly links the ethic of self-overcoming 




The separation of genealogy from the will to power is necessary in order to re-introduce 
genealogy as an non-theoretical approach that specifically resists the juridico-discursive 
model of power.91 In other words, separating genealogy from will to power makes it 
possible to employ it as a method of analysis from the non-state standpoint on power.
Deleuze and hierarchy
Early in Nietzsche and Philosophy Gilles Deleuze appears to capture the essential 
elements of Nietzsche’s power ontology and specifically his notion of hierarchy with 
respect to relations of force between the noble will to power and the slave will to power. I 
introduced Deleuze’s account of Nietzschean will to power in the first chapter and did so 
with specific reference to the difference between active and reactive force. Deleuze was 
thus seen to have distinguished relations of active and reactive force in terms of a two­
pronged conception of hierarchy. Here, in the last few sections of this chapter, I launch a 
brief critique of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche where he appears to depart from this 
dualism and theorize the synthesis of active and reactive force. In this way, my critique 
attempts to point out the inconsistencies of Deleuze’s account of power in Nietzsche and 
how his earlier and more accurate account of hierarchy is eventually subverted in order to 
provide the philosophical basis for a levelling politics of difference akin to Foucault’s.
It may be helpful to briefly summarize Deleuze’s early position by re-introducing the 
relationship between the two senses of hierarchy he distinguishes as active and reactive 
hierarchy. What Deleuze suggests is that reactive hierarchy compels active force to
90Benjamin Sax, “On the Genealogical Method: Nietzsche and Foucault” International Studies in 
Philosophy, vol. 22, no. 2 (1990): 135-136.
91I address the status of “genealogy” in Nietzsche’s thought at greater length in chapter 5.
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become reactive. The slave revolt in morality and the process of rendering man morally 
calculable represents the triumph of reactive force and the realization of reactive hierarchy. 
In this way, Deleuze claims that reactive force is successful by “separating active force 
from what it can do”.92 This description corresponds nicely with Nietzsche’s critique of 
the subject and his description of the “doer” who is separated from his deeds (GM I, 13). 
The idea is that the slave type compels the noble type to become responsible for the 
discharging of his strength and thus effectively separates the noble type from what he can 
do by imposing upon him the reactive psychology of responsibility for evil.
Under the conditions of reactive hierarchy the master has, as Deleuze puts it, stopped 
being a master because he is separated from what he can do. Here Deleuze describes the 
will to power in terms of “forces” in order to describe more easily the formation, 
dissolution, and re-formation of relations amongst individuals and their identities with 
respect to underlying power relations. In the case of reactive hierarchy the slave type 
“prevails over the master who has stopped being one” but in terms of their actual original 
historical identities it no longer makes sense to speak of either masters or slaves at all. In 
other words, it may still make sense to speak of noble or slave traits and the hegemony of 
slave “force” but it makes no sense to speak of a so-called original noble or slave identity 
since these identities are no longer relevant.93
Deleuze admits that the dualism of Nietzsche’s will to power ontology makes it 
impossible to think of active force as either disappearing altogether or turning into reactive 
force. Nietzsche’s ontology of power as hierarchy is such that active and reactive forces 
can, at bottom, be neither dissolved completely nor assimilated into their opposite. It is this
Q'y
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 64.
93Ibid, p. 60.
79
ontological dualism that requires Deleuze to refer to active force as “becoming-reactive” 
force under the conditions of reactive hierarchy. The point is simply that in order to 
account for the potential re-emergence of active force, in the event of a shift to active 
hierarchy, forces may never be described in terms of a synthesis which might be thought to 
eliminate the fundamental distinction between instincts of life-denial and those of life- 
affirmation. And importantly, it is the potential shift to active hierarchy that Deleuze 
appears to be most interested in articulating.
eternal recurrence and becoming-active
To begin his task, Deleuze suggests that “becoming-active” must mean affirming life and 
being life-affirming “just as becoming-reactive is negating and nihilistic”.94 Presumably, 
therefore, becoming-active will involve a revaluation of values articulated in terms of an 
active psychology re-uniting active force with what it can do. However, what is 
problematic about Deleuze’s account of this process is that he employs Nietzsche’s 
teaching of eternal recurrence to explain the future triumph of active force. Deleuze’s use 
of the eternal recurrence ideal is problematic because he seems to interpret it in an anti- 
Hegelian way that does not resonate within Nietzsche’s overall framework of life- 
affirmation. I will begin the attempt to unravel Deleuze’s interpretation by offering a brief 
description of the eternal recurrence ideal and by reproducing Deleuze’s basic claim about 
the significance of eternal recurrence.
The Nietzschean conception of eternal recurrence is first introduced in The Gay Science 
as the idea that life recurs eternally. The force of this thought is described as “the greatest 
weight” for it could only be endured by the strongest of life-affirming individuals (GS
94Ibid, p. 68.
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341). Only the strongest person could affirm that the evils and trials of life in general, and 
one’s own life in particular, recur eternally. Nietzsche touches on eternal recurrence again 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight o f the Idols, and Ecce Homo. He also has something 
to say about it in his unpublished notes which have been edited and re-produced by Walter 
Kaufmann in The Will to Power. Now what is important to acknowledge about the idea of 
eternal recurrence is that Nietzsche describes it as his greatest teaching but at the same 
time devotes relatively little attention to it. In the past the basic point of contention 
amongst Nietzsche’s interpreters has been whether it represents an ethical ideal of life- 
affirmation or whether it represents a cosmological theory that life actually recurs 
eternally.95 Increasingly, and in recent years especially, the possibility that Nietzsche 
intended eternal recurrence to represent a cosmological truth has been largely refuted. The 
evidence weighs heavily in favour of the notion of eternal recurrence as an ideal of life- 
affirmation intended to replace the ascetic ideal of the slave will to power. The meagre 
evidence that Nietzsche may have intended a cosmological theory is to be found almost 
exclusively in his unpublished notes.96
Thus, it is significant that Deleuze draws largely from the unpublished notes in piecing 
together his version and he makes the following claim about eternal recurrence:
Only the eternal recurrence can complete nihilism because it makes negation a negation o f  
reactive forces themselves. By and in the eternal return nihilism no longer expresses itself as the 
conservation and victory of the weak but as their destruction, their self-destruction,97
What Deleuze derives from eternal recurrence is the idea of “active negation”. Deleuze
suggests that reactive forces, in confronting nihilism, go that one extra step and negate
95Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, pp. 245-286.
96Ibid. Clark offers a summary of the different interpretations of eternal recurrence along with a 
consideration of how Nietzsche’s unpublished notes on eternal recurrence have been received.
97Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 70.
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themselves as negating forces. And it is this self-destructive negation that represents the 
so-called active negation. As Deleuze puts it:
Active negation or active destruction is the state of strong spirits which destroy the reactive in 
themselves, submitting it to the test of the eternal return and submitting themselves to this test
98
Yet what remains unclear in Deleuze’s account is the status of the eternal recurrence 
hypothesis. Is eternal recurrence an ideal of life-affirmation or a cosmological theory? 
Deleuze, rather confusingly, describes it as both an ethical thought and a fundamental 
“selection” of power itself." Thus, at the very,least he unites eternal recurrence with the 
will to power ontology.
It would make sense that as an ideal the ethical thought of eternal recurrence would help 
liberate active force from its status as “becoming-reactive” force because only the 
strongest types would be able to bear the weight of this most abysmal thought. However, 
eternal recurrence could not compel reactive force to become active since this would 
violate the terms of Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis of power as hierarchy. In other 
words, the weak and slavish could not affirm the notion of eternal recurrence and “become 
active” since their life-denying nature precludes them from affirming life at the highest 
level that eternal recurrence demands. The significance of hierarchy in determining the 
implications of eternal recurrence suggests that active force does not influence reactive 
force in the same way that reactive force separates active force from what it can do and 
thus an active hierarchy would be qualitatively different from a reactive hierarchy. An 
active hierarchy would not involve a “becoming-active” of reactive force but simply a
98Ibid.
99Ibid, pp. 68-71. As an ethical ideal Deleuze describes eternal recurrence as the following imperative 
or practical synthesis; “whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return.” 
Deleuze’s construction here sounds far too Kantian to reflect Nietzsche’s position appropriately and 
from a “Nietzschean” perspective it might be thought to represent certain “slavish” streaks in his, 
Deleuze’s, work.
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liberation of active force from its “becoming-reactive” condition.
Returning to Deleuze’s ambiguous rendering of eternal recurrence, it appears that he 
may have contradicted himself with respect to what he said earlier about hierarchy and in 
doing so he may have violated the unique terms of Nietzsche’s power ontology. The basis 
of this contradiction lies in Deleuze’s attempt to unite eternal recurrence with the will to 
power ontology itself. Deleuze’s claim is that eternal recurrence is actually productive of 
active force. In this way he moves from the thought experiment of eternal recurrence to 
the ontological force of eternal recurrence within power relations:
It is no longer a question of the simple thought of the eternal return eliminating from willing 
everything that falls outside this thought but rather, of the eternal return making something come 
into being which cannot do so without changing nature. It is no longer a question of selective 
thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection.100
By making eternal recurrence an ontological element of power, that “selects being”,
Deleuze appears to contradict Nietzsche’s strict distinction between noble and slave will to
power. Eternal recurrence, on Deleuze’s rendering of it, would make it possible for
reactive force to negate itself and “become active” through an obscure process of
“selection”. Although Deleuze may not be claiming that eternal recurrence is a
cosmological truth, he nevertheless adjusts Nietzsche’s ontology of power so that what
was formerly a strict dualism can now be understood as a unity of active force insofar as
the role of eternal recurrence, as a selective ontological element of power, has the
capability to transform reactive force into active force. In this re-configuration of
Nietzsche’s ontology reactive force is negated and as Deleuze states explicitly “[t]he small,
petty, reactive man will not return”.101




Convalescent” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra where Nietzsche offers his most compelling 
description of the role of eternal recurrence. Here Nietzsche describes Zarathustra’s 
nausea at the idea that the small man will return eternally (Z, The Convalescent). On my 
reading, which is supported by Maudemarie Clark and others, what emerges is the truth 
about eternal recurrence as an ideal of life-affirmation. The nausea Zarathustra suffers 
from cannot simply be over the idea that the small man recurs eternally but that he, 
Zarathustra, can never will the negation of the small man, his nemesis for so long, since it 
is only because of the small man that he may overcome the reactive force of the small man 
within himself. In other words, active force can only liberate itself from its becoming- 
reactive condition. As life-affirming force it does not negate reactive force per se but 
rather affirms itself and in turn, according to the ideal of eternal recurrence, affirms the 
small man as well.
In the metaphor of “The Convalescent”, eternal recurrence produces a snake which gets 
caught in Zarathustra’s throat. As the metaphor unfolds Zarathustra bites off the head of 
the snake and spits it out. For Deleuze the snake represents the reactive force which 
Zarathustra negates or finally has his revenge against once and for all but, as I argue, what 
is closer to the spirit and substance of Nietzsche’s power ontology is the view that the 
snake represent the nausea of eternal recurrence as a test for the Ubermensch and 
Zarathustra spits it out only to recover and resume the highest path to the affirmation of 
life.102
I argue that Deleuze’s rendering of eternal recurrence contradicts the idea of active 
hierarchy because it undermines hierarchy altogether. The becoming-active of reactive 
force is an impossibility according to Nietzsche’s power relation hypothesis. If reactive
102See Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, p. 277.
84
force can “become active” then the entire framework of the inequality of force relations is 
rendered contradictory. On Deleuze’s interpretation, active and reactive forces undergo a 
kind of synthesis wherein reactive force negates itself and actually turns itself into active 
force. What this amounts to is a synthesis of forces by way of the elimination of reactive 
force altogether. Not only does this violate the idea of life-affirmation but it destroys the 
idea of inter pares equality which symbolizes the underlying incongruity between noble 
and slave will to power.
The only question remaining is why Deleuze tries to manipulate Nietzsche’s power 
relation conception from an ontological dualism to an ontological unity of forces. Philip 
Goodchild goes a long way toward answering this question where he remarks:
By relating the overman to a quality of synthesis, rather than to any particular force, Deleuze 
radically subverted the distasteful political implications of Nietzsche’s position. For Deleuze, 
there will no longer need to be any supreme force or great commander who subjects all others’ 
wills to his own; indeed Deleuze found a different way of relating wills apart from violence and 
conflict. For this reason, his reading of Nietzsche differs significantly from many of Nietzsche’s 
own expressed opinions and is politically much more interesting: instead of favouring a self- 
affirmative aristocracy, Deleuze always favoured the lowest.103
What Goodchild confirms in his characterization of Deleuze’s intentions is the importance
of hierarchy to Nietzsche’s power relation conception. At the same time he provides us
with a good reason for associating Deleuze’s position with Foucault’s in terms of a
concern for the weakest, or lowest as he puts it. Deleuze is unable to derive a non-
hierarchical interpretation of the triumph of active force without compromising the
integrity of Nietzsche’s power relation ontology. The production of the Ubermensch, in all
his enigmatic value-legislating splendour, depends on the pathos of distance between a
higher extra-moral realm and a lower realm of common morality. Hierarchy produces the
Ubermensch and at the same time affirms reactive force in the guise of the small man.
103Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics o f Desire (London: Sage 
Publications, 1996), p. 32.
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Thus, Nietzsche’s power relation conception demands that an active hierarchy of relations 
of force be a real hierarchy.
Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian framework
Further consideration of Deleuze’s interpretation would suggest that the idea of an 
“active negation” fits comfortably within the anti-Hegelian framework of interpretation 
that he employs to characterize Nietzsche’s thoughts throughout Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. Of course theorizing the synthesis of active and reactive forces makes Deleuze 
appear to be Hegelian rather than anti-Hegelian but what he wants to do is re-think a unity 
of forces that translates as a desire for “difference” in contradistinction to the Hegelian 
synthesis of desire that leads to a unity of identity. In other words, Deleuze employs the 
Hegelian language of “synthesis” in order to arrive at a very anti-Hegelian, or un-Hegelian, 
result. Alan Schrift offers support for this characterization of Deleuze’s intentions where 
he remarks:
By tracing the interplay of affirmation and negation in Nietzsche’s typology of active and reactive 
force, Deleuze concludes that the Ubermensch, Nietzsche’s metaphor for the affirmation of 
multiplicity and difference as such, is offered in response to the conception of human being as a 
synthesized unity provided by the Hegelian dialectic.104
On my view Deleuze may have arrived at an un-Hegelian result in his manipulation of
Nietzsche’s ontology of force relations but in doing so he has arrived at a rather un-
Nietzschean result as well. Re-thinking the Ubermensch as a metaphor for difference
complements Deleuze’s synthesis of forces approach and is I would argue the un-Hegelian
end Deleuze has in mind from the very start. By eliminating the Ubermensch, as a unique
vision of extra-moral value-legislation, however enigmatic that vision may be, Deleuze re-
104Alan Schrift, “Nietzsche’s French Legacy” in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd 
Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 330.
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articulates power in Nietzsche according to the non-specific outcome of force relations in 
terms of “difference”. Thus, Deleuze’s characterization of Nietzsche’s aims goes a long 
way toward theorizing the idea of groundless difference wherein “otherness” is embraced 
beyond any particularly Nietzschean vision of the self-creating subject of power.105
conclusion
Goodchild’s evaluation of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche, as more politically 
interesting than Nietzsche’s own conception of a “self-affirmative aristocracy”, is typical of 
the opinions expressed in many recent studies of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, this 
approach informs the standpoint of those interpreters I referred to above as the advocates 
of an agonal-democratic Nietzsche. Like Foucault, Deleuze appears to articulate the power 
relation conception from the standpoint of “difference” as it may be associated with the 
position of resistance to hierarchy and this corresponds to the non-state standpoint 
generally speaking. Deleuze and Foucault may differ in other respects but their shared 
standpoint in contradistinction to Nietzsche’s is quite clear. Most importantly, for the 
purposes of my argument in chapters three and four, it is this standpoint which forms the 
basis of the agonal-democratic reading of Nietzsche.
What I want to establish firmly in this chapter, therefore, is that the political in Foucault 
and Deleuze is dissimilar to the political in Nietzsche. In other words, there is something 
unique about the political in Nietzsche which Foucault and Deleuze either bypass, subvert, 
or simply refuse to acknowledge. Nietzsche’s framework of power re-asserts hierarchy in a 
uniquely anti-democratic way and this puts his framework of analysis well beyond the
105Deleuze states that: “Nietzsche’s practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity, 
becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that only joy returns.
Multiplicity, becoming and chance are the properly philosophical joy in which unity rejoices and also 
in being and necessity.” Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 190.
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resistance standpoint.
In the context of the political in this chapter, I attribute the resistance standpoint to 
Deleuze as well as Foucault’s insofar as Deleuze’s attempt to tame Nietzsche, by removing 
the hierarchical elements of his power ontology, reflects a levelling politics of difference 
similar to Foucault’s. It could be argued that what I refer to as a resistance standpoint 
misleadingly makes Foucault and Deleuze out to be defenders of the “oppressed” and 
indeed I do make this sort of claim where I cite the characterizations of Bemauer and 
Goodchild who refer to the positions Foucault and Deleuze champion as the positions of 
the weakest or the lowest in contradistinction to Nietzsche’s position. Therefore, it could 
be argued that neither Foucault nor Deleuze ever explicitly champion so-called oppressed 
individuals or groups and such a contention would seemingly be helped along by 
acknowledging the fact that both Foucault and Deleuze actually abandon traditional 
revolutionary causes on the Nietzschean grounds that they suffer too much from 
ressentiment. However, I suggest that even if those individuals Foucault and Deleuze 
appear to champion do not fall neatly into traditional categories of what constitutes the 
“oppressed”, they nevertheless set out to oppose hierarchy in an effort to “celebrate 
difference”. The point I am making is simply that opposing hierarchies of truth in an effort 
to promote new subjectivities or “difference” ought to be viewed as championing the 
oppressed in some important sense for it is surely not the opposite, namely, the attempt to 
philosophize more hierarchy and oppress a greater number of people for the benefit of 
producing new forms of subjectivity.
Thus, my purpose in this chapter has been to separate Nietzsche from Foucault and 
Deleuze on the issue of hierarchy. Although the issue of hierarchy alone applies more 
directly to Deleuze’s explicit anti-Hegelian appropriation, Foucault’s more subtle
characterization of Nietzsche’s power relation conception involves an assimilation of 
various Nietzschean ideas within a non-state approach to the political.
Given these fundamental differences, I suggest that we view the important 
appropriations of Nietzsche that Foucault and Deleuze offer strictly in terms of the 
genealogy of Nietzsche interpretation within a straightforward state/non-state, framework 
of the political. This gives us the opportunity to articulate what is uniquely political in 
Nietzsche beyond such a framework and, as I demonstrate in chapter seven, this anti­
democratic Nietzsche provides us with an interesting model of the political against which 
we might improve our democratic arguments.
On my view the non-state appropriation is not necessarily more politically interesting 
than the hierarchical interpretation. Nor is the hierarchical interpretation more politically 
interesting than the non-state appropriation. The non-state standpoint represents a 
particular strain of interpretation that helps address identity-based issues in political theory 
whereas the hierarchical reading captures the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s difference as a 
political thinker, challenging us in other, less specific, ways.
By illustrating the significant differences between these thinkers, with respect to 
hierarchy and power, I have offered an analysis which might form the basis of a framework 
of categorization that allows for a multiplicity of interpretations while at the same time 
saving a place for the anti-democratic impulse that lies at the core of what is unique in 
Nietzsche’s political philosophy. In the context of the recent debate over the taming or 
domestication of Nietzsche my position attempts to mediate between the conflicting views 
that Nietzsche is either an anti-democratic thinker on the one hand or that he is an under­
determined democratic thinker on the other hand.106 My conclusion is that Nietzsche’s
106See Ruth Abbey, Fredrick Appel, and Mark Warren, “Critical Exchange: Domesticating Nietzsche” 
Political Theory 21, no. 1 (1999): 121-130.
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power relation conception of the political is closely linked to the idea of hierarchy and is 
therefore not transmissible within the context of our present-day values. Thus, my reading 
affirms a multiplicity of appropriations while at the same time resisting the recent trend in 
Nietzsche interpretation to read Foucault or Deleuze back into Nietzsche’s political 
philosophy.1071 now turn to a critique of agonal-democratic readings of Nietzsche to 
demonstrate, further, the importance of leaving a space for the anti-democratic Nietzsche.
107Appreciating the uniqueness of philosophers was extremely important for Nietzsche too. In The 
Gay Science he writes: “Those who want to mediate between two resolute thinkers show that they are 
mediocre: they lack eyes for seeing what is unique. Seeing things as similar and making things the 
same is the sign of weak eyes.” (GS 228).
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CHAPTER THREE - AGONISTIC DEMOCRACY
The recent trend to construct a normative democratic theory out of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy has led to the tentative and controversial proposition that a new political vision 
of the Left ought to draw upon Nietzsche’s rendering of the Greek agon, or “contest”, to 
form its basic structure.108 In the last chapter I referred to this approach as the agonal- 
democratic reading of Nietzsche but instead of addressing the agonal-democratic theory 
straight away I paused first to consider Foucault’s and Deleuze’s characterizations of 
Nietzsche’s thought since they appear to have inspired the agonal-democratic position to a 
significant extent. In this chapter I turn to a more focussed consideration of the agonal- 
democratic argument but I refer to it as the theory of agonistic democracy and in doing so 
I move from a consideration of the poststructuralist reading that encouraged it to a direct 
analysis of the specific political project Nietzsche’s thought is said to engender.
There are several versions of agonistic democracy and what they share is a theory of 
institutionalised competitive pluralism derived from Nietzschean building blocks. Of course 
elements of a competitive or agonistic pluralism may be found in the work of recent liberal 
theorists as well and indeed as far back as J. S. Mill’s On Liberty.109 But I am obviously 
concerned with the most recent Nietzschean versions of political pluralism. By referring to 
the theory of agonistic democracy I mean those core elements of the various theories of 
agonistic democracy that are uniquely Nietzschean and at the same time of normative 
interest in terms of a shared theoretical response to the fact of pluralism.
I /\0
William Connolly, Identity/Difference (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991); David 
Owen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1995); Bonnie Honig,
Political Theory and the Displacement o f Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1993); Lawrence Hatab, A Nietzschean Defence o f Democracy (Chicago: Open Court, 1995).
109Cf. John Gray, Post-Liberalism: studies in political thought (London: Routledge, 1996) and 
William Galston, Liberal Purposes: goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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I develop my analysis in this chapter within a framework comparing the theory of 
agonistic democracy to John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism. Given the adversarial 
status that proponents of agonistic democracy (agonists) confer upon Rawls in particular, I 
set out to compare and contrast the theory of agonistic democracy to Rawls’s theory of 
political liberalism in an attempt to assess the claims of agonists according to the force of 
the Nietzschean elements in their theories that are meant to rival certain controversial 
elements in Rawls’s theory. By uncovering the limitations of the democratic Nietzsche, in 
this context, I continue my efforts to re-focus the discussion on developing a better 
framework for understanding what is uniquely political in Nietzsche’s thought.
I begin with a brief summary of the argument of the last chapter but within the context of 
William Connolly’s attempt to politicize a Foucault-inspired reading of Nietzsche. I then 
move on to an account of the agonist position against Rawls. At this point I turn to a 
consideration of “perspectivism” and “agonistic respect” as Nietzschean ideas that are 
dealt with controversially in the theory of agonistic democracy. I conclude the chapter by 
discussing the limitations of the reading of Nietzsche that is the motor-force of the political 
theory of agonistic democracy.
William Connolly and the Foucaultian nature of agonistic democracy
Nietzsche does not produce arguments in a way that is typical of most thinkers. Instead, 
he often presents himself as an agent provocateur whose ideas follow in the wake of ad 
hominem attacks on earlier philosophers. For this reason Nietzsche may be considered 
combative in a way that reflects and augments his approach to philosophy. Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s consistent attempts to focus our attention on the link between a thinker’s ideas 
and that thinker’s actual ethical life, is representative of Nietzsche’s own unique approach 
to assessing the value of the philosophical activity. Thus, Nietzsche may be thought of as
engaging in a very real or very lived philosophical “contest” and it is this agonistic 
approach to the philosophical life that he may be said to project on to his extra-moral 
philosophers of the future. I argue that agonists fail to appreciate this aspect of Nietzsche’s 
thought and in doing so they narrow the political in Nietzsche by reducing agonism to the 
level of democratic political pluralism.
Agonistic democracy is the product of a Foucaultian interpretation of Nietzsche. William 
Connolly, one of the most influential and prolific proponents of agonistic democracy, 
develops his approach to politicizing Nietzsche on the basis of the claim that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is void of any unambiguous political structure.110 Thus, Connolly describes his 
interpretation as a “political thematization of Nietzschean sentiments”.111 Connolly states 
that, in forming a political vision, “I use Nietzsche to fill out Foucault and Foucault to fill 
out Nietzsche until we reach a perspective I am willing to endorse.”112 Now this is a fairly 
accurate self-characterization but what is most significant, with respect to what I have 
described as being uniquely political in Nietzsche, is that Connolly may also be said to read 
a Foucaultian standpoint back into Nietzsche. And in doing so Connolly relies on the claim 
that Nietzsche’s so-called agonism is simply open-ended and straightforwardly amenable 
to a Foucaultian articulation.113 As mentioned above, this is based on the assumption that 
the unsystematic nature of Nietzsche’s thought precludes it from constituting a “political
110See the following texts for a comprehensive look at the development of Connolly’s political 
thought. In each of these contributions the basic position of agonistic democracy is presented to a 
greater or lesser degree. William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988); Identity/Difference (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991); “Beyond 
Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault” Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993); The 
Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993); The Ethos o f Pluralization 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); “A Critique of Pure Politics” Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 24, no. 1 (1997).
111 Connolly, Identity/Difference, p. 197.
112Connolly, “Beyond Good and Evil”, p. 368.
113See Mark Redhead and William Connolly, “Nietzsche and Liberal Democracy: a Relationship of 
Antagonistic Indebtedness?” The Journal o f Political Philosophy vol. 5, no. 2 (1997): 183-193.
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theory” per se and this particular Foucaultian characterization establishes the resistance 
standpoint within the non-state conception of power relations that I discussed in the last 
chapter. In other words, the Foucaultian characterization articulates the political in 
Nietzsche within a democratic framework of “resistance” to hierarchy broadly speaking. 
And this makes agonistic democracy an extension of the “levelling” approach to pluralism 
or “difference” that I identified in the last chapter.
Connolly does admit that Nietzsche’s elitist or aristocratic sentiments have some bearing 
on the nature of his positive ethical teachings but for Connolly this only adds to the 
reasons for giving Nietzsche a Foucaultian gloss rather than alerting us to the likelihood 
that there is more of a structure to Nietzsche’s arguments than might be evident at first 
glance. Therefore, what gets lost in the Foucaultian gloss is the unique extra-moral nature 
of the ethic of self-overcoming. Instead of seeing self-overcoming as a product of 
hierarchy, of the uniquely political in Nietzsche, Connolly and other Foucault-inspired 
political theorists tend to see the ethic of self-overcoming as a highly individualized ethic 
in need of politicization. These theorists fail to acknowledge the connection between the 
ethic of self-overcoming and the extra-moral philosophical agonism that is produced by a 
hierarchically ordered set of power relations.
The following characterization by Leslie Thiele is representative of a position that he and 
many others share with Connolly:
Nietzsche’s struggle to order his soul led him to disdain and depreciate politics. Foucault opted 
for its proliferation. In short, Foucault politicized what Nietzsche had internalized: the will to 
struggle.114
What has occurred in this Foucaultian gloss on Nietzsche’s ideas is the complete 
eradication of the uniquely political which issues from Nietzsche’s ontology of will to 
power. On this interpretation the will to power becomes the will to struggle and the will to
114Leslie Paul Thiele, “The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault’s Thought”
American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 923.
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struggle is interpreted as “resistance”. The ethic of struggle as resistance which Foucault 
champions is something altogether different from the ethic of self-overcoming Nietzsche 
establishes according to the will to power. Resistance replaces domination or exploitation 
in this rendering and the political in Foucault is read back into Nietzsche subverting the 
political as hierarchy and value creation. The political in Foucault, as Jon Simons puts it, 
aims “to prevent the solidification of strategic relations into patterns of domination by 
maintaining the openness of agonistic relations.”115 In this way, Connolly and other 
agonists are able to eschew Nietzsche’s extra-moral philosophical agonism and re-think 
agonism in terms of democratic pluralism.
The ethical argument of the philosophy of agonistic relations seeks to advance the notion 
of “agonistic respect” between competing identities. Connolly describes the ethic of 
agonistic respect as the recognition of contingent identity on the part of individuals and 
groups who realize that the sustained conflict and competition between different identities 
and conceptions of the good is crucial to the further maintenance and expression of one’s 
life:
You could not be what you are unless some possibilities of life had been forgone (“to do is to 
forgo”). And you now depend upon the difference of the other for your identity. Recognition of 
these conditions of strife and interdependence, especially when such recognition contains an 
element of mutuality, can flow into an ethic in which adversaries are respected and maintained in 
a mode of agonistic mutuality, an ethic in which alter-identities foster agonistic respect for the 
differences that constitute them, an ethic of care for life.116
Based on the idea of agonistic respect, Connolly attempts to articulate political relations in
terms of an “ethos of engagement” wherein the issue of contingent identity, of pluralism, is
admitted into the institutional framework of politics.117 And this is the foundation on which
the political theory of agonistic democracy is built.
115Jon Simons, Foucault and the political (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4.
116Connolly, Identity/Difference, p. 166.
117Connolly, “A Critique of Pure Politics”, pp. 20-21.
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the meaning of agonism
Against this Foucaultian appropriation of Nietzschean agonism, I argue that there is an 
important tension between Foucault and Nietzsche with respect to the use of the Greek 
agon and that this must be properly acknowledged and accounted for. For Nietzsche, the 
agon describes ethical relations amongst the noblest types and there is no “agonism” which 
is descriptive of social or political relations amongst contingent identities equally across 
society. Therefore, Foucault’s description of the resistance standpoint within power 
relations as an agonism is particularly un-Nietzschean.
Nietzsche’s use of the Greek agon is limited to a discussion of the ethical life of the 
Greeks in an early essay entitled Homer on Competition (HOC). What is significant about 
the agon, or contest, is that it should be interpreted more in terms of an ethic of struggle 
amongst strong and independent equals rather than an ethic of struggle as resistance. This 
would explain why Nietzsche sometimes refers to power relations in terms of domination 
but never in terms of agonism. To refer to power relations as agonism would be to confuse 
the difference between the ethic of struggle the nobles engage in amongst themselves and 
the nature of force relations between noble will to power and slave will to power which 
may never be understood in terms of a struggle amongst equal forces.
Taking this point a little further, if we look for some kind of agonism in Nietzsche’s 
mature thought it would have to be seen as being particular to his so-called highest types 
or Ubermenschen rather than as a description of power relations in general as Foucault 
sees it. Where we can find evidence of what might be referred to as agonism in Nietzsche’s 
mature thought it is invariably a product of relations amongst equals as in the case where 
Nietzsche himself appears to compete for philosophical glory with the philosophers of the 
past including, and amongst his favourites, Socrates, Plato, and Kant. Another example of
this agonism might be found in the section “Of the Friend” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z, 
O f the Friend). Nietzsche’s recommendation that we make our friend our greatest enemy 
makes sense for his highest types in terms of a contest or “agonism” of self-overcoming 
but not between higher and lower types who Nietzsche clearly feels ought to be 
segregated. And I take this up at greater length later toward the end of the chapter where I 
discuss the integrity of Connolly’s notion of agonistic respect. The point for Nietzsche, 
however, is that the doctrine of equality which typifies democratic values is a levelling 
equality that prevents the noble will to power from re-emerging. This formulation is the 
crux of Nietzsche’s ontological hypothesis and if we are to say that Nietzsche promotes a 
specific conception of “equal relations”, it would only make sense amongst the so-called 
highest types of the extra-moral period. Equality is always understood to be inter pares 
within Nietzsche’s framework of power (cf. BGE 30, 44, 219, 221, 259, 265).
Foucault’s interpretation appears to see agonism as a way of avoiding the reduction of 
difference to sameness, or the unity of identity, and this is the approach that Connolly and 
others pick up on. Along these lines Foucaultian agonism might be thought to meet the 
requirements of democratic equality while avoiding an equality of sameness. But what 
Foucault means by “difference” is definitely not what Nietzsche means and the 
interpretation of “difference” and “agonism”, in the theory of agonistic democracy, is 
highly questionable as a conception directly attributable to Nietzsche. In other words, 
attributing an agonistic and levelling politics of difference to Nietzsche represents little 
more than reading Foucault back into Nietzsche.
In summary, my position on “agonism” in Nietzsche is that it is only directly attributable 
to his thought as “philosophical agonism” and philosophical agonism appears in two 
distinct forms in his writings. Philosophical agonism means either the competition 
Nietzsche imagines between himself and the philosophers of the western tradition or it
means a “friend/enemy” form of agonistic respect amongst Nietzsche’s philosophers of the 
future. But in neither case is there evidence that agonism in Nietzsche is universalizable 
within power relations writ large. Therefore, agonism is only possible inter pares. And I 
also want to emphasize the fact that although the Greeks had their own unique framework 
for the production of excellence, that included the agon as an institutional check on 
tyranny and chaos, there is no clear link between agonism and excellence in Nietzsche’s 
positive teachings insofar as he offers no unambiguous conception of what constitutes 
“excellence”.118
the agonists and Rawls
In constructing his theory of political liberalism, John Rawls seeks to articulate the 
political in terms of a shared “identity”. And he distinguishes this notion of identity as 
separate from what he refers to as a conception of the good.119 Rawls states that:
[I]n the well-ordered society of justice as fairness citizens share a common aim, and one that has 
a high priority: namely, the aim of political justice, that is, the aim of ensuring that political and 
social institutions are just, and of giving justice to persons generally, as what citizens need for 
themselves and want for one another. It is not true, then, that on a liberal view citizens have no 
fundamental common aims. Nor is it true that the aim of political justice is not an important part 
of their identity (using the term ‘identity’, as is now often done, to include the basic aims and 
projects by reference to which we characterize the kind of person we very much want to be). But 
this common aim of political justice must not be mistaken for ... a conception of the good.120
The characterisation of political justice as political “identity” is important to my analysis of
agonistic democracy because agonists appear to think that, by imposing one fixed notion
of identity, a liberal notion of identity, onto all groups and individuals, Rawls is guilty of
118I discuss this at greater length in chapter 4. The point is that independent value creation is, as a 
form of life, so radically individualized that there is no standard of excellence between value creating 
types that is communicable, according to Nietzsche’s presentation of the concept.
119John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 19-20. Here 
Rawls offers a lengthy definition of what he means by a conception of the good.
120John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies, vol. 7, no.
1 (1987): 10, n. 17.
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“negating” the plurality of identities and “denying” them access to the public sphere where 
they might otherwise be allowed to flourish as “political” identities. However, if it can be 
shown that agonists themselves are unable to establish basic egalitarian principles due to a 
weak interpretation of Nietzschean ideas, then the point about political “identity” becomes 
far less significant.
My summary of the agonist position against Rawls is that agonists share the conviction 
that Rawlsian “neutrality” toward competing doctrines of the good places unreasonable 
restrictions on public discourse and needlessly inhibits the development and expression of 
“difference”. Restrictions on public discourse are considered unreasonable in part due to 
the fact that issues concerning the good continually find their way back into the public 
sphere anyway and therefore require access to public expression in a way that satisfies 
their ever-emerging nature as public issues. On my reading of their collective position, 
agonists claim that in giving priority to the right over the good, Rawlsian neutralists 
prematurely dismiss the possibility that competing conceptions of the good might be 
susceptible to the kind of rational consensus that both ensures stability yet allows for a 
more robust expression of individual and collective identity. The notion of competing 
doctrines of the good is best described as the fact of pluralism. Contrary to the position of 
Rawlsian neutralists, agonists appear to believe that this fact may be mediated in a way 
that allows difference to flourish in the public sphere.
I will now introduce the agonist position with reference to the criticisms that Chantal 
Mouffe levels against Rawls’s theory. Mouffe is not a “Nietzschean” agonist but I make 
use of her position in an introductory way since her discussion makes certain points in 
relation to Rawls that helps clarify the theory of agonistic democracy. Chantal Mouffe 
characterizes the fact of pluralism as uniquely modern and she criticizes Rawls for failing 
to fully appreciate this fact. Thus, she suggests that the crucial difference for us, between
ancient and modern democracy, is the latter’s acceptance of pluralism:
Such a recognition of pluralism implies a profound transformation in the symbolic ordering of 
social relations. This is something that is totally missed when one refers, like John Rawls, to the 
fact of pluralism. There is, of course, a fact which is the diversity of the conceptions of the good 
that we find in a liberal society. But the important difference is not an empirical one; it concerns 
the symbolic level. What is at stake is the legitimation of conflict and division, the emergence of 
individual liberty, and the assertion of equal liberty for all.121
Mouffe acknowledges that the Rawlsian position recognizes the fact of pluralism but she
insists that it is insensitive to the political needs of a pluralistic ethos. On Mouffe’s view,
liberty and equality follow from the full recognition and expression of difference. In other
words, it is only the full recognition and expression of the conflict and contest which exists
between and amongst competing conceptions of the good that ensures democratic equality
and liberty in a uniquely modem way. Here, Mouffe’s notion of democratic equality and
liberty ought to be understood as non-Rawlsian insofar as the priority of conceptions of
the good is re-asserted in a uniquely agonistic way. The idea of justice which attaches to
her view is built on the notion that the institutionalised expression of the conflict and
division betv/een conceptions of the good, at the political level, is the only way to ensure
equality and liberty for all.
Therefore, this conception of pluralism is meant to rival Rawls’s claim about justice as 
fairness. What I argue below, however, is that the Nietzschean-agonist position is a hollow 
one built on a specious interpretation of the Nietzschean concepts of “perspectivism” and 
“agonistic respect”. I argue that neither perspectivism nor agonistic respect, as they appear 
in Nietzsche’s philosophy, can guarantee egalitarian justice.
Rawls emphasizes the nature of individuals as citizens and not their non-public identities. 
His response is worked out in terms of the notion of justice as fairness and is described as 
the theory of political liberalism. Rawls argues that the most reasonable political
121Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy, Power, and ‘the Political’” in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla 
Benhabib (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 246.
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conception of justice for a democratic constitutional regime is a liberal conception. In turn, 
he draws his “organising idea” from what he identifies as public political reason. This 
organising idea is “that of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and 
equal persons viewed as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life”.122 
Thus, Rawls introduces what he refers to as the overlapping consensus which orders the 
political sphere.123 Justice as fairness represents an overlapping consensus which forms our 
political identity insofar as it mirrors “the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas 
and principles” which form public culture.124 The difference between “identity” and “the 
good”, which Rawls articulates in terms of a conception of political justice is distinguished 
in terms of the values or conceptions which exist in the public political realm rather than as 
the truth of any one philosophical or moral doctrine. Grounding his claims in what 
represents our public political reason is the only way to render those claims publicly 
justifiable given the fact of pluralism.125
Thus, Rawls claims to have replaced a comprehensive Kantian liberalism with a purely 
political liberalism.126 Now this may be a difficult position to sustain without conceding 
certain limitations and agonists focus their attack on certain misleading aspects of Rawls’s 
argument. However, concerning the competing claims of agonists, it needs to be asked 
whether or not the theory of agonistic democracy derived from Nietzsche’s philosophy can 
compete with political liberalism given Nietzsche’s limitations as an egalitarian thinker. If, 
as I argue, the Nietzschean foundations of agonistic democracy do not yield an
122Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 9.
123Ibid, pp. 132-172.
124Ibid, p. 8.
125Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.
207.
126Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 172.
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unambiguous egalitarian framework for political autonomy, then it may be concluded that 
Rawls’s theory is, still, more appropriate to our present-day circumstances and demands 
despite the tensions in it that agonists are critical of.
The agonist David Owen elaborates his criticisms of Rawlsian liberalism from a 
Nietzschean standpoint where he describes Rawls’s overlapping consensus as “anti­
perfectionist state neutrality”.127 Owen observes that what is central to Rawls’s anti­
perfectionist position is that there can be no exceptions to the rule that the autonomy of 
persons as citizens would necessarily be breached under any attempt to unify modem 
political society according to a conception of the good.128 Here Owen offers closer 
scrutiny of Rawls’s claim to a neutrality which presupposes an anti-perfectionist position 
concerning the autonomy of persons as citizens. According to Owen the problem is not 
that neutrality fails to address the concern that the conflict between conceptions of the 
good may lead to social disagreement but rather that it is disingenuous to claim neutrality 
in the event of various “perfectionist” social agreements. In other words, in the event of 
increasing social agreement with respect to a particular perfectionist conception of the 
good, for instance, neutrality might have to be abandoned, and a comprehensive liberal 
doctrine be re-imposed, in order to protect the non-perfectionist autonomy of all citizens. 
Thus, Owen claims that the “neutral” quality of Rawls’s theory, the quality that is 
intended to make the theory “political” rather than “comprehensive”, is misleading and 
unsustainable.
Owen’s criticisms echo the observations of Mulhall and Swift with respect to the anti­
perfectionist position Rawls maintains on the autonomy of citizens:
But the establishment of, and state action designed to reflect, reasonable social agreement upon 
some aspect of a perfectionist comprehensive doctrine could result in a localized but definite
127Owen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, p. 155.
128Ibid.
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encroachment upon the autonomy of citizens as Rawls understands it and how could someone 
substantively committed to an anti-perfectionist liberal polity regard such a consequence as 
permissible or just?129
In pointing out that under certain circumstances Rawls’s understanding of autonomy 
would have to be re-asserted, Mulhall and Swift suggest that, at bottom, Rawls still relies 
on a comprehensive liberal doctrine of the good to secure what should be limited to a 
purely political doctrine of non-perfectionist autonomy. Given the inconsistency of Rawls’s 
claims in this context, Owen concludes:
In the face of pluralism, this defence admits the controversy it was designed to avoid. Thus it 
appears that Rawls must either give up the strong connection between anti-perfectionism and 
autonomy modelled by his political conception of justice or recognise the unsustainability of the 
distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism.130
Rawls himself admits that in certain circumstances where individuals, holding 
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, attempt to assert perfectionist ideals 
the state may have no other choice but to impose elements of a comprehensive liberal 
doctrine in an effort to maintain the authority of an non-perfectionist conception of 
justice.131 Thus, Owen’s point is valid. However, Rawls, in admitting the difficulty of 
maintaining neutrality under certain circumstances, directs our focus back to the non­
perfectionist conception of political justice that may, nevertheless, remain the most 
accurate description of a so-called shared political “identity”.
Now what is immediately significant here is the fact that Owen’s criticisms represent the 
position agonists tend to adopt in response to the inconsistency of Rawls’s claim to a 
purely political liberalism. In response, Owen and others seek to advance the claim that the 
competition between comprehensive doctrines can only be dealt with reasonably once it is 
acknowledged that all views, including liberal arguments for political justice, are
129Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 225.
130Owen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, p. 159.
I31Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 152.
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inextricably linked to certain larger conceptions of the good. In this way, Mouffe argues 
that Rawlsian politics reduces what ought to be a vibrant public arena of “difference” to 
the level of “a struggle on the part of minorities and so called interest groups to assert their 
rights.”132
The shared position advanced by agonists like Mouffe and Owen, in both theoretical and 
practical terms, is best represented in the following remarks by William Connolly:
The issues of identity and the good thus cannot be excluded from public discourse. They 
inevitably seep back into the public arena in one way or another whenever attempts are made to 
exclude them by procedural means. The connections between personal and collective identity 
must be engaged overtly and politically if they are not to spawn a collective politics that 
unconsciously represses difference in the name of neutrality.133
Thus, agonists oppose Rawls in favour of a politicized model of pluralism. This model
celebrates difference and promotes the fair competition between diverse claims to identity
within the public sphere. But what is most significant about the agonist notion of pluralism,
at least for my purposes, is that it represents an egalitarian articulation of the Nietzschean
concepts of perspectivism and agonistic respect.
agonistic perspectivism
Central to the theory of agonistic democracy is an appeal to the perspectivist 
contingency of identity. In his rendering of a so-called Nietzschean agonism, Lawrence 
Hatab claims that identities are contingent insofar as one perspective necessarily relies on 
an “other’s”, conflicting and opposing, perspective in order to remain self-coherent. Hatab 
attributes this view to Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy o f Morals where Nietzsche 
presents the conflict between master and slave in terms of a competition between moral 
perspectives. Hatab concludes:
132Mouffe, “Democracy, Power, and ‘the Political’”, p. 247.
133Connolly, Identity/Difference, p. 161.
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The bottom line in Nietzsche’s genealogy, then, is that every perspective is mixed with its Other. 
Such a mixture has two components: First, a perspective needs its Other as an agonistic 
correlate, since opposition is part of a perspective’s constitution; second, a perspective can never 
escape a certain complicity with elements of its Other. Conflict, therefore, is not simply to be 
tolerated; affirming oneself requires the affirmation of conflict, since the self is not something 
that is first fully formed and then, secondarily, presented to the world for possible relations and 
conflicts. The self is formed in and through agonistic relations. So in a way openness toward 
one’s Other is openness toward oneself. 4
On Hatab’s view, Nietzsche’s concepts of perspectivism and agonism are conjoined and
together this notion of agonistic perspectivism may be “cashed out as a model for political
pluralism”.135
I introduced my position on Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” in chapter one with reference to 
Maudemarie Clark’s interpretation of it. With respect to the political appropriation of 
perspectivism agonists employ, it may be helpful to re-visit her interpretation in order to 
judge the credibility of the agonist account. Hatab’s interpretation of Nietzsche is 
representative of the position agonists maintain on the issue of relations of “identity”.
What is essential to this interpretation of Nietzsche is the egalitarian “political” gloss on 
perspectivism. Interpreting Nietzsche’s perspectivism as an argument for the equally 
contingent and competing nature of all perspectives (identities) allows agonists to make 
the further claim that all perspectives are equally “politically” valid in this respect. 
Therefore, what must be considered is what Clark’s position would be on this particular 
conception of perspectivism.
Clark addresses this relativist interpretation where she offers a critique of Alexander 
Nehamas’s account of perspectivism.136 Thus, Nehamas may be said to offer the account of 
perspectivism that informs the agonist position or at least the account that is most like the
134Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense o f Democracy, p. 48.
135Ibid. Hatab, in a later footnote, acknowledges his debt to Connolly and suggests that his project 
ought to serve as an attempt to further extend the argument for the thematization of Nietzsche’s 
thought in a contemporary democratic context (Hatab, p. 254).
136Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, pp. 154-158.
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one agonists adopt. Nehamas states:
Perspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that my view is as good as any other; it 
holds that one’s own views are the best for oneself without implying that they need be good for 
anyone else.137
This form of relativism establishes the equal validity of perspectives as competing 
perspectives but it must be emphasized that Nehamas’s claim is articulated at an 
epistemological level rather than a political level. David Owen may be seen to offer the 
politicized version of Nehamas’s interpretation where he writes:
[T]his thesis regards perspectives as having an equal right to claim epistemic authority and only 
rules out the attempt by certain perspectives (e.g. Kant’s) to deny this right to all other 
perspectives. The modelling of this theory of truth as a political theory entails that persons 
holding particular substantive perspectives on the good have an equal right to claim political 
authority and that the only position ruled out is that of denying this equal right to those whom we
1T8disagree with.
In this movement from epistemological perspectivism to political perspectivism, Owen 
appears to be suggesting that the Kantian claim to non-perspectival knowledge is inferior 
to “perspectivism” at the political level as well as at the epistemological level. However, 
no clear argument is made as to how this movement is internally consistent. In other 
words, Kant’s epistemological position is not the same as Rawls’s political position. Rawls 
does not claim that political liberalism is a non-perspectival political perspective but, 
rather, that it constitutes the best description of political justice given the fact of pluralism.
Thus, Owen claims that Rawls and Nietzsche actually share the belief that modernity is 
formed by the fact of an irreconcilable pluralism concerning doctrines of the good but, 
according to Owen’s Nietzsche, it is possible to re-think the question of democratic 
equality in terms of the Nietzschean conception of agonism between competing 
comprehensive doctrines. Thus, it may appear as though Owen’s version rules out Kant’s, 
and therefore Rawls’s, position in much the same way that Nietzsche’s perspectivism rules
137Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.
72.
1380wen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, p. 160.
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out the non-perspectival perspective as absurd and therefore cognitively inferior (cf. GM 
III, 12). However, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is merely a rhetorical move that allows him 
to escape the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. Perspectivism does not, in 
other words, translate politically, for example, as an epistemological reply to Kant and at 
the same time as a political response to Rawls. Rawls’s non-perfectionist neutrality is not a 
non-perspectival political perspective and it seems inaccurate for Owen to suggest such an 
association.
It is furthermore worth considering what Clark has to say about the Nehamasian 
interpretation Owen may be thought to rely on. The key to Clark’s critique is, as presented 
in the first chapter, her ability to pinpoint how the relativist theory fails to account 
adequately for Nietzsche’s view that some perspectives are false. Clark’s critique is as 
follows:
If there are always competing perspectives that are as good as our own, then it is not merely the 
case that perspectivism itself could be false. Rather, from some equally legitimate perspective, it 
is false. Further, in making all beliefs equally true, his interpretation makes them all false. Only 
the whole that incorporates them all is true... Nehamas can defend perspectivism against these 
objections by reducing it to anti-foundationalism. In that case, however, perspectivism will not 
explain Nietzsche’s claim that knowledge falsifies or any other claim about truth.139
Clark’s point is that a purely anti-foundational position with respect to perspectival truths
has no way of distinguishing what is true from what is false without re-entering the
framework of the falsification thesis. Since we know that perspectivism establishes the
possibility that certain claims could be truer than others, we know that Nietzsche did not
adopt a simple anti-foundationalist standpoint on truth. Thus, another factor making
political perspectivism a doubtful appropriation is the fact that it has no framework for
establishing certain political perspectives as “truer” or “better” than others in any way.
Clark’s criticisms of Nehamas’s interpretation, in light of Owen’s politicization, appear 
to establish the fact that the particular version of relativism at work in this interpretation
139Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, pp. 157-158.
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leads to a rather Hegelian conclusion about all perspectives being true/valid only in the 
actualization of the political whole. As Clark herself suggests, “[w]e have here the 
Hegelian view that truth is the whole, in which beliefs lose their partiality by abandoning 
their claim to be the whole truth.”140 Of course, on my view, it is inappropriate for agonists 
to attribute this kind of egalitarian relativism to Nietzsche in the first place because it 
denies the role of hierarchy in his thought. Diana Coole makes a similar point where she 
writes:
To collapse perspectivism into relativism is to render Nietzsche an advocate of what he saw as 
symptomatic of modernity’s decadence, while re-situating his political significance within the 
politics of the egalitarian ideologies he condemned as nihilistic sickness. 41
What is clear from this brief discussion of perspectivism is that the equality of
perspectives, and therefore identities or conceptions of the good is not something that may
be directly attributable to Nietzsche’s philosophy. Given Clark’s account of perspectivism,
it appears as though agonists like Owen, for example, would force Nietzsche back into the
purely anti-foundationalist or neo-Kantian position he actually attempted to overcome by
developing his notion of hierarchically ordered perspectival knowledge. Furthermore,
adapting Nietzsche’s perspectivism to an account of political pluralism obscures what is
uniquely political in Nietzsche.
excellence and agonistic respect as hierarchically determined concepts
Nietzsche explains how, in ancient Greek society, grudge and envy, as goads to mens’ 
actions, were channelled into an interest in competition and away from the kind of 
struggles to the death that such emotions were capable of inciting. In this way, envy was 
considered a blessing and a natural invitation to compete with others. Thus, Nietzsche
140Ibid, p. 157.
141 Coole, “The Politics of Reading Nietzsche”, p. 359.
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documents the Hellenic teaching that “every talent must develop through a struggle”
(HOC 192). Greek competition or agonism, generally speaking, is understood by 
Nietzsche as an ethos which allowed life to continue and the Greek state to exist.
Agonists bypass a concern for the meaning of the agon to the lives of the Greeks and the 
life of the Greek state in favour of an interest in those elements of Greek agonism that 
appear to be relevant to modem pluralism. In this way, agonists focus on the element of 
ostracism which allowed Greek society to perpetuate itself, striving for excellence. What 
agonists emphasize is the institutionalization of ostracism wherein a hegemonic force is 
ostracised in order to perpetuate the competition amongst the remaining forces in society. 
Thus, Bonnie Honig remarks:
According to Nietzsche, it was for the sake of the contest that the Greeks practised ostracism. In 
contrast to most commentators, who see ostracism as proof of the Greek demos’ intolerance of 
excellence, Nietzsche sees the practice as evidence of the Greek commitment to the promotion of 
excellence. It banishes those strong enough to dominate the agon in order to keep the agon 
open.142
Ostracism, in terms of agonistic democracy, would appear to correspond with Owen’s
recommendation to exclude any Kantian-neutralist perspectives from the political sphere.
Hence, what agonists derive from Nietzsche’s rendering of the Greek agon is the notion of
an institutionalised competitive pluralism. The hope is to construct a set of democratic
political arrangements wherein difference may be allowed to flourish and excellence may
be pursued at the same time.
With these goals in mind, Hatab reaches the following conclusions:
Nietzsche argued that the Greek agon represented a cultivation of destructive instincts which did 
not strive for the annihilation of the Other, but rather an arranged contest that would test skill 
and performance in a competition. In this way, strife produced excellence, not obliteration, since 
talent unfolded in a struggle with a competitor.143
Yet this flourishing of difference combined with a pursuit of excellence appears to
142Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement o f Politics, p. 70.
143Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense o f Democracy, p. 62.
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represent a rather superficial reading and appropriation of ethical conceptions particular to 
the ancient world. What is superficial about this reading is the denial of what “excellence” 
represents and the political structure of society, writ large, that was required to produce 
excellence in the Greek context.
The framework for excellence in the Greek context is a hierarchy built on the institution 
of slavery. Similarly, according to my interpretation of Nietzsche’s political framework, 
“excellence” for him is also made possible because of hierarchical power relations. Of 
course, for Nietzsche, excellence would have to be understood in terms of independent 
value creation but, as I argue in the next chapter, this particular form of excellence is 
partially incomprehensible. Therefore, excellence in Nietzsche’s case is obscure but 
hierarchically produced.
In light of the significance of hierarchy to both the Greek and Nietzschean contexts, this 
characterization of excellence would be incomprehensible as a democratic perfectionist 
conception of autonomy because neither the Greek version of “self-mastery” nor the 
Nietzschean version of value creation is circumscribed within a political framework that is 
“egalitarian” according to our contemporary standards of universality. What Nietzsche 
admires most about the Greeks is the association of art to the ethical lives of the Greeks 
who participate at the highest level of culture. In this way, he affirms the fact of slavery 
and the necessity of hierarchy for the production of art and ethical relations of the kind the 
Greeks produced.
Nietzsche is well aware of the profound differences between what he admired in the 
Greeks and what is lacking in modern European political culture:
The misery of men living a life of toil has to be increased to make the production of the world of 
art possible for a small number of Olympian men. Here we find the source of the hatred which 
has been nourished by the Communists and Socialists as well as their paler descendants, the 
white race of ‘Liberals’ of every age against the arts, but also against classical antiquity. (TGS 
179)
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The production of culture in terms of the production of excellence is the common thread 
that connects Nietzsche’s philosophical and ethical concerns from his earliest period to his 
untimely breakdown. Indeed, it is my position that it is only in terms of the production of 
hierarchy and the Ubermensch that the term “political” is uniquely applicable to Nietzsche 
at all. Given the reality of Nietzsche’s sentiments, especially in terms of his recognition that 
modernity fails to offer the type of ethical landscape on which his hierarchical political 
architecture might be realised, it is obvious that Nietzsche’s criticisms of modem European 
culture are not intended to serve as a prelude to the kind of normative democratic 
theorising that agonists take them to be.
Rather than articulating a theory of political equality, Nietzsche is interested in exploring 
the possibilities of inequality. This is a non-negotiable element of Nietzsche’s uniquely 
political concerns, since what he emphasizes most in his interpretation of Greek culture, 
with respect to his own political sentiments, is not so much the ethic of respect the Greeks 
may be thought to have exhibited toward their agonistic rivals but instead the broad social 
framework of a hierarchical society whose main concern is the cultivation of excellence. It 
may be that there is a case to be made for the interpretation of Nietzsche’s agonism as 
“agonistic respect” but this is not strictly speaking an egalitarian element of his thought in 
the modern democratic sense that Connolly, for example, suggests. Nietzsche’s unique 
political vision, which I believe exists in conjunction with his ethical concerns, puts him at 
odds with modernity and its efforts to advance the cause of democratic equality and 
liberty.
Nevertheless, it may be helpful to explain my position with reference to the specific 
Nietzschean passages that are thought to establish the idea of “agonistic respect”. The idea 
of agonistic respect, as introduced earlier in the chapter, comes from Nietzsche’s peculiar 
thoughts, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, on the nature of friendship. In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra Nietzsche writes:
And often with our love we only want to leap over envy. And often we attack and make an enemy 
in order to conceal that we are vulnerable to attack. ‘At least be my enemy!’ - thus speaks the true 
reverence (so spricht die wahre Ehrfurcht), that does not venture to ask for friendship. If you 
want a friend, you must also be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be 
capable of being an enemy. You should honour even the enemy in your friend. Can you go near 
to your friend without going over to him? In your friend you should possess your best enemy.
Your heart should feel closest to him when you oppose him. (Z, O f the Friend)
What agonists are interested in, in this passage, is the idea of Ehrfurcht or “reverence” for
one’s enemy as one’sfriend. What is helpful to the agonist position is the idea that “one
should feel closest to him when you oppose him”. This maxim establishes, for agonists, the
contingency of identity as an agonistic contingency that demands Ehrfurcht between and
amongst all parties.
Now it is not my claim that this type of ethical framework is either “untrue” or 
“unhelpful” with respect to identity politics in general but I do insist that it is un- 
Nietzschean where it is translated into the specific framework of political equality that 
agonists assume. Nietzsche does not promote this kind of agonism within a universal 
framework of equality. As I have argued above, any notion of agonistic respect that might 
be directly attributable to Nietzsche would have to be an inter pares agonistic respect. I 
realize that it could be argued that Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence ideal of life-affirmation 
suggests a certain agonistic respect where it requires the highest type to affirm the slave 
type, as a precondition of his ascendancy, but strictly speaking the slave type is neither a 
“friend” nor an “enemy” according to the terms of friendship Nietzsche describes in 
Zarathustra. Indeed, the highest type must affirm the slave type at the same time that he 
subjects that type to his will to power. The will to power hierarchy in Nietzsche precludes 
the possibility of “agonistic respect” according to the political structure of agonistic 
democracy. Therefore, my interpretation establishes the integrity of the claim that what is 
uniquely political in Nietzsche is contrary to the theory of agonistic democracy.
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conclusion
What I have confirmed in this chapter are the limitations of the democratic Nietzsche. 
The claim that agonistic perspectivism and agonistic respect are at the same time 
egalitarian and Nietzschean is unsustainable. Having illustrated these limitations, I have 
also established the fact that because Nietzsche offers no clear egalitarian framework for 
agonistic equality and autonomy, the theory of agonistic democracy, insofar as it relies on 
Nietzschean ideas to establish its status as a legitimate rival to Rawls’s theory, is 
unsuccessful.
Given the dubious integrity of the interpretations of perspectivism and agonism that 
inform the theory of agonistic democracy, it is clear that agonists have no way of 
guaranteeing democratic equality and liberty according to Nietzsche’s philosophy. Seyla 
Benhabib criticizes the theory of agonistic politics in the following way:
Agonistic visions of democratic politics inevitably invite the question, How can we be so sure that 
the agon of episodic politics, or the contest of pluralisms that cannot be adjudicated at the higher 
levels, will all be instances of good and just democratic politics as opposed to being instances of 
fascism, xenophobic nationalism, right-wing populism?...How can theorists of agonistic 
democracy safeguard freedom and justice, respect for the rights of citizens as equal and free 
beings, if they are unwilling to place some constraints that bind, trump limit, and otherwise 
confine the will of the sovereign people?144
Benhabib’s “Kantian” criticisms in this passage are important because they remind us of 
Rawls’s claim about what constitutes a shared political identity. Even if Rawls’s non­
perfectionist neutrality is unsustainable as a purely political form of liberalism, it, 
nevertheless, attempts to safeguard the “rights of citizens as equal and free beings” in an 
unambiguous way. Thus, agonists attack Rawls’s notion of political “identity” without 
realizing that their own position is, still, less reasonable than his in many other respects.
What I suggest is that agonists adopt Nietzsche’s anti-Kantian position without making 
better sense of what that position entails and how it undermines democratic and egalitarian
144Seyla Benhabib, “The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference” in Democracy and 
Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 8.
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structures of thought at all levels. Indeed, Nietzsche’s anti-Kantian position requires that 
he construct a new anti-democratic vision of politics as hierarchy and autonomy as 
independent value creation. This requirement, that Nietzsche imposes upon himself and his 
thought, affects all his mature ideas, including his notion of agonistic respect. What I am 
arguing, however, is not that Nietzsche’s various positive teachings are closed to 
appropriation but simply that they do have a place within Nietzsche’s unique and self- 
contained political thought and therefore their value as democratic ideas may be limited fo r  
that very reason.
In my discussion of agonistic democracy, including the elements of perspectivism and 
agonistic respect, I have pointed in general to the anti-democratic nature of Nietzsche 
political project. In doing so, I touched on the idea that Nietzsche’s conception of 
excellence, his conception of philosophical autonomy, is partially incomprehensible. 
Therefore, I now turn to a further explication of Nietzschean autonomy with respect to its 
obscure articulation in his formulations.
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WALTER KAUFMANN’S 
ARISTOTELIAN NIETZSCHE
In Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Walter Kaufmann emphasizes 
Nietzsche’s apparent debt to Aristotle concerning greatness o f  soul.145 Kaufmann suggests 
that Nietzsche’s opposition to Christianity "can scarcely be seen in proper perspective 
apart from Aristotle's ethics".146 Of course one of Kaufmann’s main concerns in this 
seminal post-war study is to rescue Nietzsche from his reputation as a proto-fascist 
thinker. Thus, where Kaufmann introduces an Aristotelian Nietzsche he appears to do so 
as part of a larger effort to dispel all fear of the proto-fascist Nietzsche.147
The proto-fascist Nietzsche is the philosopher whose thought is irresponsibly associated 
with war, eugenics, and race exploitation. In this way, Kaufmann’s Aristotelian Nietzsche 
represents an attempt to overcome the proto-fascist Nietzsche and affirm instead the 
creative and virtuous Nietzsche directing us toward those great human beings who enjoy 
an overflowing strength of character. What makes Nietzsche’s project acceptable in this 
context is the promotion of the Ubermensch as a universally communicable exemplar of 
virtue.
Kaufmann’s move to underline Nietzsche’s supposed Aristotelian influence is employed 
as a way of minimizing the exploitative overtones of Nietzsche’s thoughts while, at the 
same time, maximizing the ideal of the Ubermensch as a “great-souled man”. On 
Kaufmann’s interpretation, however, no genuine effort to make sense of Nietzsche’s 
peculiar views on hierarchy is made. Walter Sokel offers an appropriate summary of
145Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (New York: Meridian Books, 
1966), p. 327. Cf. WP 981 {Seelengrdsse)\ Aristotle, Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (London:
Penguin Books, 1976), iv, 3 (megalopsychia).
I46Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 327.
147Ibid.
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Kaufmann’s de-politicization of Nietzsche where he states that:
[K]aufmann removes the Will to Power from any important connection with political-social 
considerations. He does not pose the questions which his own emphasis on this element in 
Nietzsche’s thought elicits. The whole political dimension of this thought is bracketed out by 
Kaufmann. He considers Nietzsche to be an “a-political” thinker, although it was Nietzsche 
himself who doubted the possibility of such an animal.148
Nietzsche’s notion of autonomy as value creation is never considered closely in association
with his hierarchical conception of relations between active and reactive will to power.
Thus, the implication of Kaufmann’s reference to Aristotle’s influence on Nietzsche is that
Nietzsche’s great-souled man, his Ubermensch, ought to be recognized as a universal
ideal of human virtue. In this way, what makes Nietzsche acceptable is the universal nature
of the Ubermensch as an ideal and this marks Kaufmann’s contribution as one of the first
and most influential post-war attempts to render Nietzsche respectable.
Since the initial influence of Kaufmann’s book a great deal has been written about 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and it is to Kaufmann’s credit that he was able to bring about a 
change in the way Nietzsche was received in the English-speaking world. Yet Kaufmann 
was able to help render Nietzsche respectable by divorcing his ethical ideal from the 
implications of the will to power hypothesis. It is ironic, therefore, that today Nietzsche is 
increasingly read for the political in his thought, since it was Kaufmann who de-politicized 
Nietzsche and, as I argue in this chapter, it is his apolitical Nietzsche that remains at the 
heart of recent attempts to establish Nietzsche’s relevance to democratic theory.
In this chapter I claim, with respect to Kaufmann’s influential analysis, that the apolitical 
Nietzsche must be seen as an important but inaccurate reading that has since led to other 
misleading characterizations of the Ubermensch ideal. But it is not my purpose here to 
revisit Kaufmann’s position in any comprehensive way. In fact, I limit my focus in this 
short chapter to his brief consideration of Aristotle’s influence. What I want to stress is
148Walter Sokel, “Political Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in Walter Kaufmann’s image of Nietzsche” 
Nietzsche-Studien 12 (1983): 438.
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that I am not introducing a reassessment of Kaufmann’s interpretation to reclaim certain 
aspects of his work which have either been discredited or improved on over the years. 
Instead, I want to link what I consider to be a significant underlying premise of 
Kaufmann’s position to the contemporary debate on the nature of the political in 
Nietzsche’s thought. Therefore, I limit my focus to Kaufmann’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s appropriation of Aristotle’s megalopsychos, or great-souled man. My 
conclusion is that Kaufmann’s apolitical Nietzsche, presented in Aristotelian terms, has 
been transformed into a democratic Nietzsche. However, the underlying weaknesses of 
Kaufmann’s original characterization are reproduced in this democratic Nietzsche and this 
result suggests that our contemporary discourse continues to obscure, overlook, and deny 
what is uniquely political in Nietzsche.
Nietzsche contra Aristotle and Christianity
Alasdair MacIntyre acknowledges Nietzsche’s debt to Aristotle concerning greatness of 
soul but, unlike Kaufmann, hastens to point out the profound differences between the 
original rendering and Nietzsche’s unique appropriation of it.
Nietzsche rarely refers explicitly to Aristotle except on aesthetic questions. He does borrow the 
name and notion of “great-souled man” from the Ethics, although it becomes in the context of his 
theory something quite other than it was in Aristotle’s. But his interpretation of the history of 
morality makes it quite clear that the Aristotelian account of ethics and politics would have to 
rank for Nietzsche with all those degenerate disguises of the will to power which follow from the 
false turning taken by Socrates.149
What MacIntyre refers to as “the false turning taken by Socrates” may be better articulated
here as the key element present in both the Aristotelian and Christian value systems that
Nietzsche identifies as the life-denying expression of the will to power.150 What these two
149Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth & Co, 1976), p. 117.
150In Twilight o f the Idols Nietzsche claims that: “The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato 
downwards is pathologically conditioned: likewise their estimation of dialectics. Reason = virtue = 
happiness means merely: one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark desires by producing a 
permanent daylight - the daylight of reason. One must be prudent, clear, bright, at any cost: every
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moral frameworks have in common is the idea that the good for man is linked to the telos 
of man in terms of that which is achieved through the proper exercise of the virtues and 
grounded in something other than the human will (i.e. in the metaphysical). MacIntyre 
associates this connection with the work of Aquinas and his efforts to shape the New 
Testament according to certain key Aristotelian principles:
The New Testament’s account of the virtues, even if it differs as much as it does in content from 
Aristotle’s - Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have been 
horrified by St. Paul - does have the same logical and conceptual structure as Aristotle’s account. 
A virtue is, as with Aristotle, a quality the exercise of which leads to the achievement of the 
human te lo s151
The important connection for Nietzsche is that both the Aristotelian and Christian moral 
systems share a principle that posits the universally communicable notion of the proper 
exercise of the virtues as the correct path to the human telos.
On Nietzsche’s view it is the universality of virtues that makes these two systems life- 
denying expressions of the will to power because universalism denies the worldly 
difference separating human types in favour of a metaphysical ideal (WP 315):
My brother, if you have a virtue and it is your own virtue, you have it in common with no one.
Let your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names: and if you have to speak of it, do not be 
ashamed to stammer. Thus say and stammer: ‘This is my good, this I love, just thus do I like it, 
only thus do I  wish the good. “I do not want it as a law of God, I do not want it as a human 
statute: let it be no sign-post to superearths and paradises. It is an earthly virtue that I love: there 
is little prudence in it, and least of all common wisdom” (Z, O f Joys and Passions).152
For Aristotle, the great-souled man is magnanimous and the virtue of magnanimity “seems
to be a sort of crown of the virtues, because it enhances them and is never found apart
yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards ...” (TI, The Problem o f Socrates, 10). I 
discuss the significance of Socrates as Nietzsche’s arch-rival in the next chapter.
151 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 184. Cf. GS 139.
152It is important to note that, like Nietzsche’s Ubermensch, Aristotle’s great-souled man might not be 
considered a particularly democratic ideal either, by our standards, but the issue in this chapter is 
universalism and however un-democratic Aristotle’s ethical theory might be the teleological structure 
of virtue in it is based on a fundamental universalism that Nietzsche’s ethical position attempts to 
overcome.
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from them.”153 For Nietzsche, the “self’ is known only as a performative self or, rather, as 
the will to power in action. Therefore, although Nietzsche often refers to certain traits or 
capabilities, including honesty, solitude, and courage, as virtues there is no conception of 
the Ubermensch's magnanimity that would represent the “crown of the virtues” (cf. D 
556; BGE 284).
This “anti-universalism”, with respect to virtues, must be understood in terms of how 
telos is re-configured in Nietzsche’s thought. Nietzsche re-thinks telos along anti- 
universalist lines in order to establish an earthly, as opposed to metaphysical, ideal. In this 
light, Kaufmann’s attempt to describe the Ubermensch as both creative and exemplary may 
be seen to ignore this anti-universalism. The Ubermensch is not an exemplary human being 
in universal terms but rather an earthly telos conceived within a fundamental anti- 
universalist framework of virtue that separates man as a species from a future type that 
overcomes him.
In this way telos itself is re-configured. For Nietzsche, creativity is understood in terms of 
the self-legislation of values divorced from a universal framework of virtue and happiness. 
The reason why there may be no earthly universal ideal for Nietzsche is because life is 
“will to power” and will to power is the expression of hierarchy. Given the will to power 
hypothesis in Nietzsche’s thought, what fundamentally separates Nietzsche from Aristotle 
is his perspective on the relationship between virtues and the human telos.
On Nietzsche’s view Aristotle’s approach, like the Christian approach, denies the 
difference between a strong and independent health that acts according to individual 
virtues and a weak and conformist sickness that requires a universal framework for the 
exercise of virtues to achieve “happiness”. Nietzsche establishes this position clearly in the 
following passage:
153Aristotle, Ethics, p. 155.
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The most general formula at the basis of every religion and morality is: “Do this and this, refrain 
from this and this - and you will be happy! ...” Every morality, every religion is this imperative - 1 
call it the great original sin of reason, immortal unreason. In my mouth this formula is converted 
into its reverse - first example of my “re-valuation of all values”: a well-constituted human being, 
a “happy one”, must perform certain actions and instinctively shrinks from other actions, he 
transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other 
human beings and with things. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness. (TI,
VI, 2)
In summary, where Kaufmann states that Nietzsche’s interpretation of greatness o f soul is 
strongly influenced by Aristotle’s ethical framework MacIntyre insists that it is not. With 
regard to Kaufmann’s assertion that Nietzsche’s anti-Christian position may be best 
understood in light of his appropriation of Aristotle’s megalopsychia, it becomes 
necessary, given MacIntyre’s account of things, to make better sense of what Kaufmann 
subsumes in this claim. The tension lies between Kaufmann’s coupling of Nietzsche and 
Aristotle against Christianity and MacIntyre’s claim that Nietzsche never strays from his 
view that both the Aristotelian and Christian perspectives represent, equally, “the false 
turning taken by Socrates”.
Kaufmann’s Aristotelian Nietzsche
Kaufmann develops his Aristotelian Nietzsche where he hints at a shared Aristotelian 
and Nietzschean ethical view with regard to relations between the strong and the weak 
(the exceptional and the common/mediocre). He suggests that, with respect to the self­
opinion of the common man, Aristotle “condemns vanity without in the least praising 
meekness or humility; and many of the provocative ideas which he expresses so 
unprovocatively and dryly are fashioned into polemical arrows in Nietzsche’s works, 
especially in Zarathustra”.154 Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra includes his positive 
ethical teaching therefore Kaufmann’s interest in anti-Christian “polemical arrows” ought 
to be interpreted here as an allusion to Nietzsche’s alternative ethical project. Thus, where
154Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 328.
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Kaufmann associates the highest virtue with an elevated social ranking, he appears to leave 
open the possibility of a link between Nietzsche and Aristotle with regard to the 
magnanimity of the great-souled man.
What is of foremost significance, however, is the fact that in commenting as he does on 
the differences between Aristotelian and Christian moral systems, Kaufmann never bothers 
to acknowledge the key aspect these frameworks have in common concerning the 
relationship of virtue and telos. In this way, he introduces Aristotle’s influence on 
Nietzsche and, in turn, the anti-Christian nature of that influence in a very selective 
fashion. What Kaufmann suggests, without explicitly claiming it, is that Nietzsche’s anti- 
Christian approach to virtue does not amount to a complete separation of a noble ethical 
framework from the overall moral framework of virtue that a community might be thought 
to share universally:
Nietzsche’s point is not that the happiness of the weak should be sacrificed to that of the strong, 
but that the weak are incapacitated for ultimate happiness. Only the strong attain that happiness 
which all men want.155
In this passage, Kaufmann’s conclusions appear to be expressed in the teleological terms 
appropriate to Aristotle’s moral framework wherein “the strong attain that happiness 
which all men want'.
The suggestion here is that Nietzschean hierarchy does not necessarily preclude the 
notion of an Aristotelian-like telos for man. But, significantly, Kaufmann never makes the 
explicit claim that on Nietzsche’s view the happiness of the strong represents the happiness 
which all men ought to desire or ought to be habituated to desire. Therefore, Kaufmann 
does not explicitly ground his interpretation of Nietzsche in the Aristotelian terms of moral 
teleology and this allows him to avoid positing any overt link between virtue and telos. 
Nevertheless, the implication of Kaufmann’s description of a so-called Nietzschean
155Ibid, p. 329.
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“happiness”, in the passage cited above, remains that, like its Aristotelian counterpart 
eudaimonia, it ought to be understood in terms of a telos for man, however ill-defined.
Against Kaufmann’s reading, it is important to represent clearly Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
hierarchy as they appear, for example, in section 57 of The Anti-Christ. In this section 
Nietzsche does appear to characterize his intentions in terms of an end for man but, unlike 
Aristotle who imagines a telos for man in universal moral terms, Nietzsche imagines the 
end for man to be the creation of a highest type that would represent the overcoming of 
man. On this view the nature of a so-called highest type is not to be understood in terms of 
a recognizable end with respect to all individuals forming a universally integrated ethical 
community. Instead, the majority of individuals, the “herd”, would simply form the 
“moral” foundation upon which an “extra-moral” type might flourish. This highest type is 
the value legislating philosopher of the future, or the Ubermensch, and should be 
understood as such within the context of an active hierarchy of relations in which the 
highest type presides over a caste-like society:
A high culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base, its very first prerequisite is a 
strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. (AC 57)
Hierarchical relations are never worked out in detail in Nietzsche’s philosophy but they
conform to the framework of active hierarchy as I introduced it in chapter one. The
essential point in this framework is that, as Nietzsche puts it in On the Genealogy o f
Morals, “mankind in the mass sacrificed to the prosperity of a single stronger species of
man - that would be an advance” (GMII, 12).
Nietzsche does not secure his ideal according to universal moral principles but rather on 
the basis of that which defines and ensures the difference between his ideal and the rest of 
mankind. Even for Plato, the health of the soul is a universal ideal in the service of which 
his framework of hierarchy makes sense but this is not the case for Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s 
anti-universalism separates the mediocre from the Ubermensch at all levels and there is no
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virtue in common between them. Thus, Nietzsche insists that, “[f]or the mediocre it is 
happiness to be mediocre” (AC 57). And what this suggests, concerning Kaufmann’s 
characterization of Nietzsche’s intentions, is that he overlooks Nietzsche’s “political” 
framework of power in a very misleading way with respect to Nietzsche’s ethical ideal.
Kaufmann’s critique of the proto-fascist Nietzsche
Kaufmann claims that the proto-fascist Nietzsche is an inaccurate interpretation. 
Kaufmann shifts the focus away from the proto-fascist Nietzsche toward the Nietzsche 
who inspires a uniquely creative strength of character. In this way, where Kaufmann re­
considers Nietzsche’s admiration for Caesar and Napoleon he concludes that:
[I]t was not the military or political successes which Nietzsche looked to, but the embodiment of 
the passionate man who controls his passions: the man who, in the face of universal 
disintegration and licentiousness, knowing this decadence as part of his own soul, performs his 
unique deed of self-integration, self-creation, and self-mastery.156
Kaufmann’s point is that if one identifies Nietzsche’s admiration for such controversial
historical figures correctly, in terms other than the terms of political and military conquest,
then one must admit that Nietzsche does not really cross over to something
“unacceptable”, where unacceptable amounts to affirming the manipulation and
exploitation of the rest of humanity on the part of the great man. The argument Kaufmann
wishes to advance, it seems, is that if there is strong evidence that Nietzsche is more
interested in strength of character than simply measuring the value of great men on the
basis of their ability to set masses in motion and destroy great numbers of enemies, then he
is not, at bottom, an unacceptable advocate of “power”. Indeed, it is on the integrity of
this link to character that Kaufmann suggests that Nietzsche’s Ubermensch has important
Aristotelian qualities.
156Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 273.
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It is also along these lines that Kaufmann emphasizes the significance of Goethe, 
Beethoven, Heine, and Stendhal as well as Caesar and Napoleon. The great-souled man, 
as artist and warrior alike, is to be valued for his great character. With respect to Napoleon 
Kaufmann seeks to distance Nietzsche’s admiration for the famous general from any 
admiration for nationalism or wars of liberation. Kaufmann’s concern is to bracket out 
Nietzsche’s “politics”, where politics might be thought to mean the power that the great 
man wields over the rest of humanity. Sidestepping a more comprehensive consideration of 
the political, Kaufmann links Nietzsche with Aristotle concerning greatness of soul in an 
effort to advance the idea that Nietzsche intends to offer up the character of the great- 
souled man as an exemplar of virtue rather than as an exemplar of tyrannical power.
But I argue that Kaufmann’s focus on escaping the tyrannical Nietzsche obscures the
disjunction Nietzsche establishes between the ethical life of the Ubermensch and the idea
of moral “utility”. Nietzsche states:
“Moral evaluation,” in so far as it is a social evaluation, measures men exclusively according to 
the effects they produce. A man with a taste of his own, enclosed and concealed by his solitude, 
incommunicable, reserved - an unfathomed man, thus a man of a higher, at any rate a different 
species; how should you be able to evaluate him, since you cannot know him, cannot compare 
him? (W P 878)
Given Nietzsche’s stress on the moral incommunicability of the great-souled man it is 
patently inaccurate of Kaufmann to suggest that Nietzsche is positively influenced by 
Aristotle’s ethics in the way that he claims Nietzsche is. Moreover, the proto-fascist 
Nietzsche that Kaufmann targets for critique is never the uniquely political Nietzsche 
because hierarchy and independent value creation are never addressed in terms of a unified 
political philosophy in Kaufmann’s book. Indeed, if they had been, then Kaufmann would 
have had to acknowledge the fact that Nietzsche’s description of value creation, with its 
emphasis on being morally incommunicable, makes it impossible to universalize any value 
as an ethical ideal. Nietzsche states that “the ‘higher nature’ of the great man lies in being
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different, in ‘incommunicability’, in distance of rank, not in an effect of any kind - even if 
he made the whole globe tremble”(WP 876).
Thus, the “value” of the great-souled man, for Nietzsche, is never understood according 
to a utility-based criterion of value, be it moral or military. There is a fundamental division 
between the Ubermensch and the rest of society with respect to “value” and what this 
means is that there is no attempt in Nietzsche’s books to articulate the value of his ethical 
ideal to humanity in a way that is familiar to us. The only “value” Nietzsche’s highest type 
may be the thought to have is as an overcoming of the species man itself.
At the time that Kaufmann wrote his book it was necessary to liberate Nietzsche from 
his reputation as a proto-fascist thinker, and this would explain Kaufmann’s attempt to 
undermine the purported military and tyrannical nature of Nietzsche’s great-souled man. 
But what is most significant about Kaufmann’s reading, for my purposes, is that the 
apolitical thesis that would allow for an Aristotelian Nietzsche is still very much with us. 
Therefore, in the next section, I suggest that it is the apolitical Nietzsche that has been re­
politicized as a perfectionist ideal within democratic structures of thought. Thus, it may be 
interesting to consider the possibility that Kaufmann’s Aristotelian Nietzsche remains at 
the centre of our assumptions about Nietzsche’s value and these assumptions may be 
working against a better understanding of the political in Nietzsche.
the politics of perfection
In his book on the political in Nietzsche, Dan Conway insists that the Ubermensch ideal 
represents the “perfection” of the species man as it is.157 In this way, Conway’s 
presentation of Nietzsche’s ideal appears to re-introduce Kaufmann’s thesis that the 
Ubermensch is an exemplary human being (i.e. an example of ethical perfection for all
1S7Conway, Nietzsche and the political, pp. 20-21.
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others to emulate). Conway claims that the Ubermensch “embodies a perfection of the 
soul from which others may draw courage and inspiration.”158 Yet Conway differs from 
Kaufmann where he presents Nietzsche’s philosophy as uniquely “political”. On Conway’s 
view, Nietzsche ought to be considered political where “[t]he central task of politics ... is 
to produce (as a matter of design) those individuals who stand, ‘in relation to humankind 
as a whole,’ as exemplary human beings.”159 
What makes Conway’s interpretation political is that he attempts to address the question 
of producing the Ubermensch whereas Kaufmann sees Nietzsche’s highest type as 
exemplary without further mention of the future context of the ideal. As I argued above, 
Kaufmann does not describe Nietzsche’s Ubermensch, nor the production of such 
individuals, as distinctly political because his specific aim is to disabuse his reader of the 
proto-fascist Nietzsche. Moreover, Kaufmann’s interpretation may be considered 
decidedly apolitical where it ignores the real nature of the link Nietzsche forges between 
the unique ethical life of his highest type and hierarchical will to power. Hence, given the 
shortcomings of Kaufmann’s reading, it would appear that interpreters like Conway would 
have to address this important link if their work were to be considered a proper analysis of 
what is uniquely political in Nietzsche’s thought.
Conway does address hierarchy to a certain extent. He addresses the difference 
between Nietzsche’s Ubermensch and the noble type generally speaking. Conway remarks:
In contrast to Zarathustra’s ambiguous teaching, Nietzsche’s sketch of the Ubermensch in The 
Antichrist(ian) is consistent with (and explicitly linked to) his more familiar discussions of the 
political role of exemplary human beings. On those rare occasions when he uses the term 
Ubermensch, he apparently has in mind the apotheosis of those specimens of “higher humanity” 
to whom he more regularly refers. While it may be important in certain contexts to distinguish 
between the Ubermensch and this “higher humanity,” we are justified in treating the two concepts 
as continuous within the economy of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, the only salient difference 
between the Ubermensch and other, more familiar specimens of this “higher humanity” is that 




the task of perfecting the all-too-human.160 
In this passage Conway does not obscure things in terms of an Aristotelian influence on 
Nietzsche the way Kaufmann does. Yet, in claiming that the only thing which separates 
Nietzsche’s highest type from his higher types is the notion that the former is to be willed 
where the latter simply appeared, Conway may be seen to have sidestepped the issue of the 
“incommunicability” between strata as misleadingly as Kaufmann.
Conway is able to ignore the incommunicability of Nietzsche’s highest type on the 
authority of one passage from The Anti-Christ wherein, according to him, Nietzsche rules 
out the kind of ethical solitude the Ubermensch may be thought to represent in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra:
Nietzsche describes these iibermenschlich types as standing “relative to,” rather than independent 
of, “humanity as a whole” (AC 4). This description not only militates against defining the 
Ubermensch in absolute or ideal terms, but also directs our attention to the relationships that 
obtain between Ubermenschen and “humanity as a whole.” In fact, if these iibermenschlich types 
stood independent of “humanity as a whole,” estranged altogether from the ethical life of the 
communities that produce them, then they could play no role in the permanent enhancement of 
humankind. It is within the domain of these (admittedly unique) relations that the distinctly 
ethical content of Nietzsche’s perfectionism resides. His attention to these relations furthermore 
indicates that he understands the Ubermensch as constituting the perfection, rather than the 
transcendence, of humankind.161
Conway’s rather obscure argument is based on the claim that Nietzsche’s highest type
does not represent an overcoming of man but rather man’s perfection. Yet he also claims
that Nietzsche’s highest type is not an ideal. This begs the question as to what constitutes
“perfection” on Conway’s interpretation where a highest type would represent something
perfected in less than ideal terms.
Conway, like Kaufmann before him, defines Nietzsche’s Ubermensch in virtue of what
160Ibid, p. 22.
161Ibid, p. 23. Conway does go on to admit that communities of this type could never be founded 
on the kind of rational principles or notions of inclusiveness which would be sufficient “to mollify 
Nietzsche’s liberal critics”. Nevertheless, he suspects that such communities would be friendly, that 
they would cater to a certain aesthetic sensibility, and that they would create an environment wherein 
individuals would be free to “elevate one another through conflict and contest” ( p. 24). Such claims 
point to the theory of agonistic democracy I considered in the last chapter.
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he is not rather than what he is. For Conway, he is not a transcendent type. But what does 
this mean exactly? To discover what this means it is necessary to examine Nietzsche’s 
thoughts in The Anti-Christ, since it is in this book that Conway finds the textual support 
for his specific rendering of Nietzsche’s intentions. In The Anti-Christ Nietzsche states:
Mankind does not represent a development of the better or the stronger or the higher in the way 
that is believed today. “Progress” is merely a modem idea, that is to say a false idea. The 
European of today is of far less value than the European of the Renaissance; onward development 
is not by any means, by any necessity the same thing as elevation, advance, strengthening. (AC
4)
Clearly, in this passage, Nietzsche is attempting to disabuse his nineteenth century readers 
of their faith  in moral progress. This challenge opens up a space for Nietzsche to suggest 
what he would consider to be a real “enhancement” of man. Thus, he points toward his 
highest type by referring back to the great men of the past who appeared on the world’s 
stage randomly and not as the result of any necessary process ordained by God :
In another sense there are cases of individual success constantly appearing in the most various 
parts of the earth and from the most various cultures in which a higher type (h&herer Typus) does 
manifest itself: something which in relation to collective mankind is a sort of superman (etwas, 
das im Verhdltnis zur Gesamt-Menschheit eineArt Ubermensch ist). Such chance occurrences of 
great success have always been possible and perhaps always will be possible. And entire races, 
tribes, nations can under certain circumstances represent such a lucky hit. (AC 4)
Importantly, it is this passage which Conway considers to be “decisive” evidence that
Nietzsche’s highest type “embodies a perfection of the soul from which others may draw
courage and inspiration.”162 But the integrity of Conway’s claim depends largely on what
Nietzsche’s comparison is intended to suggest. What is much more consistent with his
overall project is that Nietzsche is simply saying that the “lucky hit” throughout history
establishes a hierarchy of types that allows us to consider the possibility of producing an
even greater type in the future but by design rather than by luck.
Nevertheless, in this section of The Anti-Christ, Conway identifies two elements which
are meant to secure his interpretation of Nietzsche’s “politics of perfection”. Firstly, since
162Conway, Nietzsche and the political, p. 20.
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Nietzsche does not consider the scientific evolution of man to be necessarily synonymous 
with man’s moral “improvement”, his epic portrayal of the Ubermensch in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, as a future type, must be viewed as an entirely “literary” embellishment. 
Secondly, and following from this first point, it may be concluded that if the Ubermensch 
is not specifically a future type then, given what Nietzsche has to say about the higher type 
in the foregoing passage from The Anti-Christ, the figure of the Ubermensch is meant to 
be as exemplary a figure, “in relation to humankind as a whole”, as those specimens which 
make up Nietzsche’s “higher humanity” are and have been in the past. The only difference 
between Nietzsche’s highest type and his higher humanity is, to repeat, the fact that the 
former is meant to be willed where the latter simply appeared. Thus, Nietzsche is rendered 
“political” where, as introduced above, “[t]he central task of politics ... is to produce (as a 
matter of design) those individuals who stand, ‘in relation to humankind as a whole,’ as 
exemplary human beings.”163
Conway, like Kaufmann, manages to circumvent the specific relationship of ethics to 
social order in Nietzsche’s thought by relying on the specious assumption that Nietzsche’s 
Ubermensch represents an exemplary human being with respect to the rest of humanity. 
Unlike Kaufmann, Conway addresses the difference between the highest type and 
Nietzsche’s higher humanity as “political” but in doing so he fails to distinguish properly 
between the two according to the difference between a traditional framework of moral 
universalism and Nietzschean anti-universalism. By concentrating on the “production” of 
exemplary human beings Conway is able to render Nietzsche political according to a 
democratic perfectionist framework while implicitly remaining faithful to the apolitical 
Nietzsche of Kaufmann’s earlier work.
Where Nietzsche, in The Anti-Christ, describes his higher type as “something which in
163Ibid, pp. 20-21.
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relation to collective mankind is a sort of superman (Ubermensch)”, he does not say that 
his higher type in this instance is the Ubermensch he introduces elsewhere, let alone a 
more accurate rendering of the Ubermensch he introduces elsewhere. All that he appears 
to say is that “noble” individuals represent something iibermenschlich “in relation to 
collective mankind”. In The Anti-Christ Nietzsche states that what distinguishes his 
philosopher of the future most profoundly, from both his higher humanity and mediocre 
types, is his unique conception of happiness that involves a superior capability and desire 
for the life of extra-moral danger:
The most spiritual human beings, as the strongest, find their happiness where others find their 
destruction: in the labyrinth, in severity toward themselves and others, in attempting; their joy 
lies in self-constraint: with them asceticism becomes nature, need, instinct. (AC 57)
Nietzsche never identifies his higher humanity within “the labyrinth” as he describes it here.
“The labyrinth”, most certainly, indicates the pursuit of knowledge but it reflects the
philosopher of the future’s pursuit of “performative” or “experimental” truth-seeking,
specifically, and this involves an ethic of extra-moral self-overcoming that corresponds to
the life of independent value legislation. Thus, greatness of soul is the philosopher’s virtue
alone and it is a communicable “virtue” only in the sense that it represents how
philosophical “happiness”, “the labyrinth”, may be bracketed out and distinguished apart
from the happiness of the rest of humanity.
conclusion
In this chapter I have established the incommunicability of the Ubermensch ideal 
according to Nietzsche’s own characterization of an autonomy that defies any universal 
framework of virtue. I have done so in order to illustrate why the uniquely political in 
Nietzsche defies the attempt on the part of agonists and other democratic-perfectionist 
interpreters of Nietzsche, like Conway, to tame his ideas by forcing them into a universal
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framework of values or virtues as the case may be. Nietzschean autonomy, as self­
overcoming and value creation, is not comprehensible as a framework for the perfection of 
individuals or groups within an egalitarian ethos and is therefore not possible as a solution 
to the fact of pluralism within a political context that must be democratic. A democratic 
politics of difference is necessarily a “levelling” politics and Nietzsche’s politics of 
difference is a “hierarchical” politics.
If Nietzsche’s conception of autonomy is to be thought of as representing a politics of 
perfection then such a politics is necessarily anti-democratic in nature. Of course it is 
possible to conceive of an anti-democratic, or un-democratic, notion of autonomy that is 
still comprehensible to us even though we are egalitarians. Indeed, Aristotle’s conception 
of the great-souled man provides us with just such a framework. But Nietzsche’s 
conception, as I have presented it thus far, defies even Aristotle’s approach because of its 
fundamental anti-universalism. In this way, what is unique about the political in Nietzsche 
is that it is both anti-democratic and anti-universalist.
At this point it is necessary to consider the nature of Nietzschean autonomy as a unique 
conception of the philosophical life. Self-overcoming and self-creation is for Nietzsche a 
mode of life that is possible only for the philosopher of the future. This makes Nietzschean 
autonomy an exclusive conception but it is important to make better sense of how 
Nietzsche develops this notion of philosophy and the way in which he came to articulate it 
as universally incommunicable. It is to this discussion that I now turn.
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p a r t  n
CHAPTER FIVE - TRAGIC PHILOSOPHY
In part two of the thesis I present an exegesis of Nietzsche’s political philosophy. The 
argument I construct should be seen as an alternative to the recent democratic articulations 
of the political in Nietzsche that I have addressed in part one. My approach to the political 
in Nietzsche is based on the supposition that there is an important relationship between 
Nietzsche’s revaluation of philosophy and his thoughts on hierarchy. I develop my position 
according to this basic claim.
In an attempt to establish a new conception of the political in Nietzsche I argue that it is 
not enough to say simply that Nietzsche’s thought is presented in an unsystematic way and 
that it therefore defies categorization as a self-contained political philosophy. Instead, I 
argue that Nietzsche’s thought is more accurately described as aw//-systematic or anti- 
theoretical and what it means to be anti-theoretical in Nietzsche’s case suggests a unique 
relationship between politics and philosophy that ought to be acknowledged and better 
understood. For Nietzsche, being anti-theoretical has to do with a particular unity of style 
and content. Against what will be called a “theoretical” unity of style and content, 
Nietzsche’s aphoristic and genealogical style/method complements the attempt to re-think 
philosophy in the direction of a life-affirming way of living a philosophical life. Thus, 
Nietzsche attempts to subvert and overcome a “life-denying” way of doing philosophy and 
being a philosopher.
In keeping with Nietzsche’s inclination to divide the world up into types it may be said 
that there is a theoretical type that embodies a life-denying will to truth. Nietzsche 
challenges the integrity of the theoretical will to truth by replacing the goal of “truth” with 
the goal of “life”. Nietzsche associates the systematic philosopher with slave morality and
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thus, by contrast, associates a noble will to power with the possibility of an anti-theoretical 
philosopher of the future. In Daybreak Nietzsche states:
Systematisers practise a kind of play-acting: in as much as they want to fill out a system and 
round off its horizon, they have to try to present their weaker qualities in the same style as their 
stronger - they try to impersonate whole and uniformly strong natures. (D  31 8 )
In this aphorism Nietzsche establishes a link between how one philosophizes and the type
of weak or strong life individuals represent as types of philosophers.
Therefore, in this chapter, I address Nietzsche’s attempt to distinguish an anti-theoretical 
conception of philosophy apart from a theoretical one. I describe Nietzsche’s anti- 
theoretical conception of philosophy as tragic philosophy and in doing so I concentrate on 
the significance of tragic knowledge and the pre-Socratic thinkers Nietzsche admired. In 
this chapter I focus on Nietzsche’s early and middle periods in order to establish the key 
elements of his political thought that, later, come to inform the positive teachings of his 
mature period which I turn to in the next chapter. The purpose of presenting my position 
in this way is to trace the development of Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy from an 
early pre-Socratic or “tragic” approach in general to the more specific Nietzschean idea of 
philosophy as value legislation.
This chapter is presented in eight parts. I begin by situating Nietzsche’s anti-theoretical 
approach within the context of the controversy over Nietzsche’s status as a political 
thinker. In the second section I introduce the idea of the tragic and the theoretical as 
competing ways of thinking about philosophy that map onto Nietzsche’s intuitions about 
life-affirmation and life-denial. In the third and fourth sections I describe this opposition in 
terms of the significance of genealogy as a personalized Nietzschean mode of 
philosophizing over and against something I describe as Socratism. And in the fifth section 
I provide an overall context for Nietzsche’s attitude toward Socratism by linking it up with 
his critique of the ascetic ideal in On the Genealogy o f Morals. In the last three sections of
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the chapter I launch an exegesis of Nietzsche’s efforts to liberate “tragic” philosophy from 
what I have introduced in the first three sections as “theoretical” philosophy. It is in these 
last three sections that I focus specifically on an exegesis of the development of 
Nietzsche’s ideas from his early writings of the 1870s through Human All Too Human and 
Daybreak up to The Gay Science.
It must be emphasized that in these last three sections, especially, I establish the origin 
and early development of the role of philosophy and hierarchy in Nietzsche’s thought. 
What this requires is an exegesis that also illustrates how the development of Nietzsche’s 
political philosophy evolves in relation to his struggle with the metaphysical 
correspondence theory of truth, or the “falsification thesis”, as I referred to it in chapter 
one. Therefore, an important element of my exegesis in part two is to articulate the 
movement of Nietzsche’s thoughts on philosophy and hierarchy according to the stages of 
overcoming the two world theory of representation.
Foucault, Bernard Williams, and the question of “theory”
Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche as the first philosopher to think about power 
relations beyond the structure of traditional political theory suggests that Nietzsche’s 
thought is non-theoretical and therefore the philosophy in it is not rigidly circumscribed 
within a fixed conception of the political. In other words, Nietzsche’s non-theoretical 
approach is thought to preclude the possibility that there is a self-contained political 
philosophy that we ought to be concerned about. My counter-claim is that this approach is 
limited where our concern may be to develop a conception of what is uniquely political in 
Nietzsche.
The Foucaultian position relies on the implications of Nietzsche’s thought as non- 
theoretical or unsystematic. Bernard Williams elaborates this position where he suggests
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that “[w]ith Nietzsche ... the resistance to the continuation of philosophy by ordinary 
means is built into the text, which is booby-trapped, not only against recovering theory 
from it, but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates to theory.”164 
Despite this obstacle to easy understanding which Williams presents as something 
Nietzsche orchestrated, where he describes the texts as “booby-trapped”, Williams 
nonetheless refuses to characterize Nietzsche’s thought as non-philosophical. Thus, 
Williams claims that Nietzsche is non-theoretical yet philosophical.
What is odd about Williams’s characterization is that he acknowledges the overtly 
intentional nature of Nietzsche’s non-theoretical method yet he makes no effort to better 
understand what Nietzsche’s purpose might mean over and against a philosophical 
tradition that relies on theory as a prerequisite for its communication and elaboration. By 
“theory” or the “theoretical” I mean systematic in terms of a well-ordered and logical 
progression of ideas presented in a formal exposition. But I also refer to the theoretical 
throughout this chapter as a mode of philosophizing that embodies a life-denying will to 
truth according to Nietzsche’s framework of moral psychology. Therefore, the theoretical 
may be understood, on Nietzsche’s perspective, in terms of the unity of form and content 
particular to a mode of philosophical “life” Nietzsche opposes.
Now what is especially curious about Williams’s characterization of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is that he goes on to suggest that even though Nietzsche’s texts are in- 
themselves “securely defended against exegesis by the extraction of theory” we should not, 
in attempting to put those texts to use, feel constrained to avoid theorising ourselves.165 
Indeed, Williams says nothing about taking Nietzsche seriously from the point of view that
164Bernard Williams, “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, 
ed. Richard Schacht (London: University of California Press, 1994), p. 238.
165Ibid. I suggest that “extraction” is a misnomer and that Nietzsche’s relation to “theory” is best 
described as an abstention from theory.
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there might be something in his non-theoretical philosophy that resists assimilation to our 
theoretical mode of philosophizing. What I mean is that the non-theoretical nature of 
Nietzsche’s style of writing may be an important clue to something substantive in his 
thought which is meant to resist our attempts to “theorise” his ideas and thus tame them as 
well. But Williams merely suggests that “Nietzsche will not help if he is taken to impose 
some one method on us.”166
In focussing our attention on what might be helpful to us instead of what Nietzsche is 
actually doing or saying, Williams undermines the possibility that Nietzsche’s texts may 
yield a rather sophisticated political philosophy. This explains why Williams is adamant 
that Nietzsche is philosophical yet unhelpful as a thinker who offers us a unified body of 
thought. The point is to retain Nietzsche’s value to us without having any Nietzschean 
limits imposed on that value. What Williams actually says is that the legitimacy of the 
attempt to make use of Nietzsche follows from Foucault’s claim that there is “no single 
Nietzscheism” we should be concerned about and that this truth (?) follows necessarily 
from the abstention from theory in Nietzsche’s texts.167 The abstention from theory, as 
mentioned above, refers to the presentation of ideas in an unsystematic way that makes 
deriving a unified political philosophy impossible.
I argue that Williams ends up restricting our political interpretations of Nietzsche by 
imposing this apparent “truth” about what the abstention from theory in Nietzsche’s texts 
means. In other words, Williams presents us with a particular interpretation based on 
assumptions made about what the abstention from theory in Nietzsche ought to mean fo r  
us. In this way, Williams’s argument follows from Foucault’s assessment of Nietzsche as 




is what allows Foucault to make the claim that there is no single Nietzscheism about which 
we ought to be concerned. And I discussed Foucault’s position at length in chapter two. 
Williams, however, goes on to discuss Nietzsche’s conception of the will in terms of a thin 
moral psychology that might be of interest to us. Once again, Nietzsche’s conception of 
the will is assumed to be of interest to us according to Williams because it plays no 
necessary part in a unique Nietzschean political philosophy that would make it more 
difficult for us to assimilate within our systematic theories of politics and morality.
Concerning my counter-claim, what is most significant is the idea that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is void of theory but not philosophy and this is supposed to mean, according to 
Williams, that we can theorise Nietzschean ideas within the framework of democratic 
politics but we cannot attribute to Nietzsche any significant and integrated political 
framework of his own. This is important to my position because it amounts to “policing” 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in a way that discredits any attempt to piece together a uniquely 
Nietzschean political vision. It is interesting to note, therefore, that elsewhere, in Shame 
and Necessity, Williams claims that Nietzsche’s philosophy does not yield a coherent 
politics. He qualifies this observation on the grounds that any politics Nietzsche may be 
thought to have does not address our ethical concerns. Thus, he concludes that Nietzsche 
“provides no way of relating his ethical and psychological insights to an intelligible account 
of modern society - a failing only thinly concealed by the impression he gives of having 
thoughts about modem politics that are determinate but terrible.”168
In this way, Williams attempts to strengthen his approach by suggesting, inaccurately, 
that if Nietzsche may be thought of as advocating a certain political position at all then he 
must have intended it to be applicable within a modern moral context. And this claim is
168Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, (California: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 9- 
10.
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clearly meant to give the impression that Nietzsche’s political formulations remain under­
determined in contrast to many of his philosophical claims. In turn, Nietzsche’s 
philosophical claims may be separated out and made to appear more transmissible within 
our modern political theories.
Williams’s efforts to discredit a link between Nietzsche’s ethical and political philosophy 
parallels Foucault’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s ideas on power. Foucault, as I have 
mentioned in previous chapters, abandons Nietzsche’s conception of power, as will to 
power, on the grounds that Nietzsche’s thoughts are open to a myriad of uses and 
interpretations. And this allows Foucault’s own formulations on power to remain 
equivocal with respect to their Nietzschean roots. Thus, where Nietzsche stresses the 
elements of commanding and obeying in all power relations and the necessary link to 
revaluation therein, Foucault’s observations and hypotheses emphasize both domination 
and resistance in power relations without any necessary link to moral values or moral 
psychology per se.
What I want to emphasize, therefore, is that Foucault’s characterization of Nietzsche as 
a non-theoretical and unsystematic thinker is a purely negative re-classification which fails 
to make sense of Nietzsche’s positive teachings and therefore the uniqueness of his 
relationship to the theoretical tradition. Characterizing Nietzsche as an unsystematic 
thinker merely serves to obscure his unified project wherein the style/method of 
philosophizing is intended to complement an alternative philosophical and political 
framework based on a new way of thinking outside of, or beyond, what might be referred 
to as the “theoretical”. In like manner, by dissociating the substance of Nietzsche’s thought 
from the style of presentation, Williams is able to assimilate what he describes as 
Nietzsche’s “minimalist moral psychology” to “theory” since this, as he puts it, may be 
valuable to us. But this misses out on an aspect that is more specifically important to
138
Nietzsche. In other words, it overlooks the anti-modern and future “us” to whom 
Nietzsche is speaking. In assimilating Nietzsche’s minimalist moral psychology to theory 
Williams eschews any concern for the possibility that there is something about doing 
philosophy in a theoretical way that is representative, on Nietzsche’s view, of a certain 
moral psychology that he, Nietzsche, opposes and hopes to overcome. Thus, Williams 
ignores the significance of the connection between form and content that Nietzsche 
articulates and exploits. Williams, like Foucault, avoids and obscures what is uniquely 
political in Nietzsche.
Given my position against Foucault, I need to discredit Williams’s characterization of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy by offering an exegesis of Nietzsche’s thought that establishes an 
interesting link between his philosophy and his politics. Specifically, this requires an 
exegesis that defies Williams’s claim that Nietzsche’s texts are securely defended against 
exegesis by the abstention from theory. What is required is an analysis of Nietzsche’s 
position on the “theoretical” as a life-denying mode of philosophy. It will then be necessary 
to elaborate Nietzsche’s alternative anti-theoretical vision which may be described as tragic 
philosophy.
the theoretical and the tragic
In his Attempt at a Self-Criticism (ASC) Nietzsche claims that as early as The Birth o f 
Tragedy he began to associate the philosophical activity with life-affirming values at least 
insofar as he began to question the value of pessimism as a sign of either weakness or 
strength:
An intellectual predilection for hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspects of existence, prompted 
by well-being, by overflowing health, by the fullness of existence? Is it perhaps possible to suffer 
precisely from overfullness? The sharp-eyed courage that tempts and attempts, that craves the 
frightful as the enemy, the worthy enemy, against whom one can test one’s strength? From whom 
one can learn what it means “to be frightened”? What is the significance of the tragic myth 
among the Greeks of the best, the strongest, the most courageous period? And the tremendous
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phenomenon of the Dionysian - and, bom from it, tragedy - what might they signify? (B T ,
ASC, 1)
In this passage from Attempt at a Self-Criticism, written 16 years after The Birth o f  
Tragedy, his interest in the Greeks and especially the tragic myth among the Greeks must 
be understood in terms of a re-emergence of tragic pessimism in the future context of the 
Ubermensch ideal which he had introduced at this point. It is tragic pessimism that 
Nietzsche affirms over and against the nihilism of the Christian ascetic ideal. The tragic 
view of life is a pessimism toward life that is life-affirming and this must be weighed 
against the optimism of modem man that seeks truth in order to overcome the suffering 
and iniquity of existence. Thus, he states the following:
Could it be possible that, in spite of all ’’modem ideas” and the prejudices of a democratic taste, 
the triumph of optimism, the gradual prevalence of rationality, practical and theoretical 
utilitarianism, no less than democracy itself which developed at the same time, might all have 
been symptoms of a decline of strength, of impending old age, and of physiological weariness? 
These, and not pessimism? ... It is apparent that it was a whole cluster of grave questions with 
which this book burdened itself. Let us add the gravest question of all. What seen in the 
perspective of life, is the significance of morality? (BT, ASC, 4)
Of course the question of the link between morality and “life” has already been answered
by Nietzsche at this point. The “physiological weariness” refers to the slave morality of
Christianity and its modern forms of expression: rationality, democracy, and utility.
Modernity has inherited the physiological weariness of the original slave revolt in morality
which relied on the weapon of spiritual rather than physical revenge against the strong or
noble types. Spiritual revenge is “theoretical” revenge in the sense that the genius of the
weak was to develop the idea of responsibility for evil which imposed bad conscience on
to the moral psychology of the strong (GM I, II). In this way, modernity represents a
physiological weariness because it affirms life only at the level of the morality of utility as I
described it in chapter one.
Although Nietzsche had not developed his hypothesis of the will to power at the time 
that he wrote The Birth o f Tragedy, it is clear that tragic pessimism is understood by the
140
Nietzsche of The Birth o f Tragedy as a life-affirming instinct of some sort, however ill- 
defined that instinct may have been at that stage. The key difference between the 
theoretical and the tragic in The Birth o f Tragedy is the difference between approaches to 
truth-seeking and knowledge. Theoretical optimism describes the Socratic turn toward 
rationality and the pursuit of eternal truth whereas tragic knowledge maintains the 
significance of illusion, myth, and what may be referred to as the purely anthropomorphic 
nature of all philosophical knowledge. Clearly, in The Birth o f Tragedy, Nietzsche is 
struggling with metaphysics at a very initial stage. However, the important point is that he 
tries to distinguish a tragic mode of thinking and knowing apart from a theoretical mode of 
thinking and knowing.
The Socratic turn toward eternal truth puts truth on the road to radical scepticism with 
respect to the so-called world of appearances or the world of the senses and this, 
according to Nietzsche’s famous argument, ends in nihilism as the Christian ascetic ideal 
begets the will to scientific truth that undermines the foundations of the Christian god and 
Christian values (GM III). Yet, in The Birth o f Tragedy Nietzsche has already identified 
the seeds of an alternative perspective and thus it is the tragic mode that affirms the need 
for art and illusion as the backdrop to truth-seeking. The tragic mode affirms illusion as the 
necessary medium of truth-seeking and in this way secures knowledge against the 
unwitting drive to nihilism. In his notes from the 1870s Nietzsche writes:
For the tragic philosopher the appearance of the metaphysical as merely anthropomorphic 
completes the picture o f existence. He is not a sceptic. Here there is a concept which must be 
created, for scepticism is not the goal. When carried to its limits the knowledge drive turns 
against itself in order to proceed to the critique o f knowing. Knowledge in the service of the best 
life. One must even will illusion - that is what is tragic. (PT 12)
Therefore, it is the ability to “will illusion” which Nietzsche describes as tragic and he sees
this mode of knowing as a creative mode superior to scepticism.
In The Birth o f Tragedy Nietzsche writes:
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Therefore Lessing, the most honest theoretical man, dared to announce that he cared more for the 
search after truth than for truth itself - and thus revealed the fundamental secret of science, to the 
astonishment, and indeed the anger, of the scientific community. Besides this isolated insight, 
bom of an excess of honesty if not of exuberance, there is, to be sure, a profound illusion that first 
saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought, using the 
thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not 
only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies 
science as an instinct and leads science again and again to its limits at which it must turn into art 
- which is really the aim o f its mechanism. (B T , 15)
What Nietzsche means by “correcting” being is the modem faith in science and the idea 
that our will to scientific truth will eventually eliminate suffering and injustice. In this way, 
Nietzsche attacks the feeling of moral evolution that tends to accompany scientific 
advancement. Nietzsche’s presentation of truth here foreshadows his critique of the 
Christian will to truth in his mature works. But what is especially noteworthy at this early 
stage is that Nietzsche has already conceived of the problem of nihilism. The difference 
between Nietzsche’s presentation of the tragic mode in The Birth o f Tragedy and his re­
configuration of it as value creation is that in the later works Nietzsche gives “life” 
ontological definition as the will to power. Thus, in the mature Nietzsche, we find a 
version of the tragic that has been re-introduced according to the framework of active 
hierarchy.
In the early writings Nietzsche is already thinking about an alternative to the ascetic ideal 
but the tragic conception is still a non-specific idea about the need for art to provide the 
meaning for truth-seeking which the drive for truth itself cannot offer us. Therefore, what I 
would point to as evidence of Nietzsche’s first and original step down the road to the 
revaluation of values is his presentation of the tragic as a world view in opposition to the 
theoretical world view he sees embodied in the figure of Socrates. Nietzsche writes:
If ancient tragedy was diverted from its course by the dialectical desire for knowledge and the 
optimism of science, this fact might lead us to believe that there is an eternal conflict between the 
theoretical and the tragic world view, and only after the spirit of science has been pursued to its 
limits, and its claim to universal validity destroyed by the evidence of these limits may we hope 
for a rebirth of tragedy. (B T , 17)
It is this particular tragic approach to truth-seeking that Nietzsche would go on to develop
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further and not the Wagnerian pretensions that may appear to eclipse his ideas in The Birth 
o f Tragedy on a superficial reading of it. But I now turn to a brief summary of the unity of 
style and content in Nietzsche’s overall project that will help introduce, further, the theme 
of tragic philosophy.
aphorism and genealogy as an anti-theoretical style
One of Nietzsche’s criticisms of his first book is that it fails to communicate his ideas in 
an altogether new and personalised language of its own. And what is most important about 
this self-criticism is that the style did not properly complement the substance of what he 
wanted to say. Therefore, Nietzsche laments having expressed his thoughts in The Birth o f  
Tragedy the way he did. What he suggests is that he should have allowed himself an 
individual language of his own in which to express new values at odds with Kant’s and 
Schopenhauer’s “spirit and taste”. Instead, however, he attempted to express his new 
thoughts “by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas” (BT, ASC, 6).
Concerning the phases of Nietzsche’s writing and how he presents his thought, his work 
may be divided into three different stages. The first stage includes The Birth o f Tragedy, 
his notes from the early 1870s, his early essays including The Greek State, Homer on 
Competition, and Philosophy in the Tragic Age o f the Greeks, as well as his Untimely 
Meditations.169 In these early writings Nietzsche makes his first bold attempt to wrestle 
with truth as well as the purpose of philosophy and the role of the philosopher. The early 
writings, except for the notes, were presented in essay form and are distinguished more by 
their polemical character than by their example as experiments in how philosophical ideas 
might be communicated anti-theoretically. Nevertheless, they address the theme of anti-
169Since I have made reference to Homer on Competition in earlier chapters, and I make reference to 
The Greek State in chapter 7 ,1 focus on Philosophy and Truth, Philosophy in the Tragic Age o f the 
Greeks, and Untimely Meditations in this chapter.
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theoretical philosophy in an interesting way and they are vital to understanding the 
consistency of Nietzsche’s concerns for they represent the intellectual workshop from 
which he eventually launched his critique of moral psychology and his positive teachings of 
the will to power, eternal recurrence, and the Ubermensch.
The next phase of writing, known amongst Nietzsche scholars as the middle period, 
represents the time of Nietzsche’s first indulgence in the aphoristic mode and includes 
Human All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science. During this period Nietzsche’s 
style is considered to have been at its most anti-dogmatic and I want to acknowledge this 
period as Nietzsche’s initial attempt to develop an “anti-theoretical” style of writing to 
complement his attack on “theoretical” philosophy. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, therefore, 
marks the next significant transition and ushers in the mature period of Nietzsche’s 
positive teachings. During this final period Nietzsche may be said to have experimented a 
great deal with his writing style and the presentation of his thought is at times poetic and 
allegorical. Overall, however, his most consistent style is best summarized as aphoristic.170 
The aphoristic style is combined with a highly rhetorical mode in the mature writings 
providing Nietzsche with a cultivated “language of his own” in which to communicate his 
new ideas and positive teachings.
What distinguishes the aphoristic style of the final period from the middle period is the 
gradual development of that style from an earlier anti-dogmatic approach to a more 
integrated presentation of the central themes of his work. Books like Beyond Good and 
Evil and On the Genealogy o f Morals are well thought out and in them we can see 
Nietzsche’s attempt to offer the most sophisticated presentation of his unique style. In the 
mature works Nietzsche’s rhetorical and aphoristic mode of expression may be seen as the 
language of the will to power and it represents an overcoming of the Schopenhauerian
170See Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, pp. 76-78.
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language of the will Nietzsche set out to re-configure. The consistent development of this 
new “language” represents the movement away from the systematic style of traditional 
philosophy and toward a new vision of what philosophy might become.
What obtains in On the Genealogy o f Morals is the best example of the unity of form 
and content that is representative of Nietzsche’s overall philosophical experiment. His so 
called genealogical method is not a new method of doing philosophy within the theoretical 
tradition but rather the attempt to re-configure moral philosophy itself in terms of the 
attempt to posit his own “anti-method” of moral psychology that operates in the service of 
revaluation. Of course one could, as Foucault does, simply describe genealogy as the 
practice of documenting the non-linear history of morality but ultimately such a description 
forces Nietzschean genealogy into a traditional and universalist category of methodology 
that it actually attempts to escape.171 Therefore, it is my claim that there is no such thing as 
a genealogical method that is independent of both the theoretical tradition and Nietzsche’s 
ontology of will to power. I argue that what makes Nietzsche’s philosophy so unique is the 
metaphorical language of noble and slave that he “creates” in order to develop new 
thoughts about moral psychology and build a foundation for his re-conceptualization of the 
philosophical life. Nietzsche’s new metaphorical language is expressed aphoristically and 
thus the message he is trying to get across is that there is a necessary unity of form and 
content to be observed and digested in his books.
Of course what is also significant, in light of Williams’s claims, is that the third 
genealogical inquiry is presented as an exegesis of an aphoristic passage from Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. By offering an exegesis of one of his aphorisms, within the framework of his
171See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Foucault Reader (New York:
Penguin Books, 1984). In this essay Foucault writes about genealogy per se. But in writing about 
genealogy as a method in-itself Foucault abstracts from the specific Nietzschean context of re­
valuation and in doing so attempts to make use of Nietzschean ideas in much the same way that 
Williams would have us make use of them.
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genealogical inquiry, Nietzsche actually demonstrates the integrated nature of the project 
he has been developing by illustrating the associations that culminate in his explanation of 
the meaning of the ascetic ideal. Therefore, he offers an aphoristic exegesis of an aphorism 
(cf. GM preface, 8). He emphasizes the significance of the unity of form and content to his 
overall project by offering an exegesis that is not presented systematically but nevertheless 
seeks to explain an integrated body of thought. In this way, he opposes an entire tradition 
that assumes that unity and understanding can only come from a systematic presentation of 
philosophical ideas. Thus, Nietzsche’s overall experiment is best characterized as an anti- 
theoretical philosophy, for it is only in self-conscious contrast to the theoretical that 
Nietzsche is able to articulate a new approach to valuing. The theoretical is identified as an 
expression of life and Nietzsche’s anti-theoretical style/method complements a tragic 
world view that he would like to champion and re-introduce within the future context of 
what philosophy might become.172
Socratism
In Attempt at a Self-Criticism Nietzsche identifies the death of Greek tragedy at the 
hands of “Socratism” as the most important theme in The Birth o f  Tragedy (BT, ASC, 1). 
What Nietzsche means by Socratism is the desire to be rational at all costs and how that 
desire translates as a moral phenomenon. Commentators have pointed out that Nietzsche’s 
apparent attempt to hlame Socrates for the death of Attic tragedy is not only historically 
inaccurate but fails to do justice to the comprehensive nature of the Platonic Socrates who 
was as invested with wit, irony, and story-telling, as he was with the desire to be rational.
172Of course it could be argued that Nietzsche’s exegesis in GM is more integrated because it is more 
systematic than any of his other books. But I would prefer simply to see it as Nietzsche’s best 
presentation of his aphoristic style.
146
Thus, commentators criticise the one-dimensional nature of Nietzsche’s Socrates.173 But 
such criticisms tend to reflect a preoccupation with scholarship and they fail to appreciate 
Nietzsche’s attempt to re-value Socrates by articulating Socrates’s influence in terms of 
something Nietzsche describes as “Socratism”.
Beginning with the themes he presents in Attempt at a Self-Criticism, it is clear that the 
Nietzsche of the mature period perceives the pessimism of the tragic Greeks to be a source 
of great strength and life-affirmation especially in terms of the affirmation of the 
“instincts”.174 In a corresponding way, the optimism of Socratism is viewed as a symptom 
of decline or life-denial in so far as the “Socratism of morality” is perceived to have helped 
bring about the “dissolution of the instincts” (BT, ASC, 1). What is implicit in Nietzsche’s 
questioning is the process of revaluation itself or the question of the value of values. Here 
Socrates and morality are re-valued and in the process Nietzsche attaches the descriptive 
term “theoretical” to the individual who acts according to the values of Socratism (BT, 
ASC, 1). “Life” is placed at the centre of things in terms of the value of moral values. The 
value of values is to be measured against the example of “the Greeks of the best, the 
strongest, the most courageous period” (BT, ASC, 1). The Greeks, as a culture, represent 
an expression of heroic life that affirms the physical world with all its cruel and enigmatic 
contingencies.
Of course what has been present from Socrates onward is the optimism of the will to 
truth which Nietzsche calls theoretical optimism. Nietzsche re-values this tradition by
173V. Tejera, Nietzsche and Greek Thought (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 81-111.
174Nietzsche’s criticisms of BT can also be found in Ecce Homo (EH BT). Although EH was written 
dangerously close to the time of Nietzsche’s breakdown, and therefore ought to be regarded with 
suspicion, his reasons for altering the title of BT, from The Birth o f Tragedy Out o f the Spirit o f  Music 
to the 1886 version entitled The Birth o f Tragedy Or: Hellenism and Pessimism, are made clear in this 
section. The new title represents a shift in emphasis away from his early obsession with Wagner, his 
attempt to derive an artists’ metaphysics out of tragic music, and toward the value of Greek tragic 
pessimism for “life”.
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claiming that Socrates’s process of questioning, his dialectics, is designed to undermine the 
authority of the Hellenic instincts in favour of a drive to truth that is nihilistic. But it is 
important to make clear what Nietzsche means by “instincts”. The Socratic desire to be 
rational at all costs is no less an “instinct” on Nietzsche’s view than pessimism is an 
instinct of the Hellene. The steadfast will to truth which Nietzsche describes as theoretical 
and Socratic, and the rationalism that gives birth to scientific practices out of the Socratic 
tradition, involve the same instinct for life that the tragic involves insofar as the 
uncompromising search for knowledge, like tragic pessimism, gives life meaning for a 
time. Beyond this, however, Nietzsche clearly distinguishes between tragic instinct and the 
theoretical instinct to rationalism in terms of the kind of lives which these two opposite 
categories of instincts tend to produce or promote, and from which they spring. In this 
way, both the tragic and the theoretical represent life-preserving instincts but beyond the 
basic level of community preservation they are very different instincts in so far as they 
serve to promote very different “types” of life.
On this view theoretical optimism promotes weakness rather than strength in elevating 
the realm of eternal truth above the realm of appearances. The theoretical instinct confers 
value upon life-preservation and in an important sense stops at that level of life- 
affirmation. And it is this level that Nietzsche would later associate with the morality of 
utility. The Hellenic instincts of strength and struggle affirm life beyond mere preservation 
and utility because they value the senses and the physical virtues in pursuit of greatness. 
These “tragic” instincts thus promote and represent the discharge of strength in a life- 
affirming way that disdains, not self-preservation or the preservation of the community per 
se, but the weakness of an inordinate concern for preservation.175 Simply put, greatness is
175The Hellenic instincts affirm life also, and very importantly, because they do not want to correct 
life, they accept it as it is. The very instinct to want to correct life betrays a non-acceptance of life; i.e. 
those who want to correct life fail to pass the eternal recurrence test.
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valued above self-preservation. Nietzsche captures this difference with remarkable
vividness in a passage from an early essay:
[T]he person who lives life most beautifully is the person who does not esteem it. Whereas the 
common man takes this span of being with such gloomy seriousness, those on their journey to 
immortality knew how to treat it with Olympian laughter, or at least with lofty disdain. Often they 
went to their graves ironically - for what was there in them to bury? (PT 62)
Now it may seem that both the noble and common man disdain “this life”, on my
interpretation, and therefore there is something problematic or contradictory about how I
have presented things. However, what is significant is why and how these types disdain
“this life”.
Indeed, this is the origin of Nietzsche’s new metaphorical language of noble and slave 
and in it we can see the seeds of his hypothesis of the will to power as an ontological 
dualism. Even at this early stage he separates life into two qualitatively different categories 
of the life-affirming and the life-denying. The life-denying category describes the common, 
weak, or mediocre man whose affirmation of life is merely that of self-preservation and 
therefore an affirmation which disdains “this life” because it is not “eternal life”. In this 
way the common man’s life-will represents a “denial” of the noble man’s great health and 
great discharging of strength. And that is what it means to be life-denying for Nietzsche. 
The theoretical man, therefore, is the life-denying type because his moral values represent 
a mode of existence that devalues the Hellenic instincts in favour of the desire to be 
rational and, like the slave type of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy o f Morals, confers value 
upon the so-called real world over and against the sensual world of appearances. 
Theoretical optimism undermines the value of the Hellenic instincts by denying the value of 
“anthropomorphic” knowledge in favour of “eternal” knowledge. Alternatively, the noble 
type, on Nietzsche’s view, is thought to disdain “this life” only insofar as he disdains an 
inordinate concern for self-preservation. For the noble type there is no distinct faith in an 
“eternal life” that is wholly separate from “this life” and therefore there is no “reason” for
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disdaining this life in the way that the common man disdains it.
In this way, Nietzsche’s alternative conception is grounded in the so-called world of 
appearances or the world of the senses but is also re-valuing that world by interpreting it in 
terms of what he deems to be life-affirming versus life-denying. These concepts are of his 
own creation and his ontology of types serves as a framework of the will through which to 
re-think the philosophical activity from the vantage point of the philosophical life lived. 
Socratism, the reduction of Socrates to a “type”, fits within the Nietzschean conception of 
life-denial and forcing the fit is Nietzsche’s clear intention. From the vantage point of 
Nietzsche’s later works we can see that Socratism, as the instinct to be absurdly rational, 
gets its one-dimensional character from Nietzsche’s attempt to make Socratism explicitly 
proto-Christian. In other words, Socrates must represent the life-denying type because the 
Socratic instinct to be rational must, for Nietzsche’s philosophical framework to remain 
internally consistent, prefigure the ascetic ideal of the Christian moral universe.
If the ascetic ideal of Christianity can be linked to Socratism, then Nietzsche’s 
opposition to the Christian as an expression of “life”, or to the “Crucified” as a life- 
denying “type”, may be elevated to an even greater world-historical meaning in terms of 
his consistent attempt to re-value ascetic moral psychology from his earliest work The 
Birth o f Tragedy to his mature works of the late 1880s:
It was only Christianity, with ressentiment against life in its foundations, which made of sexuality 
something impure: it threw filth on the beginning, on the prerequisite of our life ... Affirmation of 
life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility 
through the sacrifice of its highest types - that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I 
recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet... And with that I again return to the 
place from which I set out - the Birth o f Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values: with that I 
again plant myself in the soil out of which I draw all that I will and can - 1, the last disciple of the 
philosopher Dionysus - 1, the teacher of the eternal recurrence. (TI, What I Owe to the 
Ancients, 4 - 5 )
Here, in Twilight o f the Idols, Nietzsche not only demonstrates his desire to present his 
philosophical experiment as an original and consistent one but he displays his penchant for 
reinterpreting specific figures in new ways that fit within his framework of revaluation. In
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this passage it is the Greek art deity Dionysus who has been reinterpreted and re-valued. 
The Dionysus of The Birth o f Tragedy was already a new figure that Nietzsche had 
manipulated to fit within his immature metaphysics of the Apollinian and the Dionysian. 
But the figure Dionysus re-appears in the later works reinterpreted yet again. Apollo has 
disappeared and Nietzsche has abandoned the Wagnerian pretensions of his earlier work. 
Here Dionysus represents the tragic type over and against the “Crucified” (WP 1052 ; EH, 
Why I am a Destiny, 9). Most importantly, Dionysus is a philosopher and Nietzsche’s 
reference to his earliest work here helps conjure an opposition between Dionysus as the 
“tragic” philosopher and Socrates as the “theoretical” philosopher. The point I am making 
is that Nietzsche’s effort to characterize Socrates as proto-Christian reflects an overall 
attempt to present the life of different “types” of individuals in terms of their life-denying 
and life-affirming nature. But it may help to think of Socratism in terms of the ascetic ideal 
and situate the discussion within the exegetical context of the third essay of On the 
Genealogy o f Morals.
the ascetic ideal
In the third genealogical inquiry it is clear that the answer to the question “what is the 
meaning of the ascetic ideal?”, which forms the title of the inquiry, is that the ascetic ideal 
itself offered man meaning for his suffering (GM III, 28). What is meant by ascetic is, in 
part, the quintessential Christian ideal of poverty, humility, chastity and the entire 
framework of life-denial that leads to the attainment of grace in the Christian afterlife. Yet 
what is also made clear in this exegesis is that the ascetic ideal “is an expression of the 
basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal - and it will rather will 
nothingness than not will” (GM III, 1). This “nothingness” is of course “God” or the idea 
of metaphysical “being”, a reality behind appearance and the sensual world which dates
back to the Platonic Socrates and the pursuit of knowledge of the Forms. And this will to 
nothingness is another way of representing what Nietzsche refers to as theoretical 
optimism. What Nietzsche suggests is that our time-honoured faith in the Christian god as 
the meaning behind human suffering is representative of a myth we have affirmed over the 
centuries in order to affirm species self-preservation (cf. BGE 4). But what makes 
Nietzsche’s argument more comprehensible in his mature works is the fact that he has 
overcome the problem of metaphysical realism by denying the very possibility of there 
being a non-perspectival perspective or “real” world.
Furthermore, the significance of the ascetic ideal as a purely “life-preserving” ideal 
explains why Nietzsche is able to describe Christianity as Platonism for “the people”
(BGE, preface). Thus, Nietzsche refers to the people as the “herd” and to the instincts of 
the people as “herd instincts”. Morality itself, on this view, is herd instinct. Indeed, any 
universal set of moral values suggests an underlying herd psychology or herd 
consciousness for Nietzsche, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the nature of the 
particular culture in question. The instincts of Christian morality represent the conditions 
for the preservation of a certain type of community and as I described it in the first chapter 
such a community represents a reactive hierarchy at the ontological level of will to power.
It is important to note that as early as The Gay Science Nietzsche already has an answer 
to the question “what seen in the perspective of life, is the significance of morality?”. His 
answer is that, “[mjorality is herd instinct in the individual” (GS 116). And this helps 
explain what is implicit in the characterization of certain individuals as “types”. Thus, his 
argument extends to the idea that the will to truth as “reason” becomes the predominant 
and overriding instinct of herd types:
From time to time this instinct, which is at work equally in the highest and basest men - the 
instinct for the preservation of the species - erupts as reason and as passion of the spirit. Then it is 
surrounded by a resplendent retinue of reasons and tries with all the force at its command to make 
us forget that at bottom it is instinct, drive, folly, lack of reasons. Life shall be loved, because -!
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Man shall advance himself and his neighbour, because -! What names all these Shalls and 
Becauses receive and may yet receive in the future! (GS, 1)
The value conferred upon “reason”, or the will to a non-perspectival perspective, which
the scientific tradition has inherited from the much older Socratic tradition, is an ideal
which functions so as to preserve the species in the sense that it is the site of herd
“meaning”.
Thus, Nietzsche re-values science as well by characterizing it in terms of the 
contingencies of life-denying instincts rather than in terms of a universal value-free 
category of its own. In effect, Nietzsche demotes reason to a radically instrumental status 
insofar as reason may no longer appear to be “self-reliant” (GM III, 25). And in this way 
the hierarchy of reason is replaced by the hierarchy of “life”. Nietzsche does, at times, 
praise the scientific drive as one of the finest human instincts but only where it is 
associated with knowledge of the senses. What he despises is the positivist claim to the 
neutral grasp of reality (WP 481; BGE 134; GS 335).
For Nietzsche, the theoretical view is an embodied “perspective”. Thus, it makes more 
sense to speak of the theoretical in terms of a “type”. A theoretical type is a herd type 
because he lives his life by the herd instinct of species self-preservation which operates 
according to the ascetic ideals of a Socratic, Christian, and modem scientific faith in the 
will to truth. Returning to Nietzsche’s concerns in Attempt at a Self-Criticism, it is now 
clear that what he intends to do, where he considers the “Greeks of the best, the strongest, 
the most courageous period”, over and against the “theoretical man”, is to affirm the tragic 
over the theoretical on the grounds that it promotes a better, stronger, and more 
courageous type of individual and thus produces a higher type of “life” (BT, ASC, 1). 
Along these lines, Werner Dannhauser makes the following observation concerning 
Nietzsche’s early position on theoretical Socratism:
Nietzsche expounds a tragic view of the world and asserts that there is an eternal battle between it
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and the theoretical view of the world. As the archetype of the theoretical man, Socrates is both the 
greatest exponent of the theoretical world view and its symbol. The battle between the two views 
centres around the definition, value, and status of instinct, consciousness, reason, science, and 
teleology.176
Dannhauser’s conclusions help substantiate the significance of Nietzsche’s comparative 
framework distinguishing the tragic apart from the theoretical in terms of competing 
“truth-seeking” hierarchies. I now turn to an exegesis of the origins of Nietzsche’s 
alternative philosophical conception and how he develops his position gradually 
throughout his middle period.
the mythical drive and the significance of the pre-Socratics
A tragic view of the world is the consequence of tragic knowledge. But what exactly 
does Nietzsche mean by tragic knowledge in the early writings and why does he think that 
the pre-Socratic thinkers practised tragic philosophy? To give an account of the tragic and 
how Nietzsche develops it into a conception of life-affirming philosophy, it is necessary to 
trace the development of his thought from The Birth o f Tragedy and the early notes up to 
The Gay Science.
In The Birth o f  Tragedy Nietzsche presents his immature metaphysics of the Dionysian 
and the Apollinian. These categories represent the eternal unity of nature and the illusion 
of individuation respectively. The Dionysian defines the intoxicating power of nature 
which remains eternally the same. The Apollinian defines man’s desire, through art, to 
escape the Dionysian and place his faith in the principle of individuation that provides him 
with the illusion of beauty.
As the unity of Dionysian and Apollinian elements, Nietzsche claims that Attic tragedy 
provided the Hellene with “metaphysical comfort - that life is at the bottom of things,
176Wemer Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View o f Socrates (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), p.
118.
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despite all changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable” (BT 7). In this 
way Nietzsche sees tragic art as life-affirming and promotes it as such over and against 
what he refers to as a “Buddhistic negation of the will” (BT 7). The negation of the will is 
the immediate effect of tragic knowledge. Nietzsche describes this clearly with reference to 
the negation of the will in the example of Shakespeare’s Hamlet:
Knowing kills action; action requires the veils of illusion: that is the doctrine of Hamlet, not that 
cheap wisdom of Jack the Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an excess of 
possibilities does not get around to action. Not reflection, no - true knowledge, an insight into the 
horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man. (BT
7)
The relationship between the Dionysian and the Apollinian in Attic tragedy offers the 
Hellene the remedy of tragic knowledge insofar as the terrible chaos and cruelty of life is 
given representation in the Apollinian illusion.of tragic art. Of course the Greeks did not 
speak of “the will” in this way and Nietzsche’s language here represents an attempt to 
respond to Schopenhauer’s conception of the negation of the will in the face of tragic 
pessimism. Daniel Breazeale offers an appropriate summary of Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
tragic pessimism where he states the following:
“Tragic knowledge” is that knowledge which penetrates the illusions and the principium 
individuationis and thereby provides one with a vision of the suffering character of existence. For 
this reason it “kills action” and demands the new saving illusions of tragic art (“returns to art its 
rights”). 177
The point is that pessimism need not end in the negation of the will where tragic art can 
offer a redemptive myth of beauty through which man might sustain his desire to know and 
overcome the negation of the will.
With this same understanding of the relationship between tragic knowledge and illusion, 
Nietzsche re-considers the myth-based nature of philosophy itself. Along these lines his 
attempt to articulate “the tragic” in The Birth o f Tragedy is projected on to his
177Daniel Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, written by Friedrich Nietzsche, edited and translated by 
Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey and London: Humanities Press International, 1979), p. 12, n. 24.
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characterization of the pre-Socratic philosophers in the unpublished essay Philosophy in 
the Tragic Age o f the Greeks, which was written at approximately the same time as The 
Birth o f Tragedy. In this essay, as Marianne Cowan suggests, “the philosophers are dealt 
with as though they were tragic heroes, or at least heroic figures in a time that was 
presented upon the world stage as a tragic drama”.178
In the notes from this period Nietzsche has a lot to say about philosophy and the 
philosopher and he describes the relationship between the philosopher and truth as 
“anthropomorphic”. He writes:
What the philosopher is seeking is not truth, but rather the metamorphosis of the world into men. 
He strives for an understanding of the world with self-consciousness. He strives for an 
assimilation. He is satisfied when he has explained something anthropomorphically. Just as the 
astrologer regards the world as serving the single individual, the philosopher regards the world as 
a human being. (P T  62)
What this means with respect to tragic knowledge and illusion is that the philosopher
“creates” truth where he creates the illusions he needs in order to live his particular life. In
this way his knowing is not the product of stripping away the veils of anthropomorphic
illusion to get at the eternal truth but instead it is a process of generating more illusion in
the service of greater knowledge of life. Nietzsche describes the process in the following
way and with specific reference to the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus:
Philosophy is a form of artistic invention. There is no appropriate category for philosophy; 
consequently, we must make up and characterize a species [for it]. The natural history o f  the 
philosopher. He knows in that he invents, and he invents in that he knows. He does not grow: I 
mean, philosophy does not follow the course of the other sciences, even if certain of the 
philosopher’s territories gradually fall into the hands of science. Heraclitus can never be obsolete. 
Philosophy is invention beyond the limits of experience; it is the continuation of the mythical 
drive. It is essentially pictorial. (PT 19)
The mythical drive captures the way in which the pre-Socratics knew. Heraclitus is
Nietzsche’s favourite pre-Socratic philosopher but the mythical drive begins with Thales
who posited the claim that “all is water” (PTG 41). For Nietzsche, the interesting thing
178Marianne Cowan, “Introduction” in Philosophy and the Tragic Age o f  the Greeks, written by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, edited and translated by Marianne Cowan (Washington: Regnery Publishing 
Ltd, 1996), p. 19.
156
about Thales’s proposition is that it represents the mythical drive but it is meant “non- 
mythically and non-allegorically” (PTG 41). For Thales there is no understanding of his 
proposition as metaphorical or conceptual. He posits his ideas as literal. Thus, the pre- 
Socratics had no concept of “concepts”. What Nietzsche celebrates in Thales, therefore, is 
not the truth value of his claims, in terms of their correspondence to “reality”, but the 
“life” value of his claims. The proposition that “all is water” expresses Thales’s absolute 
faith in the unity of being. In other words, it is an example of the mythical drive which 
predates the two world theory.
By referring to the pre-Socratics, and in emphasizing the mythical drive that describes 
their process of knowing, Nietzsche distinguishes them apart from Socrates and all later 
thinkers according to “how beautiful they were” (PT 144). This is one of the most 
significant elements of Nietzsche’s revaluation. By judging the pre-Socratics according to 
their aesthetic value rather than the truth value of their claims, Nietzsche places the 
mythical drive at the centre of knowing and makes the anthropomorphic analogy complete. 
The value of philosophy is judged according to the particular philosophical life lived rather 
than the value of a “concept” in the service of the various ends to which Socratism has 
since been directed:
Compare the thinkers of other ages and peoples with that series of figures which begins with 
Thales and ends with Democritus - yes, just compare Socrates and all the later leaders of Greek 
sects with these ancient Greeks ... “how beautiful they are!” I see among them no deformed and 
ruined figures, no priestly faces, no scrawny desert hermits, no fanatics looking at the world 
through rose-coloured glasses, no theologizing counterfeiters, no depressed and pale scholars ... I 
also fail to see any among them who consider the “salvation of the soul” or the question “what is 
happiness?” so important that they forget the world and men on that account. If only someone 
could rediscover “these possibilities o f life” \ (PT 144)
Thus, what Nietzsche became obsessed with at an early stage was liberating philosophy
from its service to life-denying impulses.
Liberating philosophy from its service to eternal truth, happiness, and the improvement 
of mankind returns it to the pessimism of tragic knowledge wherein suffering and struggle
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need to be affirmed anew through alternative redemptive myths. Thus, a return to tragic 
knowledge might usher in a new opportunity to produce a culture that would set its sights 
once again on “the world and men” and therefore constitute a life-affirming culture. 
However, Nietzsche’s emphasis on myth and illusion fails to overcome the two world 
theory at this early stage. Although he clearly wants to get past it, he focuses on life- 
affirmation and fails to come up with a way to overcome the language of metaphysical 
correspondence within his own positive formulations. Therefore, I turn now to an 
illustration of how he continues to develop the idea of life-affirmation, from the early to 
the middle writings, without clearly resolving the problem of the two world theory in his 
own assertions.
life-affirmation and the problem of the two world theory
In the early essay On the uses and disadvantages o f history fo r  life Nietzsche states the 
following with respect to the accumulation of knowledge and its ends:
Knowledge, consumed for the greater part without hunger for it and even counter to one’s needs, 
now no longer acts as an agent for transforming the outside world but remains concealed within a 
chaotic inner world which modern man describes with a curious pride as his uniquely 
characteristic ‘subjectivity’. It is then said that one possesses content and only form is lacking; 
but such an antithesis is quite improper when applied to living things. This precisely is why our 
modem culture is not a living thing: it is incomprehensible without recourse to that antithesis; it 
is not a real culture at all but only a kind of knowledge of culture; it has an idea of and feeling for 
culture but no tme cultural achievement emerges from them. (UM 78)
It is evident in this passage that for Nietzsche form and content are a unity when it comes
to culture and therefore the modern idea that the form may be missing but the content is
intact is a lie. For Nietzsche, the democratic form of modem culture is an expression of its
bankruptcy as a substantive culture that can produce greatness. For him the form which
democratic institutions adopt produces a particular type of freedom that is incapable of
producing uniquely great individual lives. I claim that, in the early writings, Nietzsche
begins to develop the elements of what he will eventually need to re-configure knowledge
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and the philosophical drive in line with the structure of a genuine culture that is capable of 
producing an “outside world” of philosophical life-affirmation. However, it must be 
acknowledged that at this stage he has as yet to offer a clear explanation of what he thinks 
constitutes an “inner” and “outer” distinction with respect to knowledge and subjectivity.
In Human All Too Human, Nietzsche’s first “middle period” work, his evaluation of the
pre-Socratics is applied directly to the idea of a new and highest philosophical type:
It is no idle question whether, if he had not come under the spell of Socrates, Plato might not 
have discovered an even higher type of philosophical man who is now lost to us for ever. We gaze 
into the ages that preceded him as into a sculptor’s workshop of types. The sixth and fifth 
centuries seem, however, to promise even more and higher things than they actually brought 
forth; it remained only a promise and proclamation. And yet there can hardly be a more grievous 
loss than the loss of a type, of a new, hitherto undiscovered highest possibility o f  the 
philosophical life. (HAH 261)
What Nietzsche marvels at is the success of the mythical drive amongst the pre-Socratics
but he understands that success to be preconditioned by the kind of life-affirming culture
the Greeks of the tragic age enjoyed. Socrates, by contrast, was a decadent, according to
Nietzsche, and Plato lived in a period of cultural decline. Therefore, Nietzsche associates
the loss of a new type with the influence of Socrates and the decline of cultural institutions
in ancient Greece. But he still is unable to explain what he means by a philosophical life, a
philosophical subjectivity, that would represent an overcoming of the inner/outer
distinction Socrates introduced.
In his next book Daybreak Nietzsche develops his scepticism about the two world 
theory further by incorporating his thoughts on truth within an emerging critique of moral 
psychology. With reference to the Greek ideal, as it is represented in the Homeric figure 
Odysseus, Nietzsche observes that “[t]he most remarkable thing about it is that the 
antithesis of appearance and being is not felt at all and is thus of no significance morally” 
(D 306). The antithesis of appearance and being refers to the separation of body and spirit 
that began with Parmenides and its greatest champion, on Nietzsche’s view, was the
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Platonic Socrates (PTG 79-80). In this way, the body/spirit split became the separation of 
the real world (of the Forms) from the world of appearances (of the senses) that I have 
been referring to as the two world theory. This two world theory, on Nietzsche’s view, 
became the blueprint for the Christian ascetic ideal and slave will to truth. What is 
important at this stage is that Nietzsche celebrates the Greek ideal as a noble ideal of life- 
affirmation, free of what he will eventually describe as slave moral psychology. Slave 
moral psychology represents the metaphysical faith in a real world behind the world of 
appearances. In Daybreak, however, the noble ideal still lacks a clear Nietzschean 
overcoming of the two world theory.
Nietzsche’s last middle period work, The Gay Science, was written in 1882 but in 1886 
he added a new preface and book to it just as he added new introductory sections to The 
Birth o f Tragedy, Human All Too Human, and Daybreak. In this new preface Nietzsche 
makes it clear that he wants to re-introduce the idea of the tragic in the sense that he wants 
to re-introduce a mode of philosophizing that predates the two world theory but within the 
context of overcoming what is modern. In this way, he wants to re-introduce the mythical 
drive at the level of the philosophical life lived because doing so returns philosophy to the 
aesthetic realm of “the world and men” where it belongs as tragic philosophy rather than as 
“theoretical” philosophy. Nietzsche writes:
Oh those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the 
surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words in the whole 
Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial - out o f  profundity. And is not this 
precisely what we are again coming back to, we daredevils of the spirit who have climbed the 
highest and most dangerous peak of present thought and looked around from up there - we who 
have looked down from there? Are we not, precisely in this respect, Greeks? Adorers of forms, of 
tones, of words? And therefore - artists? (GS, preface, 4)
Being “superficial out of profundity” describes the tragic world view because it recognizes
the need for a veil of beauty in the face of tragic knowledge and this is the significance of
the pre-Socratic philosopher whose mythical drive provided him with the necessary
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illusions to sustain the desire to know. But what is especially important concerning the 
1886 preface to The Gay Science is that it comes out of Nietzsche’s mature period.
In 1886 Nietzsche was on the verge of overcoming the two world theory, by denying the 
possibility of a non-perspectival perspective, and he was very aware of the problem of 
affirming the so-called world of appearances, or the senses, without falling back into the 
trap of representationalism himself. Therefore, his interest in remaining at the “surface” or 
“within the whole Olympus of appearance” is about to be legitimized properly by his 
“perspectivism” in On the Genealogy o f Morals. As a cognitively superior position to 
representationalism, or correspondence, perspectivism overcomes the problem of justifying 
a non-perspectival perspective and denies the distinction between the real world and the 
world of appearances altogether.
I illustrate the development of life-affirmation according to Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
representationalism in the next chapter but, to conclude my exegesis of Nietzsche’s early 
and middle periods, I turn now to a presentation of Nietzsche thoughts on herd 
consciousness and the liberation of philosophy in terms of the liberation of a unique 
philosophical type. I conclude this chapter with a focus on “consciousness” and 
“philosophy” because it is the relationship between these two elements that establishes the 
foundation of Nietzsche’s political thought according to my interpretation of it.
consciousness, the herd, and the liberation of philosophy
Nietzsche’s revaluation of philosophy issues from more than just sentimental reflections 
on the stature of the pre-Socratic Greeks. What must be recognized, in the early and 
middle periods, is his belief that the truth of the self and of the world, of subject and 
object, is unknowable in an important sense. And although this represents an important 
step in overcoming a Cartesian form of metaphysical realism, Nietzsche has yet to
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overcome the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth altogether because he remains 
within the Kantian stage of simply denying our ability to know the objective world. 
Therefore, in his early and middle periods he appears to think that human beings have 
knowledge only insofar as they are able to make unique things seem the same in 
conceptual terms. What this means is that human consciousness functions in a way that 
limits our ability to know unique things as unique things and this includes our knowledge 
of the self.
In this way, we may interpret Nietzsche as developing the idea of individual uniqueness 
without as yet being able to explain uniqueness in a way that overcomes 
representationalism. As Nietzsche puts it, consciousness demands the conceptualization 
and categorization of sense data and once a concept is arrived at “[w]e presuppose that 
nature behaves in accordance with such a concept”(PT 51). This constitutes Nietzsche’s 
claim that consciousness falsifies and therefore merely “represents”, in general and 
conceptual terms, what is fundamentally unique with respect to individual actions and the 
knowledge of the senses.
What occurs in the process of knowing, therefore, is that abstractions are established as 
truths. Nietzsche suggests that “[k] no wing is nothing but working with the favourite 
metaphors, an imitating which is no longer felt to be an imitation” (PT 51). Breazeale 
offers an excellent summary of Nietzsche’s epistemological position at this stage where he 
states the following:
(1) There is no immediate knowing; knowledge always involves a transference (Ubertragung) 
between the different spheres of subject and object, and is therefore always indirect or mediated.
(2) Truth as an ideal requires an immediate and direct grasp of the object by the subject. (3) 
Consequently, the truth about things cannot be known, for this would require a self-contradictory 
mediated immediacy.179
For my purposes here it is interesting to consider Nietzsche’s thoughts on consciousness in
179Breazeale, Philosophy and Truth, p. 51, n. 98.
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light of his appreciation of the mythical drive amongst the pre-Socratics since in both cases 
Nietzsche seems to think that the process of knowing, which represents the relationship 
between subject and object, is one that requires “illusion”.
On Nietzsche’s view, consciousness and the formation of truth suggests a struggle 
between our different “metaphorical worlds”. He offers the following example in his notes:
The pathos of the truth drive presupposes the observation that the various metaphorical worlds 
are at variance and struggle with one another. Eg. the world of dreams, lies, etc. and the ordinary 
usual view of things: the first type of metaphorical world is rarer; the other is more frequent.
Thus the rule struggles against the exception, the regular against the unaccustomed: hence the 
higher esteem for everyday reality than for the dream world. Now however, what is rare and 
' unaccustomed is more attractive: the lie is felt as a stimulus. Poetry. (PT 51)
The important elements of Nietzsche’s example in this passage include his appreciation of
what is rare in the context of competing metaphorical worlds and the idea that what is rare
is “more attractive”. In his appreciation of “the lie” and “the poetic” Nietzsche voices his
interest in challenging the metaphorical world of “the ordinary usual view of things”.
Therefore, challenging accepted tautologies of consciousness with alternative metaphorical
modes of truth is an aesthetic undertaking as much as it is an epistemological one and this
way of thinking about the challenge to consciousness resonates with Nietzsche’s
appreciation of the mythical drive amongst the pre-Socratics.
In an effort to test the limits of anthropomorphic knowing, Nietzsche sees the 
philosopher as the only type able to experiment with knowing in new ways. What is crucial 
to experimenting with knowledge, therefore, is that the philosopher liberate himself as 
much as possible from the ordinary usual view of things. This kind of liberation requires 
that the philosopher identify the experience of the self as the most significant and 
immediate site of liberation. In other words, the truth of the individual self is unknown in 
the sense that consciousness makes it difficult for us to know unique things as unique 
things but we can experiment with the limits of our own conscious knowledge of self by 
experimenting with new metaphorical worlds that challenge the ordinary usual view of
things. Of consciousness, the self, and the desire to see further, Nietzsche makes the
following comments:
Does he (man) not actually live by means of a continual process of deception? Does nature not 
conceal most things from him, even the nearest things - his own body, for example, of which he 
has only a deceptive “consciousness”? He is locked within this consciousness and nature threw 
away the key. Oh, the fatal curiosity of the philosopher, who longs, just once, to peer out and 
down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness. (PT 65)
In this passage Nietzsche’s immature position with respect to the two world theory is
obvious but he also reveals the first clues to the way in which he wants to develop
philosophy. As a challenge to the accepted metaphorical world and as an experiment with
the self, Nietzsche begins the project of liberating philosophy from theoretical optimism
and he establishes the foundations for his later conception of philosophy as value creation.
Tracing the development of these ideas requires associating Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
consciousness with his thoughts on the people, the masses, or “the herd”. In fact the best 
way to describe consciousness, in this context, would be as “herd consciousness”. It is the 
goal of re-thinking philosophy as the mythical drive, beyond herd consciousness, that 
requires a critique of herd morality. Thus, the problem of getting beyond herd morality, 
beyond good and evil, is the problem of getting beyond a metaphorical world that merely 
serves herd self-preservation or “utility” as I have consistently referred to it. The kind of 
life that herd consciousness produces is the life of the herd animal. And the life of the herd 
proceeds according to an ascetic ideal of truth that denies tragic knowledge and the 
instincts of life-affirmation. Therefore, Nietzsche must find a way to replace the ascetic 
ideal of truth with an alternative life-affirming ideal. For “life” to replace “truth” as the 
reigning ideal the mythical drive must serve life-affirmation and not herd self-preservation. 
Concerning the knowing self, this means that the philosopher must be liberated from herd 
consciousness at least to the degree that this is possible and Nietzsche comes to think that 
it is possible where he eventually conceives of philosophy as independent value creation.
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Finding evidence of an early attempt to bracket out a particular philosophical self from 
the herd is not an impossible task. However, Nietzsche develops his ideas on this subject 
very gradually. In his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche begins the process with a critique of 
the truth-seeking self. What is of most significance in the following passage is the way in 
which Nietzsche yearns for a conception of the knowing self that is “active” rather than 
“passive”, or merely “contemplative”:
Fragmented and in pieces, dissociated almost mechanically into an inner and an outer, sown with 
concepts as with dragon’s teeth, bringing forth conceptual dragons, suffering from the malady of 
words and mistrusting any feeling of our own which has not yet been stamped with words: being 
such an unliving and yet uncannily active concept-and word-factory, perhaps I still have the right 
to say of myself cogito, ergo sum, but not vivo, ergo cogito. Empty ‘being’ is granted me, but not 
full and green ‘life’; the feeling that tells me that I exist warrants to me only that I am a thinking 
creature, not that I am a living one, not that I am an animal but at most a cogital. (U M  119)
By suggesting vivo, ergo cogito over and against cogito, ergo sum Nietzsche re-introduces
the tragic mode of the truth-seeking self. And this simple reversal may be interpreted as
affirming the drive to truth in the service of life-affirmation over and against the will to
truth in the service of herd-preservation.
It is crucial to a better understanding of Nietzsche’s political philosophy, therefore, that 
we see the emerging conception of the truth-seeking self as active rather than passive in 
terms of an emerging philosophical type to be distinguished apart from the rest of society. 
In conceiving of the possibility for an alternative conception of the truth-seeking self 
Nietzsche separates the philosopher out from the masses on the grounds that the 
philosopher is the only type capable of experimenting with the truth as a lived perspective 
that embodies an alternative metaphorical world to the world of the ordinary view of 
things. In this way, uniqueness distinguishes the philosophical type as great and elevates 
him above herd consciousness. The role of the masses then becomes one of forming the 
foundation for the production of the philosophical type. In his Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche offers the following view of the masses:
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The masses seem to me to deserve notice in three respects only: first as faded copies of great men 
produced on poor paper with worn-out plates, then as a force of resistance to great men, finally as 
instruments in the hands of great men; for the rest, let the Devil and statistics take them! (UM 
113)
As faded copies of great men the masses exhibit Nietzsche’s theory of herd imitation. As 
forces of resistance to great men the masses conform to the idea that certain metaphorical 
worlds compete with other more exceptional worlds. But what I want to emphasize is the 
last consideration that the masses may serve as instruments in the hands of great men. I 
argue, according to my thesis on the role of hierarchy, that it is this consideration that 
begins to ground Nietzsche’s ideas on the uniqueness of the philosophical type more and 
more and especially as he begins to envision the philosopher beyond “moral” 
consciousness. Therefore, I argue that these associations take on new dimensions in his 
middle period.
In Human All Too and Daybreak Nietzsche begins to distinguish a new philosophical 
type from a moral type and in doing so he takes a few more steps toward philosophizing 
hierarchy. Hierarchy is, in this way, the condition for liberating philosophy from the 
morality of utility and custom. What Nietzsche does in his middle period is set up a 
framework in which certain “moral” types conform to the morality of custom and certain 
“evil” types transgress that morality:
To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practise obedience towards 
a law or tradition established from old.
To be evil is ‘not to act in accordance with custom’, to practise things not sanctioned by custom, 
to resist tradition, however rational or stupid that tradition may be ...
How the tradition has arisen is here a matter of indifference, and has in any event nothing to do 
with good and evil or with any kind of immanent categorical imperative; it is above all directed at 
the preservation of a community, a people, every superstitious usage which has arisen on the basis 
of some chance event mistakenly interpreted enforces a tradition which it is in accordance with 
custom to follow; for to sever oneself from it is dangerous, and even more injurious to the 
community than to the individual (because the gods punish the community for misdeeds and for 
every violation of their privileges and only to that extent punish the individual). (H A H  96)
We investigators are, like all conquerors, discoverers, seafarers, adventurers, of an audacious 
morality and must reconcile ourselves to being considered on the whole evil. (D  4 3 2 )
166
Having established the difference between types according to the morality of custom, 
Nietzsche takes one more crucial step in Daybreak and Human All Too Human. What he 
re-values in these books is the status of the transgressor. As is evident in the passage from 
Daybreak, Nietzsche sees the transgressor as an investigator or, rather, the investigator as 
a transgressor. Thus, Nietzsche turns this transgressor into an heroic or strongest type who 
is capable of acting and thinking independently. In Human All Too Human Nietzsche 
writes:
The butterfly wants to get out of its cocoon, it tears at it, it breaks it open: then it is blinded and 
confused by the unfamiliar light, the realm of freedom. It is in such men as are capable of that 
suffering - how few they will be! - that the first attempt will be made to see whether mankind 
could transform itself from a moral to a knowing mankind. (H A H  107)
Although Nietzsche’s language is not explicitly hierarchical in these passages, the
movement from “a moral to a knowing mankind” foreshadows and prefigures the language
of his mature books wherein the philosopher of the future is situated above “moral” man
according to an active hierarchy of relations.
conclusion
Nietzsche imagines the philosopher of the future to have overcome the “bad conscience” 
of herd morality (GM II). Overcoming bad conscience represents the liberation of 
philosophy from its service to the herd. I argue that Nietzsche’s genealogical account of 
moral psychology makes sense only in the context of the process of his thought from The 
Birth o f Tragedy to The Gay Science because Nietzsche’s genealogy is an attempt to 
philosophize beyond good and evil and the new metaphorical world of noble and slave, or 
active and reactive, is itself a product of the liberation of philosophy from its service to the 
herd.
Nietzsche’s positive teachings from The Gay Science to Ecce Homo represent an 
integrated political vision built on the relationship between hierarchy and philosophy. It is
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during the early and middle periods that Nietzsche wrestled with the ideas necessary to 
arrive at the position he came to in The Gay Science. The most important ideas from this 
period include the idea of the tragic view versus the theoretical view, the difference 
between Socratism and the pre-Socratic mythical drive, and the liberation of philosophy 
from herd consciousness. These elements combine to form the groundwork for a uniquely 
Nietzschean political philosophy. In the development of these ideas it is clear that one of 
Nietzsche’s foremost concerns is to emphasize the unity of form and content in his work 
for the purposes of communicating a philosophical mode that might be said to exist beyond 
the theoretical mode. But the significance of the unity of form and content is best found in 
the mature relationship between hierarchy and philosophy that Nietzsche elaborates from 
The Gay Science onward. Therefore, it is to the mature rendering of hierarchy and 
philosophy that I now turn.
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CHAPTER SIX - NIETZSCHE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT
Nietzsche’s political commentators tend to force his ideas into familiar categories of 
thought be they democratic, Aristotelian, or poststructuralist categories. In the preceding 
chapters I have discussed the limitations of these interpretations in order to make room for 
my argument that the role of philosophy and hierarchy represents what is uniquely political 
in Nietzsche. At this stage, however, it is important to state that by adopting a purely 
critical attitude toward these other interpretations I do not mean to suggest that 
Nietzsche’s unique status as a political thinker has been entirely overlooked. Indeed, such 
a claim would be inaccurate given the many valuable contributions to Nietzsche studies in 
political theory that have emerged over the last few decades. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
take a different tack and begin the chapter with a focus on those characterizations of 
Nietzsche’s political thought, amongst his various interpreters, that help characterize his 
politics and identify the political framework of his overall experiment.
As I mentioned in the introduction to part two, this chapter is meant to serve as an 
exegesis of Nietzsche’s mature political thought. Therefore, I begin with a discussion of 
how to develop a clearer political framework in Nietzsche. This discussion is presented in 
two parts. Following this discussion I illustrate the foundations of Nietzsche’s political 
thought as he presents them in The Gay Science. This section serves as a bridge 
connecting the exegesis in chapter five to the exegesis of Nietzsche’s later thought, which 
will follow the section on The Gay Science in this chapter. Thus, in the remaining sections, 
I offer an interpretation of Nietzsche’s political philosophy as it is presented in the works 
of his mature period. In the last section of the chapter I summarize, briefly, the virtues and 
limitations of Nietzsche’s political thought as I have presented it here in part two and 
throughout the thesis thus far.
developing Nietzsche’s political framework - part I
Bruce Detwiler describes Nietzsche’s political thought as “aristocratic radicalism”. Thus, 
he refers to Nietzsche as “the first avowed philosophical atheist of the far Right”.180 
Detwiler’s characterization is helpful because it establishes the hierarchical aspect of 
Nietzsche’s political framework and links it to “philosophical atheism”. The will to power 
hypothesis is Nietzsche’s very own self-conscious “anthropomorphism” and thus 
represents the ontological claim of a philosophical atheist. The only problem with 
Detwiler’s description, however, is that it appears to identify Nietzsche on “the far Right” 
and it cannot be emphasized enough that what is uniquely political in Nietzsche exists 
beyond our familiar political categories. Nevertheless, Detwiler captures Nietzsche’s 
distinctiveness as a political thinker where he states:
If the goal of the political sphere is the enhancement of man in a Nietzschean sense, by negative 
implication the primaiy goal of politics cannot be the promotion of virtue in the classical sense, or 
morality, or public security, or prosperity, the rights of the individual, liberty, social justice, or the 
happiness of the greatest number.18
The “negative implication” of Detwiler’s list here helps to emphasize just how removed
Nietzsche’s project is from the traditional foci of western political thought. It also directs
us back to the question of what is “positively” political in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Even if
his thought exists beyond “the far Right”, and beyond our familiar ancient and modern
political goals, we should still be able to characterize his contribution in political terms.
The problem at hand, therefore, is how to describe Nietzsche’s political framework.
How do we go about characterising the setting for the enhancement of Nietzschean man as 
political according to Nietzsche’s revaluation of values? Of course, I have already 
introduced the political in Nietzsche as the role of philosophy and hierarchy. I have 
presented his “politics” as hierarchy and his “philosophy” as value creation. But it may be
180Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, p. 77.
181Ibid, p. 66.
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necessary to say more about these elements within the context of his revaluation of values 
if we are to develop a more comprehensive political framework in his philosophy.
Tracy Strong acknowledges the problem of identifying Nietzsche’s political framework 
and he does so with reference to Nietzsche’s anti-systematic method:
[Tjhe most profound level of Nietzsche’s political thought cannot then be concerned with the 
erection of systems in the manner of classical political theory. There can be no Nietzschean 
Contrat Social, because the unit of philosophy and politics (the “dominating philosophy”) which 
would correspond to it does not (yet) exist. Nietzsche rather will be concerned to investigate the 
reasons why it is no longer possible to live a political-philosophical form of life.182
In this passage Strong claims that there is no political theory that would correspond to a
Nietzschean social contract. He then identifies Nietzsche’s interest in a “political-
philosophical form of life” but sees this as something Nietzsche laments the passing of
rather than something he hopes to re-introduce within an imagined post-modern setting.
The significance of Strong’s observations here is that they identify two crucial elements of
Nietzsche’s political thought, i.e. the absence of “theory” or “system” as well as
Nietzsche’s interest in a political-philosophical form of life. In this chapter, I describe
Nietzsche’s conception of value creation as a political-philosophical form of life.
Therefore, Strong’s observations help support my description of Nietzschean autonomy.
The obvious limitation of Strong’s description, however, is its failure to establish the link
between an anti-systematic method and the promotion of a new political-philosophical
form of life. But this may be the result of Strong’s attempt to characterize Nietzsche’s
thought as politically under-determined and in need of democratising. Regardless of
Strong’s intentions, however, it is helpful enough that his observations give us further
insight into Nietzsche’s difficult political architecture.
Another commentator who appears to grasp important elements of Nietzsche’s
182Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration, pp. 188-189.
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“positive” project is Leo Strauss.183 The great virtue of Strauss’s essay on Beyond Good 
and Evil is the clarity with which it identifies the life of the philosopher of the future in the 
context of the uniquely anthropomorphic will to power hypothesis. Thus, Strauss captures 
the direction of Nietzsche’s political project at the moment that Nietzsche overcomes the 
two world theory by denying it altogether. Strauss writes:
Man reaches his peak through and in the philosopher of the future as the truly complementary 
man in whom not only man but the rest of existence is justified (BGE 207). He is the first man 
who consciously creates values on the basis of the understanding of the will to power as the 
fundamental phenomenon. His action constitutes the highest form of the most spiritual will to 
power and therewith the highest form of the will to power. By this action he puts an end to the 
rule of non-sense and chance (BGE 203). As the act of the highest form of man’s will to power 
the Vernatiirlichung (making natural) of man is at the same time the peak of the 
anthropomorphization of the non-human (cf. WP 614), for the most spiritual will to power 
consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be (BGE 9). It is in this way that 
Nietzsche abolishes the difference between the world of appearance or fiction and the true 
world.184
What is most significant in this passage is that the Ubermensch, the “complementary man”, 
is the first man “who consciously creates values on the basis of his understanding of the 
will to power as the fundamental phenomenon”. On Strauss’s account it becomes clear 
that there is an important difference between the will to power as a revaluation of values 
and independent value creation as a future mode of life. The will to power is Nietzsche’s 
claim about “life”, his “anthropomorphism”, and therefore it is his created value. But this 
created value is not the same as “independent value creation” because it is not the product 
of active hierarchy. In other words, Nietzsche’s philosophy has not yet brought about a set 
of relations that would make the life of the highest type possible and that is why Nietzsche 
always refers to himself as a mere “free sprit” rather than as the embodiment of his value 
creating ideal itself. Strauss captures this in his description of the philosopher of the
183Strauss’s essay “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and EviF’ has been reproduced 
several times but I refer here to the version that may be found in the appendix of Laurence Lampert’s 
book Leo Strauss and Nietzsche: Leo Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and 
EviT in Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, written and edited by Laurence Lampert (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
184Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and EviF’, p. 203.
172
future’s distinctiveness. What he acknowledges is that a revaluation of values must occur 
first, ushering in an active hierarchy, and only then may a new set of relations be expected 
to produce the first self-conscious and independent value creator. The crucial point is that 
it is only the incommunicable life of the independent value creator that establishes anti- 
universalism, as I introduced it in chapter one, and Nietzsche’s hypothesis of will to power 
is not, as a philosophy, that which is incommunicable per se. In other words, it is the new 
vision of life as value creation/self-overcoming that is specifically “incommunicable”.
However, it is important to stress that I am not claiming that Nietzsche fails to “create” a 
new metaphorical world in his texts for he does in fact do this. I am simply establishing the 
fact that his role as the creator of a new metaphorical world is not the same thing as the 
role of the independent value creator. In other words, Nietzsche presents his anti- 
theoretical philosophy as a bridge to the life of the philosopher of the future on the 
condition that an active hierarchy is the product of a revaluation of values. Importantly, 
independent value creation is something “active” or “lived” as opposed to something 
“philosophical”, in a purely contemplative or literary sense. Independent value judgment 
has to do with valuing one’s own unique actions and not simply revaluing values 
“passively” as Nietzsche does. The best way of explaining this difference is in terms of 
Nietzsche’s praise of solitude, honesty, and courage which may be virtues that help to 
bring about the formation of an active hierarchy but could never be described in terms of 
virtues Nietzsche shares with his Ubermenschen. Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future 
create values in a radically independent way that defies categorization in terms of a 
universal table of values.
Nietzsche seems to develop an understanding of this difference out of an emerging 
critique of Plato’s failure as a political-philosophical legislator. In Daybreak Nietzsche 
writes:
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The evil principle - Plato has given us a splendid description of how the philosophical thinker 
must within every existing society count as the paragon of all wickedness: for as critic of all 
customs he is the antithesis of the moral man, and if he does not succeed in becoming the 
lawgiver of new customs he remains in the memory of men as ‘the evil principle’. From this we 
may gather what the city of Athens, tolerably freeminded and avid for innovation though it was, 
did with the reputation of Plato during his lifetime: is it any wonder if, filled with the ‘political 
drive’ as he himself says he was, he attempted three times to settle in Sicily, where at that time a 
Pan-Hellenic Mediterranean city seemed to be in process of formation? (D 4 9 6 )
The point of comparing Nietzsche to Plato is that Plato’s philosophy would eventually
have an enormous influence on the Christian moral universe but Plato himself was
unsuccessful as a “lawgiver”, or political-philosophical “actor”. The same may be said for
Nietzsche, barring the fact that it is improbable that his philosophy will have a similar
effect on world history. Regardless, the essential comparison is between conceptions of the
political-philosophical form of life.
Now what I want to set up here is a way of distinguishing Nietzsche’s future-based 
notion of political-philosophical autonomy as absolutely new. That is why I want to 
separate the philosopher of the future from Nietzsche himself and from the example of 
Plato. Yet, at the same time, I want to emphasize that Plato’s failure is central to the 
development of Nietzsche’s aims and the distinctions he makes between his own role and 
the incommunicable life of a new, highest type. For Nietzsche, the point is that a 
revaluation may, subsequently, produce a new Nietzschean version of the political- 
philosophical actor but the will to power is not in itself representative of a morally 
incommunicable table of values. Thus, Nietzsche may be said to present a new 
metaphorical world in terms of an eventual transformation that, like the Platonic 
metaphorical world, may have an influence on a revaluation of values in the future, 
producing a new type of humanity.
Although Nietzsche does not write about revaluation in these terms explicitly, on my 
reading of his aims I think it is fair to infer this type of framework where we need to make 
sense of the difference between Nietzsche’s will to power hypothesis and the life of
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independent value creation. I claim that we need to see these ideas as separate (but 
connected) in order to understand better just how removed Nietzsche’s ideal is from how 
he understands his own role. The point, quite simply, is that Nietzsche appears to set up 
independent value creation as a unique and altogether new form of the political- 
philosophical life that exists somewhere beyond the notion of the Platonic lawgiver as well 
as the much less self-conscious process of revaluation Nietzsche identifies in the slave 
revolt in morality.
Therefore, what is most significant about producing active hierarchy is that noble values 
begin to mix with Zarathustra’s virtues of solitude, honesty, and courage in an attempt to 
liberate philosophy from the ascetic ideal, and its service to theoretical optimism. 
Importantly, this is the most that Nietzsche appears to see himself as influencing.
According to the example of Plato, Nietzsche appears to see himself as influencing a 
revaluation of values but that revaluation, like the slave revolt in morality, would not 
represent the kind of “direct” and “active” value creation his future types will be capable of 
experiencing because it exists within a realm of what might be described as 
“contemplative” valuing.185
Therefore, according to this process, solitude and honesty are not necessarily virtues of 
the highest type but merely necessary for the liberation of philosophy. Strauss offers 
support for this reading where he makes the following comments on the significance of 
Nietzschean probity:
[PJrobity is an end rather than a beginning; it points to the past rather than to the future; it is not 
the virtue characteristic of the philosophers of the future; it must be supported, modified, fortified 
by “our most delicate, most disguised, most spiritual will to power” which is directed toward the 
future. Surely our probity must not be permitted to become the ground or object of our pride, for
1 Of
Hannah Arendt accuses Nietzsche of forming purely “contemplative” values that fail to represent
new values in the sense that his formulations fail to represent “active” judgments in the
world. I take this up in the next chapter but it is important to state here that Nietzsche, although
clearly guilty of philosophizing in the way Arendt claims, sets up the possibility of a future life that
would move beyond a purely contemplative mode of valuing.
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this would lead us back to moralism (and to theism).186 
The point Strauss makes here is that universalizing “probity” would be tantamount to re­
introducing the ascetic ideal since the ascetic ideal functions according to a nihilistic 
(theistic) will to truth. On this view, all that Nietzsche means by stressing the importance 
of honesty is that both the free spirit and the philosopher of the future need to be 
“conscious” of the new way in which they must value truth. In other words, the 
philosophical type will need to be honest with himself about who he is as, firstly, a 
transgressor and, later, an independent value creator.
The same thing can be said for the virtue of solitude. Solitude may be necessary for the 
free spirit in order to liberate himself from the morality of custom and utility, in the same 
way that it was certainly a virtue for Nietzsche throughout his life, but it need not be, and 
should not be, conceived of as a universally shared virtue of the philosophers of the future. 
What this also means is that the philosophers of the future may be described as 
independent types but not anti-social or anti-political types per se. Thus, Nietzsche’s 
interest in honesty and solitude merely serves to liberate philosophy insofar as it forces the 
free spirit to recognize his “difference” from the herd and embrace the noble mode of self­
reverence, courage, and commanding (cf. BGE 44).
Nietzsche’s notion of noble nature is not therefore Greek or Roman per se but rather his 
own unity of noble traits that serves the liberation and re-configuration of philosophy. And 
this is especially true of Nietzsche’s interest in “commanding”. Nietzsche wants to re­
introduce the instinct for commanding amongst his philosophical types but in a future, 
post-modern setting. What this means is that Nietzsche wants to re-introduce a drive to 
dominate in the context of a post-Christian psychology with its inherited self-conscious 
and self-disciplining qualities. Laurence Lampert captures the new hybrid quality of
186Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and EviF, p. 202.
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Nietzsche’s conception of noble nature {die vomehme Natur) in the following way:
It was precisely Plato’s teaching that “the virtuous man is the happiest man” that eventually cured 
old Greeks of their scorn for justice and taught them to repudiate the drive to tyranny that every 
Greek of vornehmer origin felt within himself, the drive to dominate, to sacrifice everyone and 
everything to one’s own arrogance and pleasure. Nietzsche grants that the Platonic teaching of 
happiness through virtue could not be planted too deeply into such wild natures, but he adds that 
our own long schooling in Platonic virtue has now made that virtue less necessary; our 
Vomehmheit now permits us virtues that are different from the domesticating virtues necessary in 
Plato’s time and place.187
Despite Nietzsche’s attack on the Platonic Socrates he holds Plato in high esteem and this 
is precisely because of Plato’s “political” or “tyrannical” drive to legislate, ironically, less 
tyrannical virtues and customs. Therefore, what is vital to our understanding of 
Nietzsche’s aims is that we grasp how he wants to develop a new conception of political- 
philosophical autonomy that would be informed by, but go beyond, both the ancient 
tyrannical drive and the modern instinct for a much more self-conscious and self- 
responsible mode of discipline.
developing Nietzsche’s political framework - part II
Now this brings me back to the question of the political setting for the enhancement of 
Nietzschean man. Clearly, Nietzsche does not intend for his highest types to be legislators 
in the Platonic mould since they are meant to be entirely new types. Yet he does promote 
the tyrannical drive as the “political” drive and in Beyond Good and Evil he describes the 
philosophical drive as the tyrannical drive as well (BGE 9). Therefore, it may be 
reasonable to conclude that the political-philosophical form of life Nietzsche is interested 
in is the life of independent value creation and this represents a unique variation on the 
original Platonic model. Yet in order to derive an outline, however tentative, of a 
Nietzschean political “context” we need to distinguish more clearly between Nietzsche’s 
approach to the relationship between politics and philosophy and Plato’s approach to that
I87Laurence Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, p. 113.
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relationship.
Strauss claims that the relationship between politics and philosophy in Nietzsche is 
altered by the position of religion and therefore politics is demoted to a lower level of 
significance:
Philosophy and religion, it seems, belong together - belong more closely together than philosophy 
and the city. The fundamental alternative is that of the rule of philosophy over religion or the rule 
of religion over philosophy; it is not, as it was for Plato or Aristotle, that of the philosophic and 
the political life; for Nietzsche, as distinguished from the classics, politics belongs from the outset 
to a lower plane than either philosophy or religion.188
Strauss is right insofar as Nietzsche launches his most sustained attack against the
Christian religion but what Strauss ignores is the fact that politics is not “demoted” so
much as it is re-aligned with morality and becomes a part of morality in a new sense.
Strauss is right to point out that for Nietzsche there is a different relationship between
politics and philosophy than there is for Plato or Aristotle but Nietzsche does not demote
politics “to a lower plane” per se.
Instead, Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy and modem culture suggest that he sees
political values as moral values and therefore political institutions reflect the moral
structure of any given society. Tracy Strong identifies this Nietzschean conception of
politics where he states:
[0]n a deeper level, as the first essay in the Genealogy makes clear, moral systems and politics 
are codetermined. Since the very existence of moral categories depended on the desire to assert 
power over another group of people - and under slave morality to control and render them 
predictable - all morality is fundamentally a form of politics.189
According to Strong it is the will to power that “codetermines” moral systems and
politics.190 What this means with respect to the relationship between politics and
188Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and EviF\ p. 190.
189Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f Transfiguration, p. 189.
190It could be argued that Strong is overstating “codeterminacy” here and that politics is surely less 
than morality. But I want to present “politics” according to Nietzsche’s power relation conception and 
thus I think that Strong is correct to render politics and morality “codetermined” in Nietzsche. The 
point is that separating politics and morality leaves Nietzsche in a traditional framework that he 
appears to want to overcome.
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philosophy is that if politics and morality are codetermined then extra-moral philosophy is, 
according to Nietzsche’s new definitional framework, a new form of political autonomy. In 
other words, according to Nietzsche’s notion of hierarchy, “extra-moral” autonomy would 
be “extra-political” autonomy but it would also be a new form of “moral” autonomy and, 
thus, a new form of “political” autonomy as well because o f the power relations 
framework. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to describe this new form of autonomy as 
either anti-political or apolitical since such descriptions fail to capture the power relations 
operating in the hierarchical framework Nietzsche imagines.
The best way to explain this framework might be to compare it to Plato’s framework. 
The political-philosophical form of life for Nietzsche differs from the original Platonic 
version because the Platonic model is circumscribed within a moral framework of service 
to the larger community or rather, in Nietzschean language, the herd. And this is the 
condition for philosophy’s survival in Plato’s Republic.
Lampert distinguishes between “political courage” and “philosophical courage” in the 
Greek context.191 In doing so he suggests that the problem for Plato was that political 
courage implied loyalty to custom and “dyed in opinion” but philosophical courage implied 
the contrary.192 According to this difference, Nietzsche’s interest is in philosophical 
courage over and against political courage. For Nietzsche, as Lampert puts it, 
“[pjhilosophy’s hidden first virtue becomes its open and avowed first virtue when nature is 
understood in its Vornehmheit (nobility), its appalling ‘wasteful and indifferent 
magnificence’”.193 Lampert’s observation is helpful because it reveals the fact that 
Nietzsche needs to replace political courage with philosophical courage and in doing so




reinterpret politics as morality.
What is important however, in developing Nietzsche’s political framework, is the idea
that philosophical courage is re-introduced according to active hierarchy or, rather, the
noble will to power as Nietzsche defines it. Thus, where Plato forced the “wasteful and
indifferent magnificence” of philosophical courage to serve “politics”, or political courage,
he was, on Nietzsche’s view, merely forcing philosophy to serve the morality of custom in
a way that would force philosophy to limp along as a pale shadow of its former pre-
Socratic self. What Nietzsche wants to do is release philosophy from its service to the
morality of custom and therefore re-ignite it as a “lived” or “active” life. In his Untimely
Meditations Nietzsche writes:
All modem philosophizing is political and official, limited by governments, churches, academies, 
customs and the cowardice of men to the appearance of scholarship; it sighs ‘if only’ or knows 
‘there once was’ and does nothing else. Within a historical culture philosophy possesses no rights 
if it wants to be more than a self-restrained knowing which leads to no action ... One may think, 
write, print, speak, teach philosophy - to that point more or less everything is permitted; only in 
the realm of action, of so-called life, is it otherwise: there only one thing is ever permitted and 
everything else simply impossible: thus will historical culture have it. Are there still human 
beings, one then asks oneself, or perhaps only thinking -, writing- and speaking-machines? (UM 
85).
This passage provides us with an excellent example of how Nietzsche associates “politics” 
with the realm of custom and demands that “philosophy” break out of its service to 
custom. Thus, rather than describing the virtue of political courage, of loyalty, as “noble” 
Nietzsche revalues it as slavish weakness. In this way, Nietzsche is very selective where he 
pieces together what he wants to describe as noble.
In liberating philosophy from its “Platonic” service to “politics” Nietzsche transforms 
philosophy from a contemplative mode of theoretical optimism to an active mode of value 
creation. This active mode is a political-philosophical conception of autonomy according 
to the way politics and morality are hierarchically codetermined in Nietzsche. In other 
words, an extra-moral form of autonomy is a political form of autonomy according to 
Nietzsche’s active hierarchy.
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In this way, what is “active” is “noble” and includes those elements deemed necessary to 
affirm life at the highest level. The life of Nietzschean political-philosophical autonomy 
represents the overcoming of the bad conscience and the creation of the “active” 
conscience which is the life-affirming conscience. Thus, the highest type will have an active 
conscience and this is best described in On the Genealogy o f  Morals where Nietzsche 
introduces his description of the sovereign individual (GMII, 2). I offered an account of 
the sovereign individual in chapter one but, for my purposes here, it is important to add 
that the active conscience may be described as “self-conscious” value creation because it 
represents the unity of self-consciousness and the “act” of legislating for oneself in terms 
of positing immediate, life-affirming value judgments.
It is now possible to return to the question of the political setting for the enhancement of 
Nietzschean man, and to conclude that Nietzsche’s political framework does not yield any 
clear design for a political “sphere” per se. Active hierarchy establishes Nietzschean 
autonomy as a form of “political-philosophical” autonomy but Nietzsche never says 
anything concrete about the life of extra-moral autonomy in terms of an identifiable 
political “realm” or “sphere”. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a skeletal political 
“Structure” in Nietzsche’s thought. With the help of Nietzsche’s interpreters it is possible 
to say that Nietzsche’s political scaffolding includes the following elements: 1) re-defining 
politics as morality, 2) liberating philosophy from theoretical optimism and uniting it with a 
new conception of what is “noble”, and therefore “active”, according to the will to power 
hypothesis, 3) producing a new form of political-philosophical autonomy (“self-conscious” 
and “independent” value creation) within the framework of an active hierarchy of power 
relations.
The Gay Science and the foundations of Nietzsche’s political philosophy
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In The Gay Science all the elements of Nietzsche’s revaluation are presented in a clear 
and concise aphoristic structure but without the specific metaphorical language o f the 
mature books. In other words, all the elements that form the substance of his concepts of 
will to power, noble and slave, eternal recurrence, and value creation are in evidence and 
are explained according to the trajectory of his early intuitions about philosophy, 
consciousness, and the limits of self-knowledge. Therefore, The Gay Science is the most 
important book to refer to where it is necessary to establish the link between Nietzsche’s 
early work and his positive teachings. The movement that needs to be mapped in The Gay 
Science is the movement from Nietzsche’s early recognition of the problem of herd 
consciousness to the idea of independent “legislating” as a mode of life that requires a rare 
and “noble” capacity for discharging one’s strength in a self-disciplined way.
In the following passage Nietzsche offers his mature position on the nature and limits of 
consciousness with respect to self-knowledge:
My idea is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but 
rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has developed subtlety only insofar 
as this is required by social or herd utility. Consequently, given the best will in the world to 
understand ourselves as individually as possible, “to know ourselves,” each of us will always 
succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but “average.” Our thoughts 
themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness - by the “genius of the 
species” that commands it - and translated back into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally, 
all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no 
doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.
(GS 354).
The movement in this passage is away from herd nature and toward individual nature. The 
movement is thus also away from herd consciousness and toward individual actions. 
Therefore, what Nietzsche establishes in this passage is the significance of what is unique 
and he locates what is unique in human actions. His interest in what is unique is thus 
consistent with his earliest claims about the limitations of consciousness and the 
philosophical urge to get beyond such limitations.
The most important aspect of Nietzsche’s formulations here is his concern to improve
182
the possibilities for self-knowledge while recognizing the limitations of human 
consciousness. In other words, Nietzsche attempts to focus the philosophical desire for 
self-knowledge on the uniqueness of actions but he does so within the framework of 
consciousness and therefore within the realization that to whatever extent individuals may 
be said to break with herd nature they are nevertheless imprisoned within consciousness 
and thus forced to represent their own actions to themselves indirectly and “conceptually”. 
But Nietzsche pushes the notion of “conscious” individuality to its limits where he begins 
to conceive of self-knowledge in terms of self-creation. In the following passage it 
becomes more clear how he develops the idea of self-creation out of the attempt to see 
individual actions strictly in terms of individual “values”:
Anyone who still judges “in this case everybody would have to act like this” has not yet taken five 
steps toward self-knowledge ... That our opinions about “good” and “noble” and “great” can 
never be proved true by our actions because every action is unknowable; that our opinions, 
valuations, and tables of what is good certainly belong among the most powerful levers in the 
involved mechanism of our actions, but in any particular case the law of their mechanism is 
indemonstrable. Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations 
and to the creation o f our own new tables o f what is good, and let us stop brooding about the 
“moral value of our actions”! (GS 335)
Legislating for oneself requires living outside the “moral value of our actions” in the sense
that it requires valuing actions as unique and therefore as radically individual.
It is this new relationship between consciousness and the individual valuing of actions 
that constitutes the meaning of self-creation or what Nietzsche would later, in Ecce Homo, 
elaborate as the process of “becoming who we are” (EH, Why I  am so Clever, 9). Here in 
The Gay Science it is clear that what makes the process unique and at the same time 
difficult to imagine is the incommunicable nature of such a radically individual framework 
of consciousness. Nevertheless, Nietzsche describes this new relationship between 
consciousness and individual actions as the domain of “conscience”:
What does your conscience say? You shall become the person you are. (GS 270)
In terms of the political framework underlying Nietzsche’s new conception of conscience,
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it is important to acknowledge the fact that he establishes the self-creating process within a 
hierarchical framework separating higher “individual” types from lower “herd” types. The 
higher types are described as philosophical types but in a new way that unites a former 
contemplative mode of being with a creative mode to establish what Nietzsche describes as 
a creative mode of being or “becoming” in the sense that we “become” who we are:
What distinguishes the higher human beings from the lower is that the former see and hear 
immeasurably more, and see and hear thoughtfully - and precisely this distinguishes human 
beings from animals, and the higher animals from the lower ... The higher human being always 
becomes at the same time happier and unhappier. But he can never shake off a delusion: he 
fancies that he is a spectator and listener who has been placed before the great visual and 
acoustic spectacle that is life; he calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself 
is really the poet who keeps creating this life. Of course, he is different from the actor of this 
drama, the so-called active type; but he is even less like a mere spectator and festive guest in front 
of the stage. As a poet, he certainly has vis contemplativa and the ability to look back upon his 
work, but at the same time also and above all vis creativa, which the active human being lacks, 
whatever visual appearances and the faith of all the world may say. (GS 301)
In this passage Nietzsche describes the process of self-creation in terms of the unity of the
contemplative and creative modes of life and it may be concluded that it is the active
“conscience” that embodies a unique self-consciousness of such unity.
In chapter one I introduced the evolution of conscience in terms of the overcoming of 
the bad conscience in a post-Christian setting. Nietzsche describes this conscience as an 
extra-moral conscience insofar as it is a conscience appropriate to someone who enjoys 
extra-moral autonomy (GMII, 2). Since the extra-moral conscience represents a unique 
unity of thought and action it may be appropriate to distinguish it within Nietzsche’s active 
hierarchy as “active” conscience.
Another important association Nietzsche makes in The Gay Science is the link between 
active hierarchy and philosophical courage. In the following passage Nietzsche 
characterizes his philosophical type as a courageous type who affirms the exploitative 
power relations of active hierarchy:
We “conserve” nothing; neither do we want to return to any past periods; we are not by any 
means “liberal”; we do not work for “progress” ; we do not need to plug up our ears against the 
sirens who in the market place sing of the future: their song about “equal rights,” “a free society,” 
“no more masters and no servants” has no allure for us. We simply do not consider it desirable
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that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth (because it would certainly be 
the realm of the deepest levelling and chinoiserie)\ we are delighted with all who love, as we do, 
danger, war, and adventures, who refuse to compromise, to be captured , reconciled, and 
castrated; we count ourselves among conquerors; we think about the necessity for new orders, also 
for a new slavery - for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a 
new kind of enslavement. (G S 377)
Nietzsche’s position in opposition to the levelling framework of reactive hierarchy is clear
in this passage. Politics and morality are united here in the associations Nietzsche makes
between the liberal politics of equal rights and the improvement of mankind as moral
evolution. The courage of Nietzsche’s philosophical adventurers may be described as a
kind of discharging of strength in the sense that such types refuse “to be captured,
reconciled, and castrated” (cf. BGE 188). This discharging of strength and refusal to be
“reconciled” represents the liberation of philosophy from its service to theoretical
optimism and the politics/morality of utility.
In The Gay Science Nietzsche also describes the artistry required for self-creation and in 
doing so he illustrates how the discharging of strength of the philosophical type constitutes 
a release from its service to the herd which demands, in turn, a strong and fiercely self- 
disciplined aesthetic mode of self-responsibility. For Nietzsche, there is no freedom beyond 
the constraints of form and style and this is as true for any culture writ large as it is for 
philosophy as a rare form of life. This means, for Nietzschean self-creation, that it only 
makes sense within the framework of active hierarchy. Nietzsche states:
One thing is needful - To “give style” to one’s character - a great and rare art! It is practiced by 
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an 
artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the 
eye ... It will be the strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such 
constraint and perfection under a law of their own ... Conversely, it is the weak characters 
without power over themselves that hate the constraint of style. They feel that if this bitter and 
evil constraint were imposed upon them they would be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as 
they serve; they hate to serve. Such spirits ... are always out to shape and interpret their 
environment as free nature: wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, and surprising. And they are 
well advised because it is only in this way that they can give pleasure to themselves. For one thing 
is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means of 
this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. Whoever is 
dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if  
only by having to endure his ugly sight. For the sight of what is ugly makes one bad and gloomy. 
(G S  290)
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Nietzsche, thus, interprets the illusion of “free nature”, of negative freedom, as a slave 
illusion and the hatred of aesthetic constraint as a sign of life-denial or ressentiment. The 
way Nietzsche describes the resentful person as “ugly” and “bad” also reminds us of the 
noble way of interpreting the “good” as the beautiful and the “bad” as the ugly (GM I). 
Another important element here is the idea that self-discipline, in the service of self- 
creation, both demands and begets self-reverence. It is this self-reverence that the weak 
type is unable to draw on and I considered this at length in chapter one where I discussed 
the significance of slave vanity. The inability of the slave type to rely on a self-generated 
self-opinion makes it impossible for this type of person to embrace the constraint of style. 
In other words, the weak type suffers too much from bad conscience, since bad conscience 
undermines independent value judgments.
. From my brief exegetical comments on The Gay Science it may be concluded that 
Nietzsche presents his ideas in this transitional book in a way that clearly establishes the 
foundations of his political framework and thus the basis for his positive teachings. In The 
Gay Science he transforms his early thoughts on consciousness and the liberation of 
philosophy into a positive conception of active hierarchy and active conscience. The 
foundations of Nietzsche’s political philosophy are thus integrated and consolidated in the 
aphoristic structure of The Gay Science and in the mature works Nietzsche simply gives 
these ideas their fullest expression within a new metaphorical language of will to power, 
noble and slave, self-overcoming, and value creation.
Nietzsche’s conception of what is “noble”
The framework of Nietzsche’s political philosophy is based on the idea of “revaluation”. 
Nietzsche claims that mankind has undergone only one revaluation of values in its history. 
Nietzsche describes that revaluation as the slave revolt in morality. In Beyond Good and
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Evil and On the Genealogy Morals, Nietzsche presents the victorious slave morality as the 
morality of “good and evil”. I introduced this basic framework in chapter one and 
described the morality of good and evil as “reactive hierarchy” according to Gilles 
Deleuze’s insightful account of Nietzsche’s ontology. However, at this point in my 
analysis, what needs to be explained more clearly is the specific way in which Nietzsche’s 
conception of what is noble, the basis of his future “active” revaluation of values, 
represents his particular version of “noble nature”. This is important because Nietzsche 
needs to construct his own conception of what is noble if he is going to be successful in 
establishing the preconditions for philosophical courage as a new form of political- 
philosophical autonomy.
Of course, the first thing Nietzsche needs to do is revalue “life” as will to power. He 
appears to do this quite effortlessly in Beyond Good and Evil where he states:
Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal 
instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength - life itself is 
will to power,; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results. (B G E  13)
This new way of valuing life is the cornerstone of Nietzsche’s revaluation. Specifically, the 
will to power hypothesis divides “willing” into a dualism that distinguishes a self­
preserving will to power from a will to power that seeks to “discharge its strength” beyond 
mere preservation.
Nietzsche’s interest in noble will to power as a discharging of strength follows from his 
earlier ideas about the need to liberate philosophy from the morality of custom, utility, or 
herd self-preservation as I have variously referred to Christian morality throughout the 
preceding chapters. Therefore, in Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy o f  
Morals, where he describes the noble type, he is specifically intent upon emphasizing one’s 
capacity to discharge strength as the most important noble trait because it represents an 
ability to “act powerfully” and without concern for what a moral action is. Where
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Nietzsche describes the noble races of antiquity, he is obviously looking back from the 
perspective of someone who wants to overcome the crippling passivity that the bad 
conscience has imposed upon the will ever more thoroughly over the course of the 
Christian and modem periods. For this reason it is essential that Nietzsche link the idea of 
doing philosophy differently to a conception of willing that is uniquely “active”.
In On the Genealogy o f Morals and Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche states:
The knightly-aristocratic value judgments presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, 
abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, 
hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity. (GM
1.7)
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it 
judges, “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself’; it knows itself to be that which first accords 
honour to things; it is value-creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honours: such a 
morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of power that seeks 
to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would give and 
bestow ... The noble human being honours himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has 
power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard 
with himself and respects all severity and hardness. (BGE 2 6 0 )
Of course the noble type does not represent the kind of independent value creator that the
philosopher of the future represents but Nietzsche must cultivate the idea that noble nature
includes elements that may be seen as “value-creating” insofar as these elements embody
“active” valuing rather than “passive” or “contemplative” valuing. In other words,
Nietzsche needs to present noble nature as a mode of valuing that affirms individual
actions regardless of their value to the herd. And for this reason Nietzsche emphasizes self-
glorification, self-reverence, and severity toward oneself alongside the idea of discharging
one’s strength. Thus, I argue that every description of what is noble serves the promotion
of philosophical courage as “active”.
I suggest that noble nature is the precondition for independent value creation. But the 
problem with re-introducing an active hierarchy is that noble values are not necessary to 
either the survival of modern communities or how individuals in modern communities 
might understand themselves to “flourish”. Any notion of flourishing that individuals in
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modern communities might have is quite comfortably conceived of within the framework 
of the morality of utility. In other words, if we want to have a new active hierarchy we 
need to will that structure beyond the level of herd self-preservation or “utility”, broadly 
speaking, as I have referred to slave morality throughout the thesis.
In the early essays Homer on Competition and The Greek State Nietzsche acknowledges 
the fact that the hierarchical and slavery-based structure of Greek culture was necessary to 
both the survival and flourishing of Greek city-states. However, in a post-modern or post- 
Christian setting this type of structure would be incoherent, since for us, unlike the Greeks, 
“survival” and “flourishing” are not linked in this hierarchical way. What Nietzsche needs 
to do, therefore, if he wants to re-introduce hierarchy, with new goals in mind, is to 
introduce a compelling new conception of willing that provides an ideal of flourishing 
beyond the morality of utility. This requirement explains the reasoning behind Nietzsche’s 
unique description of what is noble and it explains why he sees revaluation as both a return 
to and re-configuration of noble morality (the morality of “good and bad”) at the same 
time:
Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much longer preparation? 
More: must one not desire it with all one’s might? Even will it? Even promote it? Whoever begins 
at this point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train of thought will not soon come to the 
end of it - reason enough for me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly 
clear what my aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my 
last book Beyond Good and Evil - at least this does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad.” (GM I, 
16)
In this passage Nietzsche presents his plan for revaluation clearly. He wants us to promote, 
will, and actually produce a high culture according to the framework of noble morality as 
he has described it. But this new culture must be able to transform the type who has 
philosophical courage into the independent value creating type. Therefore, what Nietzsche 
presents as noble must serve the enhancement of philosophical courage rather than 
political courage.
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Political courage was the expression of political loyalty in the Greek context and was 
necessary for the Greeks in a way that philosophical courage was not. Therefore, political 
courage was a “noble” trait that Nietzsche needs to discard as an element of what is noble 
in order to make noble nature more “philosophical”. In the mature works, unlike the early 
essay The Greek State, Nietzsche does not discuss the significance of political courage in 
the Greek context to any significant degree nor does he discuss it with respect to any of 
the so-called noble races to any great extent. And this may be why some commentators, 
like Strauss, suggest that Nietzsche simply demoted politics to a lower plane. On my view, 
however, it is more accurate to say that Nietzsche is relatively silent about “politics” in his 
mature period since he cannot afford to include political courage in what is “noble” if he 
wants to liberate philosophy from its service to the morality of custom and utility.
distance, internalization, and the soul
Now I have just described what is noble for Nietzsche as the discharging of strength 
combined with philosophical courage. But the discharging of strength, in a philosophical 
sense, is usually described by Nietzsche as an increased “internalization” or 
“spiritualization”. For Nietzsche’s philosophical types it is an expression of their strength 
that discipline becomes an inner necessity that allows their “souls” to “become what they 
are” . Hierarchy is necessary to establish a distance between social strata and this distance 
is then translated internally, for the philosophical type, as the distance of “self­
overcoming”. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes:
Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an aristocratic society - and it 
will be so again and again - a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and 
differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other. 
Without that pathos o f distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between strata - 
when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and 
just as constantly practices obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance - 
that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown up either - the craving for an ever new 
widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, 
further-stretching, more comprehensive states - in brief, simply the enhancement of the type
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“man,” the continual “self-overcoming of man,” to use a moral formula in a supra-moral sense.
(BGE 257)
At the end of the “moral” period, in which “man was actually made calculable” (GMII, 
2), Nietzsche envisions a new mode of discharging strength that will not represent a 
simple guilt-based internalization of strength but, instead, an expression of strength in the 
form of an internal pathos of hierarchy as “self-overcoming”. Thus, it is in this passage 
from Beyond Good and Evil that Nietzsche presents an explicit political framework 
uniting active hierarchy with philosophical self-overcoming.
According to the force of this passage, I argue that one of the most important elements 
of Nietzsche’s conception of what is noble is his idea of the “pathos of distance” which I 
introduced in chapter one and again in chapter two. And it is important to note that the 
pathos of distance appears in all his mature books except for Thus Spoke Zarathustra (cf. 
GM I, 2 & II, 14; TI, Expeditions o f an Untimely Man, 37; AC 43; EH, “The Untimely 
Ones”, 3). Specifically, what must be interpreted, with respect to the pathos of distance, is 
how the idea of the discharging of strength has both an internal and external 
manifestation. What I mean is that, once we acknowledge that political courage, or 
loyalty, is to be left out of what is noble, Nietzsche appears to be free to articulate noble 
nature according to both hierarchy and self-overcoming and in this way reinterpret 
politics as hierarchy and philosophy as extra-moral autonomy.
According to the framework for self-overcoming, outlined in the passage from Beyond 
Good and Evil above, “difference” is produced hierarchically and Nietzschean difference 
is “the enhancement of the type ‘man’”. What Nietzsche establishes clearly in this 
passage is the “becoming” quality of independent value creation. The process is one of 
continual “self-overcoming” which precludes the idea that Nietzschean autonomy is a 
fixed conception that may be communicated universally or known by the passive mind as 
a conception of universal autonomy. In making self-creation a process of “becoming”
191
rather than a fixed conception of “being” Nietzsche makes it impossible to conceive of the 
Ubermensch’s “difference” as a levelling one because a levelling conception of difference 
would be universally communicable to herd consciousness. Thus, for Nietzsche, it is only 
the framework of hierarchy and the continual process of experiencing that widening 
between higher and lower, and a pathos of distance which reflects this, that represents 
difference as “becoming”.
However, this conception of becoming is linked to the “soul” and in this way the 
discharging of strength has an “inner” expression. Now the reference to “soul” may be 
appear to be misleading because the idea of a soul is usually associated with the 
metaphysical ideals of a Christian or Platonic moral telos. However, Nietzsche refers to the 
soul in many different instances and sometimes with derision, where he is contemptuous of 
these, metaphysical interpretations, but at other times he employs the term within his own 
positive framework of “becoming”. A good example of his positive usage is in the 
following passage from Ecce Homo:
The soul that has the longest ladder and reaches down deepest - the most comprehensive soul, 
which can run and stray and roam farthest within itself; the most necessary soul that plunges 
joyously into chance; the soul that, having being, dives into becoming; the soul that has, but 
wants to want and will; the soul that flees itself and catches up with itself in the widest circles; the 
wisest soul that folly exhorts most sweetly; the soul that loves itself most, in which all things have 
their sweep and countersweep and ebb and flood -. (EH, “ Thus Spoke Zarathustra ”, 6)
In this passage Nietzsche is describing the philosophical soul. Unsurprisingly, the idea of 
soul is given multiple expressions in Nietzsche’s work, according to types of souls, and it 
is important to distinguish the philosophical soul, specifically, apart from the noble soul 
more generally (cf. BGE 260, 265, 287). What Nietzsche captures is the “self­
overcoming” nature of the philosophical soul that is never “at rest” but rather exploring 
the depths and heights of its “becoming”.
Leslie Thiele offers the following characterizations of Nietzsche’s use of “soul” :
Nietzsche’s glorification of the will to power, often interpreted as a eulogy of domination, is 
essentially a tribute to self-overcoming. The greatest struggles are not to be witnessed on the
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battlefield or in the sociopolitical arena, but in the rule of the self. The greatest victory is a well- 
ordered soul.194
The feeling or inspiration, of a heightened sense of power, is attainable only when the soul rises 
above itself. The will to power is always nourished by a state of hierarchy, a ‘pathos of distance’: 
and this, according to Nietzsche, as much within as without the self.195
In these passages Thiele captures, to a significant extent, Nietzsche’s aim where he
describes the soul in terms of self-overcoming as a “heightened sense of power” . And this
pathos is the effect of active pathos or the feeling of distance. However, Thiele’s
characterization emphasizes the “internal” pathos of distance and fails to acknowledge
fully a corresponding “external” distance in the form of social hierarchy. Thiete is not
wrong to emphasize Nietzsche’s interest in the rule of the self, since Nietzsche’s aim is to
unite self-discipline with the discharging of strength in a unique way. Therefore, Nietzsche
does appear to avoid placing his highest types within the context of the “battlefield” or the
“sociopolitical arena”, as we know it, but independent value creation is the most spiritual
will to power and as such it is the product of an external discharging of strength
manifesting itself in the form of active hierarchy. The point is simply that “active” or
“noble” appears to apply to both an external discharging of strength and an internal
process of self-overcoming or “spiritualization”. I am not claiming that the philosophical
type engages in an immediate physical domination of others but rather that the framework
of social hierarchy may be interpreted as the “external” expression of the discharging of
strength, providing the highest type with the opportunity to experience an “internal”
pathos of distance as a result.
hierarchy as domination
Now I argue that the “active” nature of Nietzsche’s revaluation is crucial to his political
194Leslie Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f the Soul, p. 65.
195Ibid, p. 67.
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philosophy, since what is active represents the revaluation, and thus overcoming, of a 
moral universe that “separates strength from expressions of strength” (GM I, 13). Indeed, 
it is only according to this reversal of values in the first instance that Nietzsche can go 
further and re-think something beyond the simple reversal of values. Of course I have 
introduced this idea in previous chapters and described it in terms of Nietzsche’s critique 
of the self. In the present context it must be understood as the doctrine of “becoming” that 
is meant to replace the doctrine of “being”, particular to the ascetic ideal. In On the 
Genealogy o f Morals, where Nietzsche claims that there is no “doer” behind the “deed”, 
and therefore “the deed is everything”, he is affirming his revaluation of life as the will to 
power in action or, rather, in terms of the “external” discharging of strength (GM I, 13).
In other words, he is affirming the noble expression of strength through commanding. 
Although Nietzsche does not sanction a return to the “blond beast” it is, nonetheless, 
important to see Nietzschean autonomy in the context of the expression of hierarchy as 
domination.
In Twilight o f the Idols Nietzsche describes his future-based conception of autonomy as 
a new conception of self-responsibility set against the backdrop of hierarchy. What is 
crucial to his conception of self-responsibility in this section is that it also entails a 
responsibility to maintain the will to power as “domination”:
For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves the 
distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even 
to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one’s cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means 
that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other 
instincts - for example, over the instinct for ‘happiness’. (TI, Expeditions o f an Untimely 
Man, 38)
In this passage Nietzsche sees the highest type as one who has become free. Nietzschean 
freedom requires self-responsibility. And this is reminiscent of the sovereign individual of 
On the Genealogy o f Morals who has the “right to make promises” (GM II, 2). The right 
to make promises also gives one the right to mastery over “all short-willed and unreliable
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creatures” (GM II 2). Thus, Nietzschean freedom is a great burden and not simply a return 
to the “discharging” of the blond beast. However, it remains a form of domination that 
includes an “external” expression of power. For Nietzschean man, injustice and suffering 
must be affirmed and ressentiment must be obliterated. And this kind of autonomy requires 
a unique post-modern self-consciousness of one’s existential self-responsibility. But what 
goes along with this self-responsibility is a responsibility to preserve the distance between 
types.
Further, this unique freedom requires one to “sacrifice men to one’s cause”. The external 
expression of will to power is therefore clearly linked to domination and finds its clearest 
expression in the attempt to produce the pathos of distance. What it means to produce the 
pathos of distance in a specifically Nietzschean sense is to preserve distance in the service 
of the life of the independent value creator.
The life of independent value creation appears to require the creation of truths in the 
sense that being honest with oneself requires the strength to see one’s judgments as 
radically independent value judgments that affirm one’s actions as unique actions. In the 
Anti-Christ Nietzsche writes:
Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on 
which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to be sacrificed to it. Greatness of Soul is 
needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest service. - For what does it mean to be honest in 
intellectual things? That one is stem towards one’s heart, that one despises ‘fine feelings’, that 
one makes every Yes and No a question of conscience! (AC 50)
And with this description of philosophical courage as greatness of soul I return once again
to the incommunicable nature of Nietzsche’s political ideal. The active conscience
demands that the truth-seeker experiment with truth according to the new ideal of life-
affirmation and this means, as Alasdair MacIntyre observes, that Nietzsche’s Ubermensch
fails to “find any objective good with authority over him in the social world.”196
196MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 257.
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To conclude my exegesis I now turn to a summary of what I believe constitute the 
virtues and limitations of what is uniquely political in Nietzsche’s thought. In doing so I 
offer concluding remarks on what I have presented in part two as a whole as well as what I 
have presented in part one with respect to how I have distinguished the uniquely political 
in Nietzsche over and against democratic interpretations of his ideas. Therefore, I 
summarize the nature of Nietzsche’s political philosophy with respect to what it compels 
us to consider beyond the usual concerns of political theory interpretations of Nietzsche.
the virtues and limitations of Nietzsche’s political thought
In chapter four I outlined why Nietzsche’s political philosophy is both anti-democratic 
and anti-universalist. In this chapter I have taken the time to offer an exegesis of 
Nietzsche’s political framework as he presents it in his mature books. It must be concluded 
that Nietzsche’s visionary philosophy of anti-universalist value creation is a unique 
contribution to the history of political thought. It must also be concluded that there is an 
important link between the role of philosophy and hierarchy in Nietzsche’s political project 
that is not assimilable within our democratic and egalitarian structures of thought. But 
beyond these conclusions something more needs to be said about the virtues and 
limitations of Nietzsche’s experiment as I have presented it.
What Nietzsche offers us is a political philosophy that attempts to undermine our efforts 
to make modem democratic culture seem less herd-like. In other words, his anti- 
theoretical position is a thorough-going anti-democratic critique and it assumes, according 
to Nietzsche’s own categories of thought, that no modem democratic culture can be 
anything other than a levelling culture of mediocrity and herd self-preservation. I argue 
that this is a great virtue of Nietzsche’s political thought and not something that should be 
overlooked in an effort to make Nietzsche more acceptable. Indeed, I argue that
Nietzsche’s position challenges us to improve the philosophical arguments which underpin 
our egalitarian and democratic theories. Nietzsche’s critique of moral agency, his critique 
of “being”, as I have presented it in various contexts throughout the thesis, forces us to 
face up to the same nihilism that Nietzsche faced up to and attempted to overcome with 
his hypothesis of will to power and his doctrine of “difference” as hierarchical becoming. 
My point is that if we want to produce compelling theories of “difference” that are 
levelling theories of difference we still need to construct a “metaphorical world” that 
somehow overcomes the nihilism of the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche’s attempt to do this 
“hierarchically” serves to remind us that we have not yet done so “democratically”.
Of course it could be argued that authors like William Connolly have taken on just such 
a task. Yet I have presented my position on Connolly, and others, according to my belief 
that Nietzsche’s metaphorical world is a uniquely anti-democratic world. What I am 
arguing, therefore, is that the democratic Nietzsche may be limited because of Nietzsche’s 
uniquely anti-democratic metaphorical world. Thus, I am re-asserting Nietzsche’s 
challenge to political theory beyond these limitations.
In this way, pinpointing what is uniquely political in Nietzsche, as I have done, helps 
illustrate just how important it is to offer an alternative “positive” political vision at the 
same time that one launches a critique of moral agency. What makes Nietzsche’s political 
philosophy truly remarkable is the integrated combination of critique and positive 
construction. By presenting his positive teachings in the wake of his critique of the ascetic 
ideal (the two world theory), Nietzsche brings an integrity to his overall philosophical 
project that we can still learn a lot from.
Of course, there are important limitations to Nietzsche’s political philosophy and thus to 
his relevance to political theory. Without even getting into the question of its practicability, 
which has not been a concern in this thesis, I suggest that the greatest limitation of his
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political thought is his attempt to divide the will into two categories of life which, at the 
higher end of the philosophical will to power, separates the will, in an important sense, 
from the morality of utility broadly conceived. Indeed, this is more than just a slight 
limitation since a critique of Nietzsche’s dualist ontology has ramifications for the entire 
political framework of his thought. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that it is 
precisely Nietzsche’s attempt to escape the metaphorical world of herd consciousness that 
gets him into trouble. It is not just the case that individual value creation is 
incomprehensible to us as egalitarians and democrats but as human beings it is counter­
intuitive to think that we could be motivated to “discharge our strength” beyond a utility- 
based morality where the idea of flourishing becomes completely dissociated from that 
morality. And, thus, Nietzsche simply has no way of convincing us that we should/could 
will something as “unnecessary” as active hierarchy.
And yet, despite the thin political framework of Nietzsche’s thought, what does seem 
promising is the idea of a new political-philosophical form of life that is not a purely 
contemplative form of philosophical expression. Indeed, Nietzsche’s conception of a new 
conscience liberated from the bad conscience of the Christian moral universe is attractive 
because it represents the unity of thought and action which to some extent overcomes the 
problem of the two world theory. Overcoming the two world theory according to this 
unique unity of thought and action as self-creation allows us the opportunity to theorise a 
new conception of political autonomy that is free of the old metaphorical baggage of the 
“doer” behind the “deed”. The challenge would then be to re-think political autonomy as 
“democratic” political-philosophical autonomy and this would require a new metaphorical 
world of “becoming” in which democratic political-philosophical autonomy might make 
sense. In an effort to give greater direction to such potential in Nietzsche, I now turn to a 
comparison of Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt and attempt to establish the resonances
between Arendt and Nietzsche on the issue of political autonomy, as the unity of thought 
and action.
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p a r t  m
Hannah Arendt argues that the vita contemplativa has dominated political thought since 
Socrates and she makes a bold attempt to re-think the significance of political action and 
judgment over and against philosophy ,197 Arendt’s approach to the relationship between 
politics and philosophy is not the same as Nietzsche’s but there are interesting and 
important resonances between their different approaches where Arendt attempts to affirm 
political thinking above philosophy as contemplative thought and Nietzsche attempts to 
affirm “active” philosophy above politics as the morality of utility. Therefore, in part three, 
I offer a consideration of Nietzsche’s proximity to Arendt concerning the relationship 
between “politics” and “philosophy”. In light of what I have presented as Nietzsche’s 
unique political philosophy, I argue that even though Arendt and Nietzsche are opposed to 
one another on the issue of moral universalism they share some compelling ideas about 
“political” autonomy as a uniquely performative mode of being in the world. Thus, I argue 
that although their conceptions of autonomy are not identical they are similar insofar as 
they both describe a form of life that may be understood in terms of a unique unity of 
thought and action.
Nietzschean autonomy constitutes the unity of thought and action in the specific sense 
that it is a self-creating autonomy. The life of self-creation entails making independent 
value judgments that affirm individual actions. Thus, Nietzsche resolves to overcome a 
purely contemplative mode of philosophizing in order to re-think philosophy as an “active” 
expression of life-affirmation. What is “affirmed” by Nietzschean man is the uniqueness of 
his actions and the value of those actions to the further growth and expression of his will
197Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), p. 14 (hereafter
H Q.
to power. Nietzschean autonomy may, thus, be said to unite a performative mode with a 
judging mode and in this way it is similar to Arendt’s attempt to re-think political 
autonomy as the unity of performative action and political judgment.
But it must be admitted that the anti-democratic and anti-universalist elements of 
Nietzschean autonomy make it impossible to say that it is identical to Arendt’s conception. 
Indeed, what is dissimilar, beyond the obvious anti-democratic structure of Nietzsche’s 
hierarchy, is the fact that the Nietzschean individual’s value judgments appear to be limited 
to his own actions and the Arendtian individual’s political judgments are concerned with 
the perspectives and actions of others, according to a reflective mode Arendt describes as 
“representative thinking”. In this way, Arendt promotes the idea that the unique truth of 
individuals is identifiable only in their performative actions but, unlike Nietzsche, she 
marries this idea of the performative self to the idea of judging actions “objectively” by 
establishing in one’s mind a representative “consensus” of others’ perspectives as 
participants in the political sphere.
However, I want to consider more than just the similarities and differences between 
Nietzschean and Arendtian autonomy. I want to discuss autonomy as the unity of thought 
and action within the broader context of the relationship between politics and philosophy. 
This requires a discussion of the underlying claims that Arendt and Nietzsche rely on to 
ground their different but similar conceptions of autonomy. I suggest that although 
Arendt’s conception of political judgment is more familiar to us, and possibly more 
comprehensible, she, nevertheless, unlike Nietzsche, fails to remain internally consistent 
with the critique of the self, or moral agency, that they both share. I argue that Arendt 
grounds her conception of judgment in a traditional philosophical prejudice about the 
universality of “being” which she originally tries to overcome in an effort to establish the 
integrity of her performative model of action. Therefore, I argue that her unified
conception of autonomy as political action adjudgm ent suffers from certain limitations.
I develop my analysis according to a critique of what Arendt’s interpreters refer to as the 
“Nietzschean Arendt”. The Nietzschean Arendt emphasizes the performative and agonistic 
elements of Arendt’s theory of political autonomy. By situating my analysis within the 
discourse on the Nietzschean Arendt, one of my aims is to re-think the discussion of 
Nietzsche and Arendt in terms of the need to develop better philosophical arguments 
where we set out to theorize new possibilities for autonomy. Ultimately, however, my 
central concern in chapter seven is to illustrate the relevance of my thesis to modem issues 
in political theory by demonstrating its usefulness in understanding the limitations of 
Hannah Arendt’s political vision.
Beyond chapter seven, I conclude part three by offering a short summary of the main 
points of the thesis followed by some thoughts on the significance of the performative 
model of the self I attribute to Nietzsche. Therefore, in chapter eight, I offer some musings 
about Nietzsche’s potential beyond the immediate scope of my thesis. In this way, chapter 
eight represents a bridge, of sorts, to a future project that might be worth exploring, 
tentatively, given the reading of Nietzsche I have presented thus far.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - NIETZSCHE AND ARENDT ON THE UNITY OF 
THOUGHT AND ACTION
The recent focus on the Nietzschean Arendt has helped to push the bounds of Arendt 
scholarship beyond the standard Aristotelian interpretation. In rough terms, a 
contemporary framework for Arendt scholarship may be perceived to be split along 
performative and dialogical lines. In this way, theorists such as Dana Villa and Bonnie 
Honig argue in favour of a Nietzschean Arendt over and against the neo- 
Kantian/consensus-based models advanced by authors like Jurgen Habermas and Seyla 
Benhabib.198 Arendt’s self-appointed task of confronting the unique evil of totalitarianism 
and its conditions places her in a fully modern context but this in itself does not guarantee 
that her conclusions about the value of political action, as she presents it, constitute an 
unambiguous answer to the modem problems she identifies. What this means is that 
interpretations of Arendt’s political thought, with a stress on Nietzsche here and an 
emphasis on Kant there, must be convincing in their claims that Arendt is successful in 
confronting what she considers to be the foremost political problem of modernity - “the 
possible interconnectedness of non-thought and evil”.199
The proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt claim to reveal the axiomatic elements of 
Arendt’s theory by focusing on the performative nature of action and judgment in the 
public political sphere. In this way, the Nietzschean Arendt may be thought to escape both
198See Dana Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche and the Aestheticization of Political 
Action,” Political Theory 20 (1992); Arendt and Heidegger (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1996; “Democratizing the Agon,” in Politics, Philosophy, Terror (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1999); Bonnie Honig, "Arendt, Identity, and Difference,” Political Theory 16 (1988); “The 
Politics of Agonism,” Political Theory 21 (1993); Political Theory and the Displacement o f Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Jurgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendt on the Concept of 
Power” in Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1983); Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1996).
199Hannah Arendt, The Life o f the Mind, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), I, p.
179 (hereafter LOM).
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the Aristotelian concern for the “moral ends of community” and the Habermasian concern 
for a “dialogue aimed at understanding”.200 Although the Habermasian interpretation finds 
its modern character in the democratic element of moral and political universalism that 
underpins its concern for understanding, this is thought to derive from the kind of 
universalism that may be attributed to Kant’s practical philosophy rather than his theory of 
aesthetic judgment. Since Arendt was as appreciative of Kant’s Critique o f Judgment as 
she was critical of his categorical imperative, it would appear to be the case that the 
Habermasian Arendt is in a less convincing position prima facie than the Nietzschean 
Arendt given the latter’s emphasis on the performative nature of the political sphere.201
Therefore, in this chapter, I consider the Nietzschean Arendt. However, I offer a critique 
of the Nietzschean Arendt within a larger framework comparing Nietzsche’s conception of 
philosophy and politics to Arendt’s. This requires an examination of how both Nietzsche 
and Arendt conceive of autonomy as the unity of thought and action but from very 
different perspectives on what “politics” and “philosophy” mean. Since both Nietzsche and 
Arendt describe their conceptions of autonomy in terms of “conscience”, I examine the 
idea of the unity of thought and action in terms of both “political” and “active” conscience. 
I refer to the unity of thought and action in Arendt as “political” conscience and in 
Nietzsche as “active” conscience. I do so in order to distinguish one from the other but 
also to acknowledge the fact that Nietzsche does not think about conscience in the exact 
same terms that Arendt does. Therefore, my analysis implies thinking about Nietzsche’s 
version of conscience “in Arendtian terms” to a certain extent. In other words, I consider 
Nietzsche’s project to be as political as Arendt’s but I want to make use of it as a
200Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, p. 77.
201Ibid, pp. 59-60; Cf. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 
pp. 219-220 (hereafter BPF).
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comparative analytical tool in this context rather than as a straightforward alternative to 
Arendt’s project. Specifically, I focus on the tension between Nietzsche’s unique project 
and the Kantian and Socratic influences in Arendt. I conduct my analysis along these lines 
in order to point out that the Nietzschean Arendt, developed in the work of Dana Villa and 
Bonnie Honig, is a product of Arendt’s interpretation of Nietzsche which has certain 
limitations because of the Kantian and Socratic positions that underlie it.
Arendt describes Nietzsche’s philosophy as an anti-political “inverted Platonism”.202 1 
argue that this is a misleading characterization of Nietzsche’s aims because he actually 
attempts to re-think philosophy beyond the contemplative mode that typifies the anti­
political Platonism Arendt is so scornful of. I suggest that Arendt’s adaptation of Kant’s 
aesthetic formula for political judgment and her Socratic characterization of the two-in-one 
of conscience prevents her from escaping the prejudices of the so-called contemplative 
mode because the demands of these influences in her work make it extremely difficult for 
her to theorize a clean break from the Platonic prejudice against the vita activa as she 
presents it.
I claim that at bottom it is Arendt’s commitment to the separation of philosophy and 
politics that hinders an attempt to theorize the unity of thought and action because her 
conception of conscience remains bogged down in the rigidly defined categories of this 
conceptual reification. She is unable to elevate political thinking above philosophical 
thinking because she is unable to maintain her attempts to theorize freedom as 
performativity. What is interesting is that Nietzsche and Arendt share a certain “active” or 
“performative” conception of the self “beyond good and evil” but Arendt is unable to 
sustain this model in her work where she develops a Kantian/Socratic universality of 
conscience. Nietzsche is able to avoid Arendt’s problems because his anti-universalism
202Arendt, BPF, p. 37
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does not contradict the anti-Platonist critique of the self both he and Arendt employ. It is 
important to emphasize, however, that I am not claiming that Nietzsche’s philosophy 
offers an adequate response to the threat of totalitarian evil in place of Arendt’s theory. 
What I do suggest is that Nietzsche’s anti-democratic and anti-universalist philosophy 
helps reveal, in a new and interesting way, the fact that Arendt’s theory is limited due to 
certain inconsistent claims about the performative model of the self.
I realize that it is controversial to suggest a unity of thought and action in Arendt’s 
work, since she explicitly states that where acting begins thinking ceases.203 Indeed, Dana 
Villa has been at pains to remind us of the essential separation of thinking, judging and 
acting in Arendt’s theory.204 Yet I argue that if we take Arendt seriously on the issue of 
political judgment, we must see her as attempting to produce a conception of political 
thinking that justifies her conception of freedom as performativity in terms of one 
underlying and consistent philosophical premise about the self in the public political 
sphere. Furthermore, we must see her as failing to take this premise seriously where she 
maintains an allegiance to Kantian and Socratic forms of universalism.
acknowledging some tensions in the comparison of Nietzsche and Arendt
Although Arendt was unable to complete The Life o f the Mind it is evident from her 
lecture notes and other essays that the faculty of judgment she hoped to explore and define 
was intended, in part, to provide a justification for her revaluation of opinion over truth. In 
this way, her revaluation of political action is accompanied by a revaluation of political 
opinion. This process of revaluation involves an overturning of the Platonic prejudice
203Arendt, LOMl, p. 6.
204See Dana Villa, “Thinking and Judging” in Politics, Philosophy, Terror (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999).
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against doxai and is aided, as Arendt acknowledges, by Nietzsche’s efforts to articulate the 
decline and death of the distinction between the true world and the world of 
appearances.205
The abolition of the two world theory creates a space for the affirmation of the plurality 
of opinion in the absence of faith in the truth behind all appearances. This affirmation of 
opinion over truth involves a corresponding affirmation of the active life over the 
contemplative life with respect to an alternative mode of thought. Thus, Arendt affirms the 
significance of both the political actor and the political spectator who exercises his/her 
judgment as opinion. As Ronald Beiner puts it, “Arendt begins her account of this idea of 
spectatorship by calling attention to the plurality presupposed in judgment as opposed to 
the solitary nature of thought.”206 By liberating thought from the solitude of contemplation 
both the spectator and the actor participate in the plurality of the public political sphere. 
Dana Villa supplements Beiner’s observations where he states that the “concern with the 
judging spectator is simply the extension of Arendt’s definition of politics in terms of 
virtuosity or performance”.207 What Villa suggests is that judging and acting become 
equally associated with performing in the public sphere.
On this view it appears as though Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism supports and informs 
Arendt’s political ontology in two important ways. Firstly, it allows for the consideration 
of a plurality of opinion and secondly it recommends the flourishing of a plurality of 
performance. However, Nietzsche has no conception of “spectatorship”. In fact, Nietzsche 
is critical of the idea of spectatorship where he disparages Kant’s approach to aesthetic 
judgment (GM III, 6, 12). Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, as I argued in chapter one,
205Arendt, LOM I, p. 11.
206Ronald Beiner, “Interpretative Essay” in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, written by
Hannah Arendt and edited by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 104.
207Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, p. 81.
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provides him with the opportunity to set up his model of hierarchy and therefore the 
pluralism in Nietzsche’s approach to “judgment”, generally speaking, does not yield the 
kind of “spectatorship” Beiner observes in Arendt’s work, since the pathos of distance that 
underpins Nietzsche’s framework of power relations affirms an anti-universalist approach 
to judgment that would appear to foreclose on the kind of “shared” political setting 
“spectatorship” requires.
In contrast to Arendt, who wants to escape the solitary nature of contemplative thought, 
in the idea of political spectatorship and judgment, it is unclear exactly how to read 
Nietzsche on the question of judgment in terms of what might constitute an appropriate 
setting or context for “active” judgment. I argued, in the last chapter, that solitude must be 
distinguished as something separate from independent value judgement in Nietzsche’s 
framework. Thus, I concluded that there is no evidence that Nietzschean man must live a 
solitary life and remove himself from the world of men altogether. All that he is required to 
do is provide himself with a table of values that affirms his own unique actions.
At this point I re-assert the open-ended nature of Nietzsche’s conception of independent 
judgment and add only that his device of “perspectivism” itself, as opposed to his 
hierarchical conception of power relations, could be interpreted as being similar to 
Arendt’s position on judgment as spectatorship. And this proximity to Arendt would have 
to be based on Nietzsche’s curious notion of “objectivity” (GM III, 12). “Objectivity”, as a 
kind of openness to the idea that one’s perspective might be false, could be rendered 
similar to Arendt’s position on the grounds that “openness” involves seeing things from 
another’s perspective. However, I also see this as problematic because Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism could never be interpreted as a “representative thinking” approach to 
judgment and, therefore, interpreting him too “democratically” would violate the spirit and 
substance of his unique political position. Thus, where I address Arendtian interpretations
of Nietzsche’s approach to judgment below I am critical of them for this reason and, yet, 
with respect to appropriating “perspectivism”, beyond the scope of this chapter, I 
recognize its potential usefulness.
However, it must be admitted that the limitations of Nietzsche’s influence on Arendt are 
not discussed in these exact terms by Arendt’s interpreters, although the limitations of 
Nietzsche’s thought figures prominently in Arendt’s formulations. In piecing together a 
new conception of political action and judgment, Nietzsche’s influence is thought to 
require the complementary addition of a politicized Kantian aesthetics. Since, as I interpret 
it, Arendt’s concern was to reconfigure the public realm according to the elements of 
politics that would bring about the unity of thought and action as political “thinking” or 
“conscience”, it may be argued that the significance of Kant’s formula for an “enlarged 
mentality”, as found in his Critique o f Judgment, lies in the fact that it provides a uniquely 
modem political sphere conception of universalism that would give an underlying 
commonality to a plurality of perspectives and opinions.208
Thus, Nietzsche’s position appears to have been adapted by Arendt to suit the more 
Kantian-like political sphere she envisions. In The Human Condition Arendt describes 
objectivity in terms of a plurality of political perspectives.209 The emphasis here is on the 
qualitative difference between public and private lives in terms of the relationship between 
an individual’s identity and the presence/absence of others or, rather, spectators. Over and 
against the private individual whose identity is made up of “the prolongation and 
multiplication of one’s own position with its attending aspects and perspectives”, Arendt 
affirms the public individual whose perspectival identity is formed in participation with a
208Arendt, BPF, p. 241. I refer directly to Kant’s Critique o f Judgment later in the chapter.
209Arendt, HC, p. 54.
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“multitude of spectators”.210 In this way, a plurality of actors/spectators provides a 
perspectivism that may be thought of in terms of the formation of “objective” judgements 
based on opinion as opposed to the idea of a unity of truth which may be presupposed in 
thought. Thus, political perspectivism is said to provide a truly reliable “worldly reality” 
because it escapes the conceptual opposition between a so-called real world and a world of 
appearances.211
Elsewhere, Arendt describes this political perspectivism in terms of the capacity for an 
“enlarged mentality”.212 Arendt suggests that Kant did not recognize the political and 
moral value of his aesthetic conception of an enlarged mentality and in appropriating it for 
politics she presents the concept as the view that “[t]he more people’s standpoints I have 
present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I 
would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for 
representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion.”213 According 
to the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt, it is in the proximity of Nietzsche’s position 
to the “enlarged mentality” that Arendt’s Nietzschean influence is married to her Kantian 
influence. Of course on my interpretation this would have to be seen as constituting a 
rather unhappy marriage since Kant’s framework is a universalist framework of judgment 
and Nietzsche’s is a hierarchical and anti-universalist framework of independent value 
judgment. However, for my immediate purposes, it is merely necessary to acknowledge 
the fact that the two influences are meant to converge in the idea that there is a type of 
political thinking, a type of political conscience, that represents a “performative” but
210Ibid, p. 57.
211Ibid.
212Arendt, BPF, p. 241.
213Ibid.
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“objective” process of judging in the public sphere. As mentioned above, this conception is 
meant to celebrate an impartiality or objectivity derived from the plurality of opinion rather 
than the unity of truth. As Villa puts it, “Arendt’s politics of opinion and her antipathy to 
truth can thus be seen as a specifically political version of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.”214 
Having acknowledged some obvious tensions in the comparison of Nietzsche and Arendt, 
in light of my conclusions about Nietzsche’s philosophy, I now turn to a further analysis of 
Nietzsche and Arendt with a focus on the “Nietzschean Arendt”.
the Nietzschean Arendt
For Arendt, the “raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is 
action”.215 The heritage of Arendt’s notion of freedom is Roman and Greek but may be 
thought to transcend any particular historical ethos, as a conception of freedom, due to the 
emphasis placed on the immortality of performance. As Arendt puts it, “[ajction, to be 
free, must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect 
on the other.”216 She qualifies her description here by adding that, “[t]his is not to say that 
motives and aims are not important factors in every single act, but they are its determining 
factors, and action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend them.”217 Thus, the 
transcendent quality of political action would appear to exceed the morality of custom and 
utility and is, as a conception of freedom, quite the opposite of “‘inner freedom,’ the 
inward space into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free.”218 This
214Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” p. 286.





“inner freedom” represents the realm of moral and philosophical freedom as it has 
traditionally been conceived and on Arendt’s view just such a contemplative conception of 
freedom is “politically irrelevant”.219 Thus, freedom as action distinguishes the active life 
over and against the contemplative life and insofar as freedom transcends a moral realm 
and the realm of the intellect alike it may be thought to exist as Nietzsche might put it 
“beyond good and evil”.220 The difference between transcendent freedom as action and 
inner freedom as contemplation is crucial for Arendt because transcendence implies 
escaping accepted rules and norms, and it is these rules and norms which may all too easily 
prevent the kind of active political conscience she promotes in her concern about 
totalitarianism. In this way, her performative conception of freedom appears to match 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis of the will to power, both with respect to its transcendent quality 
and its attempt to escape the herd conformity of the morality of custom and utility.
But, at this point, it is crucial to emphasize the fact that Arendt wants to direct us 
toward a new kind of thinking rather than activism per se. As .she explains in the prologue 
to The Human Condition, her re-consideration of the value of action over and against 
contemplation is meant to make us think about “what we are doing”.221 What she wants to 
encourage is political thinking over and against philosophical thinking. This requires 
thinking about opinions and actions rather than contemplating abstract concepts and purely 
philosophical values. As Villa puts it:
Political (as opposed to philosophical) thinking is characterized not by the rigorous logical 
unfolding of an argument, but rather by imaginative mobility and the capacity to represent the 
perspectives of others. The (rational) formation of an opinion hinges upon this capacity for what 
Arendt calls “representative thought”.222
219Ibid.
220See Arendt, HC, p. 205.
221 Ibid, p. 5.
222Villa, “Thinking and Judging,” pp. 96-97.
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Political thinking is active in the sense that it is said to be both performative and 
representative rather than contemplative. One who is thinking politically is in a sense 
performing a political judgment that establishes a position in the world which may 
ultimately oppose general rules, accepted values, and the so-called wisdom of 
philosophical truth but nevertheless serves as a “representative” account of perspectives or 
opinions.
Another potential element of the performative political actor is his/her agonism. Axendt 
describes the “agonal spirit” as “the passionate drive to show one’s self in measuring up 
against others that underlies the concept of politics prevalent in the [Greek] city-states.”223 
Hence, agonism is a term applied to the competition between political actors for the sake 
of revealing who they are in word and deed.224 In chapter three I explained how 
Nietzsche’s so-called agonism is limited to a philosophical agonism that only roughly 
corresponds to his presentation of agonism in the early essay Homer on Competition. 
Therefore, it must be acknowledged that Arendt’s interpreters are attributing to Nietzsche, 
yet again, a position that is not uniquely Nietzschean but a combination of Greek agonism 
and its Foucaultian variant developed through Nietzsche. Nevertheless, establishing the 
agonistic nature of the “Nietzschean Arendt” is helpful in illustrating the overall position 
the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt adopt.
An important condition of agonism, in the Arendtian context, is that the actor leave 
behind a concern for “life” in terms of its private sphere interests, necessities, and
223Arendt, HC, p. 194.
224I associate the self-revealing nature of transcendent freedom with the Nietzschean notion of self­
creation and/or self-overcoming. Although I recognize that it is not an exact fit what I emphasize in 
the association here is the idea that the self that is “revealed” is beyond good and evil insofar as for 
both Nietzsche and Arendt there must be a notion of freedom that is active and independent in the 
particular sense that an utterly unique self appears for the first time as a performance rather than as a 
passive cogito. In any case, what “self-revealing” does not represent is some kind of peeling away of 
layers to get to a so-called “true” or “deep” self.
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comforts. Now this is not the same as overcoming the morality of utility, as in Nietzsche’s 
case. However, it is like that to a degree insofar as the performative self is not meant to be 
representing “utility-based” concerns directly but rather he/she is meant to be revealing 
who he/she is and thus creating a spontaneous public political “reality”. Another vital 
element is the emphasis on keeping the contest between individuals going by preventing an 
ultimate victor from destroying the incentive to compete amongst the other actors. The 
Greek mechanism for ensuring this competition was the practice of ostracism. As 
introduced above in chapter three, Nietzsche describes the practice of ostracism in terms 
of keeping the institution of political agonism afloat (HOC 191). But what is noteworthy in 
Nietzsche’s account is the emphasis he places on the ethos of competition across Greek 
society including areas of cultural expression beyond the political. Greek agonism was 
prevalent amongst poets, artists, and philosophers alike. On Nietzsche’s account, the 
agonism of Greek culture writ large was a product of the conditions of life the Greeks 
faced. Directing their savagery into an institutionalized framework for competition was the 
only way to defend against the alternative, chaos as destruction. And, as I presented it in 
chapter three, Nietzsche’s view is that such conditions separate us absolutely, as modems, 
from the Greek ethos of competition (HOC 192-3).
Now Arendt’s interpretation reveals the volatility of Greek agonism by acknowledging 
the contingent nature of political action. But rather than making sense of agonistic 
performativity as historically contingent, Arendt’s rendering focuses narrowly on the self- 
revealing nature of action and claims that this in itself is the essential and, once again, 
“transcendent” element of political freedom.225 Of course Nietzsche is also interested in the 
ethical life of the Greeks but he sees transcendent freedom as the product of hierarchical 
power relations in the Greek context writ large and in his mature thought he derives an
225Arendt, HC, p. 197.
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ontological hypothesis of the will to power, in part, from conclusions he makes about the 
role of exploitative institutions across Greek society.226
Bonnie Honig eschews this difference in her description of the Nietzschean Arendt and 
claims that “[t]he agon provided the plurality, equality, and commonality - the freedom 
from domination - that both Nietzsche and Arendt posit as the necessary conditions of 
virtuosic action.”227 Honig’s focus here is on freedom from  domination and it may be 
determined from this characterization of Nietzsche that the Nietzschean elements of 
Arendt’s thought do not derive from Nietzsche’s particular conception of power relations 
with its emphasis on the link between performativity and power as exploitation. Thus, her 
“Nietzschean Arendt” draws on Nietzschean influences that are separated out from his 
hierarchical philosophy of power emphasizing only those Nietzschean elements that Arendt 
endorsed herself.
Yet what the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt emphasize most of all is the 
significance of Nietzsche’s critique of the self. For Nietzsche the self, prior to action or the 
expression of strength, is a multiplicity of competing drives and instincts. The multiple self, 
therefore, can never be reduced to a unity prior to the discharging of strength (cf. BGE 
19). And this may appear to correspond roughly with Arendt’s framework for discussing 
political action and conscience.
On Arendt’s view the dialogue between me and myself represents the original Socratic 
conscience or dialogue that presupposes an “other” with whom I converse. Arendt refers 
to this as the two-in-one of conscience. However, the two-in-one of conscience is not yet 
the “performative/representative” political conscience she eventually theorizes. Instead, it 
is the contemplative conscience. Arendt claims that, since the self is a multiplicity and at
226See GM I. The particular exploitative institution Nietzsche affirms in the Greek context is slavery.
227Honig, “The Politics of Agonism,” p. 530.
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the very least a duality, it can never be said to achieve a unity as a purely contemplative 
self or contemplative conscience. Of course this characterization of the thinking ego as a 
“Socratic” multiplicity should not, as I argue below, be seen to represent the multiplicity of 
the self prior to action in the same way that Nietzsche would understand the multiple self 
Regardless of this comparison, however, Arendt suggests that unity can only be conferred 
upon an individual within the public political sphere. As Honig puts it, “[t]he actor’s 
momentary engagement in action in the public realm grants him an identity that is fixed”.228 
Therefore, conscience prior to action may not be identified as constituting selfhood, since 
the self prior to action is unknowable as a unity.
This performative identity is crucial to establishing a shared reality of experience. Arendt 
clearly states that “[o]nly where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without 
changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see 
sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.”229 This 
conception of identity is meant to be synonymous with a conception of freedom and 
political judgment. The Nietzschean Arendt, therefore, draws approximately on the 
Nietzschean model of the multiple self who achieves unity, or identity, only in the 
discharging of strength. This performative self appears to be affirmed by both Nietzsche 
and Arendt over and against the notion of the self as “knower/doer” representing freedom 
in terms of the freedom “not to act”.230 Although I illustrate why Arendt is unable to
228Honig, “Arendt, Identity, and Difference,” p. 87.
229Arendt, HC, p. 57.
Arendt’s position on “inner freedom” appears to be somewhat similar to Nietzsche’s position in 
GM  where he describes the way in which the noble type is forced to become responsible for his 
strength under the influence of the slave revolt in morality and according to the “bad conscience” 
(GM I, 13; GM II). However, I should also state that it is not only as bad conscience that the choice 
not to act manifests itself. Indeed, the noble type may choose not to act for perfectly good reasons, in 
terms of ascetic practices of self-discipline and conscience, that are not associated with the influence 
of “bad conscience”.
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sustain this position below, it is important to note that the proponents of the Nietzschean 
Arendt claim that she does sustain this position. Thus, Villa offers a summary of the 
Nietzschean Arendt where he writes:
Freedom, according to Nietzsche and Arendt, is not found in the choice not to act, nor is identity 
something that precedes or is separable from action. Only the performing self knows freedom, 
and only through performance can an otherwise dispersed or fragmented self be gathered together 
and display its uniqueness. Men become who they are, as Nietzsche would say, through action 
and the achievement of a distinct style of action. Arendt makes a parallel point when she claims
231that men show who they are in virtuosic action.
In this summary it is clear that the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt seek to adapt 
Nietzsche’s notion of self-creation, or “becoming”, to an Arendtian framework of the 
political. In this way, the “Nietzschean Arendt” represents a politicization of Nietzsche’s 
thought that overlooks the significance of hierarchy to the ideas that are selectively 
appropriated. And, for the purposes of making better sense of Nietzsche’s proximity to 
Arendt, it may be helpful to identify the reasoning behind this selective approach.
the politically under-determined Nietzsche
Although Nietzsche explicitly states that ostracism was used by the Greeks to keep the 
agon going, he does not dwell on the idea that the institution of agonism itself might have 
been excessive or prone to collapsing into chaos. The only excess and chaos Nietzsche 
comments on explicitly is the excess and chaos that men fall into in the absence of the 
institution of agonism. Arendt, on the other hand, emphasizes the volatility of agonism 
itself and Villa picks up on this by characterizing Nietzsche’s interest in agonism as anti­
political and predisposed to radical subjectivism as a result of its narrow and politically 
under-determined direction. It is in “taming” the volatility of the agon, on this view, that 
warrants and justifies Arendt’s political adaptation of Kant’s aesthetic judgment. As Villa 
puts it, “she [Arendt] broadens the Nietzschean focus on the agonistic quality of action by
231 Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” p. 282.
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reasserting the deliberative element present in both action and judgment.”232 Thus, the 
deliberative nature of the universal standpoint of Kant’s enlarged mentality appears to 
compensate for the radical subjectivism of Nietzsche’s position.
In turn, Honig’s reading sees the political quality of Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of a 
preparation for Arendt’s.233 In this way, she sees Nietzsche’s political philosophy as under- 
determined as well. Honig writes:
Arendt agrees with Nietzsche that there is no essential self, no given unity awaiting discovery or 
realization. There is no being behind doing. But she departs from Nietzsche in focusing 
exclusively on the political actor. She allows the herd its victory in the private realm, resisting 
only its usurpation of the spaces of political action in the contingent public realm. Only in the 
public realm of action, on Arendt’s account, is it the case that there is no doer, that the deed is 
everything.234
The claim here is that Nietzsche’s aesthetic attitude does not go far enough in considering 
the distinctive elements of politics. Although Honig refuses to characterize Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as anti-political per se, her interpretation, like Villa’s, relies on a politically 
under-determined Nietzsche. Furthermore, since Nietzsche’s position appears to be limited 
in political terms, Honig’s interpretation is as faithful to Arendt’s politicized Kantian 
position as Villa’s is.
As I argue below, this inevitable reliance on her Kantian influence ultimately undermines 
Arendt’s conception of the performative self that she is thought to share with Nietzsche. 
What I suggest is that the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt fail to see the scope of 
this tension, in part, because they see Nietzsche’s thought as politically under-determined. 
Given my thesis on the link between hierarchical power relations and Nietzsche’s critique 
of the self, the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt, like Arendt herself, fail to see 
Nietzsche’s conception of the performative self as uniquely consistent with an overall anti­
232Ibid, pp. 287-288.
233Honig, “The Politics of Agonism,” p. 532.
234Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, p. 78.
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democratic and anti-universalist political philosophy that may be partially incomprehensible 
but is neither simply nor best understood as politically under-determined.
The unity of thought and action
It has been suggested that the aesthetic repudiation of morality carried out by Nietzsche 
is antithetical to the moral concerns Arendt maintained in her focus on totalitarian evil and 
the indisputable guilt of Adolf Eichmann.235 However, as I have tried to show, the 
Nietzschean Arendt includes a Kantian check on Nietzsche that attempts to make up for 
his apparent indifference to the political and, by association, the moral. Indeed, Arendt 
tries to preserve the moral by affirming the political. She needs to politicize Kant’s 
aesthetics in order to ensure an underlying universalism in the public sphere. Yet, in 
theorizing universalism, she must avoid a priori moral principles in order to escape the 
purely contemplative mode of thought and the unity of the self as “knower/doer”. Villa 
states:
Kant’s aesthetic theory proves superior to his practical philosophy in this regard, because it 
eschews the monology of the categorical imperative and places the quest for a “universal,” 
objective judgment within the three-dimensionality of the public sphere and its plural 
perspectives. “Intersubjective validity” replaces a priori certainty or the subjectivism of mere 
preference.236
Now I argue that Kant’s aesthetic theory fails to escape the a priori unity of the self prior 
to performance and, therefore, it fails to be “intersubjective” in terms of an active mode of 
being in the world. But before I present my case, we need to understand exactly what 
Arendt envisions.
Arendt appears to satisfy her moral concerns by establishing the unity of thought and
235Lawrence Biskowski, “Politics Versus Aesthetics: Arendt s Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger,”
The Review o f Politics v. 57, n. 1 (1995): pp. 87-88.
236Dana Villa, “Hannah Arendt: Modernity, Alienation, and Critique,” in Hannah Arendt and the 
Meaning o f  Politics, ed. Craig Calhoun and John McGowan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), p. 196.
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action as political conscience in the public sphere. She concludes that the a priori certainty 
associated with Kant’s practical philosophy is no defense against unthinking rule-bound 
obedience and that it may in fact be seen to encourage the non-thinking adherence to 
general rules derived from abstract concepts. Instead, the intellectual or purely 
contemplative conscience needed to be given public expression as political conscience.237
The problem with Kantian moral judgment is that its structure is, as Villa points out, 
“monological” and therefore given to the legislation of general rules from the vantage 
point of a supposedly unified and autonomous ego. By replacing Kant’s categorical 
imperative with his formula for aesthetic judgment, Arendt attempts to theorize the public 
political expression of conscience. Importantly, her attempts in this direction include both a 
Kantian and Socratic influence. Socrates’ midwifery, “which brings out the implications of 
unexamined opinions and thereby destroys them”, is seen, on Arendt’s view, as an essential 
element of politics once it is institutionalized within the so-called three-dimensional public 
sphere.238 As axiomatic elements of politics, Socratic midwifery and Kant’s enlarged 
mentality are combined to provide us with political judgment as “the faculty that judges 
particulars without subsuming them under general rules”.239
The difference between contemplative thought and political thought, therefore, is the 
difference between producing general rules from abstract concepts and making “objective” 
judgments based on the development of an enlarged mentality with respect to the plurality 
of political opinions. On this view there can be no unity of thought and action where 
thought is of the contemplative kind since the self as an isolate is a solitary multiplicity.
The only way to realize conscience as a unity is in the form of political judgment. In
237Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 135-137.
238Arendt, LOMl, p. 192.
239Ibid, pp. 192-193.
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judgment, the enlarged mentality of representative thought recreates the dialogue of the 
two-in-one at the level of judging particular actions and perspectives and is expressed as a 
unity according to the self-revealing logic of freedom as performativity. Thus, Arendt 
writes:
If thinking -the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue - actualizes the difference within our 
identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product, then 
judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in 
the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to be able to think.240
In this passage, however, it is obvious that Arendt continues to maintain an allegiance to
the two world theory of “being” and “appearances” where she theorizes the movement
from a contemplative “self’ to the “self’ of the political conscience. Nevertheless, this is
the basis of political thinking for Arendt and, thus, it represents her notion of the unity of
thought and action in the performative self. Having outlined Arendt’s idea of political
conscience as the unity of thought and action, I now turn to a critique of her appropriation
of Kant’s aesthetic theory of judgment.
Nietzsche and Kant
There is significant tension between the Nietzschean influence in Arendt and the Kantian 
influence. The tension is between what may be reasonably derived from Nietzsche’s 
approach to judgment and what Kant means by an enlarged mentality. Villa sees 
Nietzsche’s agonism as radical subjectivism, yet describes Arendt’s politics of opinion as a 
“political version of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.”241 Of course what is being confused here 
is the difference between agonism and perspectivism. Villa presents Nietzsche’s so-called 
agonism as a radical subjectivism of freedom “beyond good and evil” and at the same time
240Arendt, LOM\, p. 193. Villa re-affirms Arendt’s focus on the self-revealing nature of action as 
political thinking rather than action as activism where he states that “[w]hat is called for in such 
situations is not activism but independent judgment.” Villa, “Thinking and Judging,” p. 100.
241Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil,” p. 286.
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he presents Nietzsche’s perspectivism as somewhat similar to the kind of opinion-centred 
“Kantianism” Arendt needs in order to ground her notion of political judgment.
Now I have established my position on both agonism and perspectivism in previous 
chapters and I have also explained my approach to perspectivism in this chapter, above. 
But what I want to emphasize and address at this point is that the tension between the 
Nietzschean and Kantian influences in Arendt are made worse by Villa’s Nietzschean 
Arendt. Therefore, I want to focus on the limitations of uniting Nietzsche and Kant in the 
idea of performative judgment, specifically, and leave a more open discussion of 
“perspectivism” for another occasion. What I am doing, therefore, is comparing what may 
be considered Nietzsche’s position on judgment, generally speaking, while at the same 
time by-passing the specific instrumental and rhetorical meaning of “perspectivism” to his 
overall epistemological development. Thus, I refer to Nietzsche’s approach here as 
“perspectivist judgment”. This is necessary, on my view, in order to flesh out the 
contradictions in Villa’s presentation of the performative model and it causes few 
problems, I believe, because Villa himself fails to distinguish clearly between 
“perspectivism” as a rhetorical device and perspectivism as Nietzsche’s approach to 
judgment in general.
What is most significant for my immediate purposes is the fact that Arendt turns to Kant 
rather than Nietzsche to give her theory of political conscience a more robust footing. 
What this tells us is that Arendt is interested in a Nietzschean conception of freedom 
“beyond good and evil” but would like to temper that freedom by employing a politicized 
version of Kant’s aesthetic formula for an enlarged mentality. This combination, on 
Arendt’s view, would appear to privilege political thinking over activism and this is how 
the proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt present her aims. But what needs to be 
understood is why Villa describes Arendt’s politics of opinion in terms of perspectivism
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when Arendt herself clearly looks to Kant to inform her project at this stage.
Where Nietzsche describes perspectivist judgment in On the Genealogy o f  Morals he 
does so in opposition to Kant’s attempt to establish a universal standpoint of 
disinterestedness with respect to the object of beauty. I introduced Nietzsche’s anti- 
Kantian position on aesthetic judgment in chapter one. It is clear in Nietzsche’s position on 
perspectivist judgment that it is meant to say something quite different and even opposite 
to Kant’s attitude of “contemplation without interest”.242
Indeed, judgment implies affective interpretations as opposed to the kind of Kantian 
disinterestedness that Nietzsche is scornful of (GM III, 12). Thus, Nietzsche’s approach 
appears to be active and affective whereas Kant’s appears to be passive and impartial. And 
this opposition between Nietzsche and Kant would suggest a tension between a 
Nietzschean perspectivist actor and a Kantian impartial spectator. Yet Villa insists that:
If we view Arendt’s thoughts on judgment in terms of a broader perspectivism, the standpoints of 
the actor and the spectator emerge not as two radically different species of judgment (engaged 
and political vs. detached and historical), but rather as two poles of the more inclusive 
phenomenon of independent judgment.243
The point of forcing the unity of actor and spectator is to remain consistent with the model
of the performative self. On Villa’s rendering of her position, Arendt’s conception of
independent judgment is meant to be both “active” and “impartial” and therefore
“universal” yet “performative”. Villa states that, “[ijmpartial judgment, as conceived by
Arendt, remains perspectival in character: it is opinion in its highest form.”244
Now what can be seen more clearly at this stage is that perspectivism is emphasized by
Villa in order to ensure performative unity rather than “objectivity” or “impartiality”.
242See GM III, 12; Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner 
Press, 1951), §6.
243Villa, “Thinking and Judging,” p. 103.
244Ibid.
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However, the substance of Nietzsche’s concerns does not involve a process of 
“representative thinking” at all. Indeed, Nietzsche is interested in promoting a performative 
mode of judging that enhances the individual’s ability to create his own table of values. 
Thus, “conscience” for Nietzsche is never associated with a so-called universal standpoint.
I argue that Villa’s emphasis on perspectivism represents an attempt to marry Nietzsche 
to Kant for the purpose of avoiding the problems of the contemplative mode which crop 
up in association with Kant’s notion of contemplation without interest. Kant’s idea that 
judgment is the faculty that judges particulars without subsuming them under general rules 
seems acceptable enough at first glance, yet aesthetic judgment for Kant involves a process 
whereby one recognizes the feeling of being free from one’s satisfaction with the object of 
beauty in judging and thus one is thought to realize that judgments are subjectively 
universal insofar as they may be presupposed for everyone.245 The problem with this is that 
there is a process of becoming disinterested that presupposes a “knower/doer” that the 
subject may retreat to when forming a so-called universal judgment. What this establishes 
is an a priori faculty of judgment that is disembedded and disembodied from the 
experience of satisfaction or desire.246
Although Kant claims that aesthetic judgment is non-conceptual, because aesthetic 
experience is not immediately discursive, he nonetheless posits the concept of an a priori 
faculty of judgment which separates the subject from the object and therefore the subject 
from his/her experience in the world. And this movement re-introduces the Platonic 
prejudice of a real world behind the world of appearances with respect to “being”. 
Therefore, Kant’s position must be seen as “contemplative” because it posits a conception 
of the self as a unity prior to “becoming” in the world. Although Kant claims that aesthetic
245Kant, Critique o f Judgment, §6.
246Ibid, §40.
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judgment is universal but non-conceptual, within the realm of opinion rather than truth, his 
argument is misleading because it necessarily implies something other than opinion where 
it demands an a priori universality of judgment.
Kant employs contradictory terms where he describes the universal standpoint of 
aesthetic judgment as the sensus communis 247 He appears to associate a common sense 
standpoint with a process of disinterestedness that considers imaginatively the opinions of 
others and comes to a universal judgment on the basis of such a process. But any notion of 
“sense”, as in spontaneous “feeling”, is dismissed in favour of “disinterestedness”. This 
process is then understood as an a priori mode of representing all other men in thought 
beyond “sense”. Furthermore, there is no getting around what Kant describes as the 
purpose of the process of disinterestedness which is “to escape the illusion arising from the 
private conditions that could so easily be taken for objective”.248 Arendt, too, speaks of 
escaping the private sphere, but she does so in terms of a public performative self that 
precludes any conception of self as a unity prior to action in the public sphere. Kant, by 
contrast, speaks about escaping the “illusion arising from private conditions” with an 
altogether different emphasis that retains the conceptual language of the unity of the self 
attaching to the faculty of judgment prior to judgment itself in the public sphere.
I suggest that Villa’s description of judgment as establishing a “highest form of opinion” 
reflects an attempt to draw attention away from the problems of Kant’s model in Arendt’s 
work. The claim is that a highest form of opinion is “perspectival” as opposed to “true”. 
But I argue that this simply re-introduces the question of “hierarchy” with respect to 
perspectivist judgments. What this means is that judgment is to be understood either 




relations. Given the fact that Arendt wants to overcome both the Platonic hierarchy of 
truth as well as the Nietzschean hierarchy of power relations, it is unclear exactly how we 
are to make sense of what Villa refers to as a “highest form of opinion”. Is this conception 
of judgment Nietzschean or Kantian? By emphasizing the Nietzschean influence Villa 
obviously wants to make Arendt’s notion of judgment more “performative” in a 
Nietzschean sense, but there is nothing in Nietzsche’s approach to judgment that provides 
us with the notion of a “highest form of opinion”. On the other hand, as I have argued 
above, Kant’s attitude does not yield a “performative” mode of judgment because it is 
bogged down in the very conceptual language of contemplative thinking that Arendt wants 
to overcome where she is critical of Plato’s influence and Kant’s practical philosophy.
Of course it could be argued that any “judging” involves reflection, be it a Kantian or a 
Nietzschean “judging”, and, therefore, the point is simply that reflection be a part of a 
performative political sphere as opposed to the realm of solitary thought. Yet what I am 
trying to pinpoint in this chapter is the question of a performative model of the self 
wherein the expression of strength in the world “creates” reality. If Arendt is intent on 
borrowing Nietzsche’s conception of the performative self, which follows from his will to 
power hypothesis, then she must be able to illustrate the judging self in a way that makes 
sense within Nietzsche’s framework of “becoming”. I do not mean that she must accept 
the will to power hypothesis but she must find a way to theorize judging in a way that is 
less dependent on traditional conceptions of moral agency. I argue that her Kantian 
influence is flawed on the basis of Kant’s “disinterested self’. The disinterested self re­
introduces the problem of truth and the hierarchy of truth within a “contemplative” mode 
of being typical of the traditional conceptions of moral agency Nietzsche and Arendt want 
to overcome. And, thus, I conclude that Villa’s presentation of judgment in terms of the 
“highest form of opinion” merely serves to obscure the tensions in Arendt’s work even
more.
At this point, however, it could be argued that Arendt’s appreciation of opinion over 
truth stems more from her attempt to separate an independent Socratic approach to 
thinking from Plato’s metaphysics of truth. Indeed, it could be argued that her position is 
more Socratic than Kantian and that my critique of Kant is rather obvious and irrelevant to 
the uniquely Socratic way in which Arendt wants to make use of Kant’s aesthetic formula. 
For my purposes in this chapter such a contention demands some account of the 
differences between the Socratic and the Nietzschean influence in her work, which I shall 
provide below. However, before considering the Socratic Arendt, it may be helpful to 
make better sense of Arendt’s critique of Nietzsche as well as the different interpretations 
of “politics” and “philosophy” at work in Arendt and Nietzsche.
Arendt’s critique of Nietzsche
For Arendt, philosophy can never actually “create” anything new since it exists in the 
solitary realm of thought which turns perpetually back on itself in a self-referential cycle of 
competing first principles. On this view modern claims to value creation merely represent 
the replacement of one set of “values” with another in the same way that one political 
ideology may be replaced by another. Thus, Arendt refers to modem philosophies as 
“value-philosophies”.249 She explains that traditionally it was “ideas” as transcendental 
units that were imposed to measure all human activity but that “values” have replaced 
“ideas” and in modern society all transcendental standards have disintegrated “into 
relationships between its members, establishing them as functional ‘values’”.250 Arendt 
writes:
249Arendt, BPF, p. 34.
250Ibid, p. 32.
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Values are social commodities that have no significance of their own but, like other commodities, 
exist only in the ever-changing relativity of social linkages and commerce. Through this 
relativization both the things which man produces for his use and the standards according to 
which he lives undergo a decisive change: they become entities of exchange, and the bearer of 
their “value” is society and not man, who produces and uses and judges. The “good” loses its 
character as an idea, the standard by which the good and the bad can be measured and 
recognized; it has become a value which can be exchanged with other values, such as those of 
expediency or of power. The holder of values can refuse this exchange and become an “idealist,” 
who prices the value of “good” higher than the value of expediency ; but this does not make the 
“value” of good any less relative.2 1
Such “functional values” may order the private and social spheres but what remains
forgotten and unrealised, according to Arendt, is the unique value of political action and
judgment which might serve as a more authentic source of new beginnings in the world.
Arendt sees the attempts to overturn the philosophical tradition on the part of Marx, 
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche as failed attempts resulting in a reification of the Platonic 
prejudice against the vita activa 252 Arendt states that;
Self-defeat, the result of all three challenges to tradition in the nineteenth century, is only one and 
perhaps the most superficial Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche have in common. More important 
is the fact that each of their rebellions seems to be concentrated on the same ever-repeated 
subject: Against the alleged abstractions of philosophy and its concept of man as an animal 
rationale, Kierkegaard wants to assert concrete and suffering man; Marx confirms that man’s 
humanity consists of his productive and active force, which in its most elementary aspect he calls 
labour-power; and Nietzsche insists on life’s productivity, on man’s will and will to power ... and 
Nietzsche understands his philosophy as “inverted Platonism” and “transformation of all 
values”.253
Arendt interprets Nietzsche’s revaluation of life as will to power strictly in terms of an 
inverted Platonism which does not escape the Platonic formula that posits knowledge in a 
conceptual hierarchy over opinion and political action. On Arendt’s view the public 
political forum is the truly authentic (pluralistic) forum for the spontaneous creation of a 
community’s value judgments as opposed to values. On this view, Nietzsche’s concept of 
the will to power, representing the productivity of “life”, serves as an oppressive 
philosophical first value that undermines the authority of the public political sphere in
25IIbid, p. 32.
252Arendt, HC, p. 17; BPF, “Tradition and the Modern Age”.
253Arendt, BPF, p. 35.
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measuring human activity.
Arendt is of course correct about Nietzsche’s will to power hypothesis being a first 
philosophical value with which he measures all human activity. But acknowledging the 
status of the will to power hypothesis in this respect is not the same as condemning 
Nietzsche for an “inverted Platonism”, according to the implications of Arendt’s category 
of the vita contemplativa. The will to power hypothesis might be thought of as a purely 
contemplative imposition with respect to the active life but it might, more accurately, be 
viewed as a concept that actually liberates opinion and action from a Platonic “will to 
truth”. Indeed, Nietzsche’s critique of the self is meant to liberate freedom as the 
expression of strength from the traditional philosophical conception of freedom as the 
freedom “not to act”. And importantly, Arendt follows Nietzsche’s critique of the self as 
well as his so-called agonism. Therefore, what must be considered more closely is Arendt’s 
attack on Nietzsche’s will to power hypothesis in light of her selective appropriation of 
other Nietzschean ideas.
On Arendt’s view, the will to power is a concept that “was ‘built’ and decorated by the 
thinking as opposed to the willing ego.”254 Thus, she claims that Nietzsche’s conception of 
eternal recurrence is equally flawed, as an attempt to “affirm” backward in time, and may 
be understood in terms of the contemplative mode which prevents us from thinking 
“politically”. Referring to Nietzsche’s early presentation of eternal recurrence in section 
341 of The Gay Science, Arendt states the following:
No later version of the etemal-recurrence notion displays so unequivocally its main characteristic, 
namely, that it is not a theory, not a doctrine, not even a hypothesis, but a mere thought- 
experiment. As such, since it implies an experimental return to the ancient cyclical time concept, 
it seems to be in flagrant contradiction with any possible notion of the Will, whose projects
255always assume rectilinear time and a future that is unknown and therefore open to change.
254Arendt, LOM, II, p. 158.
255Ibid, p. 166.
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In this passage Arendt appears to discredit Nietzsche’s mature rendering of eternal 
recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This seems to be an exaggerated attempt to 
circumscribe the meaning of eternal recurrence within the self-referential framework of a 
“thought-experiment”.
Honig suggests, correctly I think, that Arendt disregards the more open-ended nature of 
Nietzsche’s presentation of eternal recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra}56 In 
Zarathustra Nietzsche writes:
‘Two paths come together here: no one has ever reached their end. This long lane behind us: it 
goes on for an eternity. And that long lane behind us - that is another eternity. They are in 
opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and it is here at this gateway 
that they come together. The name of the gateway is written above it: “Moment”. But if one were 
to follow them further and ever further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be 
in eternal opposition?’ ‘Everything straight lies,’ murmured the dwarf disdainfully. ‘All truth is 
crooked, time itself is a circle. ’ (Z, O f the Vision and the Riddle)
What is most important here is the gateway “Moment”. Nietzsche does not favour the
cyclical concept of time over the linear concept of time. Obviously, eternal recurrence is a
thought-experiment but it addresses the spontaneity of the moment and is not simply or
most importantly a matter of mentally affirming what has already been willed. Eternal
recurrence is a thought-experiment which is meant to inform the willing of the moment as
performance or the expression of strength and it therefore escapes Arendt’s attempt to
place it purely within the realm of contemplation. It reflects and affirms, as a thought-
experiment, the unity of thought and action in the contingent world. As Honig suggests,
“[t]o overlook the centrality of the moment in Nietzsche’s account is to run the risk of
underestimating the importance of acting and of willing to this drama.”257
What Arendt tries to show is that Nietzsche’s critique of the self is obscured as a theory
of freedom and action due to a conception of cyclical time in which willing is a purely
256Honig, Political Theory and the Displacem ent o f Politics, p. 58.
257Ibid.
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mental exercise. Her claim therefore is that Nietzsche successfully explains the “feeling of 
strength” of commanding in the will as an epiphenomenal illusion of consciousness, 
suggesting a “knower/doer” behind all action, but that he fails to remain consistent with 
this hypothesis where he posits eternal recurrence as a product of the purely thinking ego. 
Yet if we consider eternal recurrence as one more element informing Nietzsche’s critique 
of the self then its significance lies in contributing to the meaning Nietzsche wishes to 
confer upon “becoming” and thus upon “performativity”. This is Honig’s view where she 
suggests that Nietzsche’s attempt to confer meaning does not involve the passive 
“affirmation of everything that is” but instead arises out of the performativity of the self- 
revealing process of action. Thus, Honig concludes that Nietzsche’s attempt to confer 
meaning upon the self-revealing process “is not terribly different from the task Arendt 
herself assigns to politics.”258 But this begs the question of what separates Nietzsche and 
Arendt on the meaning of “politics” and “philosophy” if, as Honig suggests, Nietzsche’s 
vision is similar to Arendt’s.
the conflicting meaning of “politics” and “philosophy” in Nietzsche and Arendt
Nietzsche’s thought is hardly ever presented in terms of a unified political philosophy. I 
suggest that this may have to do with the fact that defining Nietzsche’s mature thought in 
terms of a unified political project would make it difficult to appropriate certain ideas while 
leaving other less agreeable parts behind. Thus, the pluralist/agonist Nietzsche is separated 
out and divorced from the anti-democratic and anti-universalist Nietzsche. But if both 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his critique of the self are intimately associated with 
hierarchy and anti-universalism in his thought then this would make incorporating those 
ideas into modern democratic theories of political action and judgment difficult to justify.
258Ibid, p. 60.
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What is seldom considered is that thinking about the elements of Nietzsche’s thought in 
terms of a unified political philosophy might be just as fruitful as carving it up into 
disparate philosophical bits and pieces and this may be especially true in the case of 
Nietzsche’s relevance to Arendt’s project since she appears to be influenced by 
Nietzsche’s thought in such a selective way. Indeed, the proponents of the Nietzschean 
Arendt help clarify just how selective her reading of Nietzsche is.
Unlike Arendt, Nietzsche believes that it is philosophy and not politics (as reactive 
hierarchy) that has been the victim of the western philosophical tradition since Socrates. 
But Nietzsche and Arendt do not conceive of either politics or philosophy in the same 
way. Arendt’s approach to politics and philosophy operates according to the following 
framework:
With the disappearance of the ancient city-state - Augustine seems to have been the last to know 
at least what it once meant to be a citizen - the term vita activa lost its specifically political 
meaning and denoted all kinds of active engagement in the things of this world. To be sure, it 
does not follow that work and labour had risen in the hierarchy of human activities and were now 
equal in dignity with a life devoted to politics. It was, rather, the other way round: action was now 
also reckoned among the necessities of earthly life, so that contemplation ( the bios thedretikos, 
translated into the vita contemplativa) was left as the only truly free way of life. However, the 
enormous superiority of contemplation over activity of any kind, action not excluded, is not 
Christian in origin. We find it in Plato’s political philosophy, where the whole utopian 
reorganization of polis life is not only directed by the superior insight of the philosopher but has
no aim other than to make possible the philosopher’s way of life.25
\
The most important idea in this passage is that the vita activa was demoted to the level of 
“necessity” and this process began with Plato’s elevation of the contemplative life as the 
“only truly free way of life”. Nietzsche would agree with Arendt’s claims here because he 
sees political life as having been demoted to the level of necessity as well. But Arendt 
moves on from this to her own revaluation of politics and philosophy wherein politics is 
elevated above the realm of necessity and contemplation and thus it is re-instated as the 
only truly free way of life. The only way to see this transformation actualized is to show 
how the philosophical life does not offer the same kind of “freedom” as the vita activa. In
259Arendt, HC, p. 14.
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other words, she needs to demote the philosophical life in order to elevate the new 
conception of political autonomy she envisions.
Now what is fascinating is that both Arendt and Nietzsche denounce the theoretical or 
contemplative mode of existence and its hegemony since Plato but they end up with 
opposite evaluations of “philosophy” and “politics”. Arendt intends to revalue political 
action and judgment in a way that is similar to Nietzsche’s revaluation of philosophy but 
she is unwilling to think about philosophy as anything other than a contemplative mode of 
existence. Like Arendt, Nietzsche sees modem politics as being too concerned with 
“functional values” but he does not concentrate his efforts on revaluing “politics” as the 
highest form of freedom because he sees the problem to be one of profound nihilism across 
society and with respect to moral values writ large. It is interesting to note, however, that, 
like in Arendt, his conception of the highest freedom is informed by the lives of the pre- 
Socratic Greeks. Arendt finds her inspiration in the pre-Socratic vita activa and Nietzsche 
finds his inspiration in the lives of the pre-Socratic philosophers.
However, what Nietzsche sees in the lives of the pre-Socratic Greeks is not only the 
unique freedom of philosophy but the unique “political drive” of the Greeks in general. 
Thus, in his early essay The Greek State, Nietzsche writes:
We must, however, construe the Greeks, in relation to the unique zenith of their art, as being a 
priori ‘political men par excellen ceand actually history knows of no other example of such an 
awesome release of the political urge, of such a complete sacrifice of all other interests in the 
service of this instinct towards the state - at best, we could honour the men of Renaissance in Italy 
with the same title, by way of comparison and for similar reasons. (TGS 181)
What is most important for Nietzsche in this essay, however, is the capacity the Greeks
had to discharge their strength in the service of their instincts toward the state. And it is
this discharging of strength which Nietzsche would later employ in his hypothesis of the
will to power. Ironically, considering her interest in the political urge amongst the Greeks
as well, Arendt remains steadfast in her view that Nietzsche’s hypothesis of the will to
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power contributes nothing to the notion of political performativity as she attempts to re­
think it.
This is especially ironic given the fact that Nietzsche employs the idea of discharging 
one’s strength in order to overcome the will that is a purely life-preserving will or rather 
one which operates according to the morality of utility. If the will is simply a will to herd 
self-preservation then Nietzsche has no way of philosophizing freedom beyond the 
nihilistic trajectory of the ascetic ideal and the utility-based morality of the improvement of 
mankind. Obviously the morality of utility is a term that applies only to Nietzsche’s 
framework, since the scope of his critique of modernity is on a much more epic scale than 
Arendt’s critique, however the point I want to make is that Arendt fails to see how 
Nietzsche’s opposition to a utility-based morality resonates with her own opposition to the 
hegemony of private and social sphere concerns including the oppressive influence of so- 
called “functional values”.
Nietzsche understood better than Arendt that we cannot maintain the categories of 
“philosophy” and “politics” as we have inherited them from Plato and the pre-Socratic 
Greeks if we want to think about new possibilities for a freedom beyond the morality of 
utility in a post-Christian world. In this way, Arendt fails to see why overcoming an 
inordinate concern for purely functional values demands something as extreme as the will 
to power hypothesis in Nietzsche’s thought. Of course it could be argued that Arendt 
simply has a different theory of action than Nietzsche and that I am making too much of 
her shortcomings in this context. Yet it is important to my overall argument to emphasize 
the problem of the performative model of the self. Without a clear theory of her own, 
compelling us to put our faith in a new conception of the willing self as a performative, 
political self, her ideas about political autonomy remain circumscribed within the 
Platonic/Christian framework of freedom that she actually wants to overcome. All that I
suggest is that Nietzsche appears to see this problem more comprehensively than Arendt 
and that there are important connections to be made in Nietzsche’s political thought, i.e. 
between overcoming a utility-based morality and promoting a performative model of the 
self, that Arendt appears to have overlooked.
What this suggests, returning to Arendt’s interest in the pre-Socratic Greeks, is that she 
sees the inspiration for a new conception of political thinking and acting in the unique lives 
of the Greeks but she fails to appreciate the hierarchical preconditions for such a vita 
activa. And, in this way, she fails to see the philosophical life as a similar kind of freedom 
in the pre-Socratic context as well. Nietzsche, according to my interpretation, sees the 
political urge amongst the Greeks as both “political” and “philosophical”. And it is from 
the political urge that Nietzsche derives his notion of self-creation. As I explained in the 
last chapter, the active life of self-creation represents the unity of the contemplative and 
the creative. The creative man, on Nietzsche’s view, is not homo faber for he is never 
simply a working or fabricating man but rather a man who is creating himself. Since 
Arendt wants to re-think the active life beyond the sphere of homo faber and the animal 
laborans, I argue that Arendt’s notion of “self-revealing” freedom is much closer to 
Nietzsche’s notion of freedom as self-creation than Arendt was willing to admit.260
Nietzsche’s early notes and essays represent his earliest attempt to move beyond the 
tension between “politics” and “philosophy” that Arendt’s work never convincingly 
overcomes. In The Greek State Nietzsche writes:
The actual aim of the state, the Olympian existence and constantly renewed creation and 
preparation of the genius, compared with whom eveiything else is just a tool, aid and facilitator, 
is discovered here through poetic intuition and described vividly. Plato saw beyond the terribly 
mutilated Herm of contemporary state life, and still saw something divine inside it. He believed 
that one could, perhaps, extract this divine image, and that the angry, barbarically distorted 
exterior did not belong to the nature of the state: the whole fervour and loftiness of his political 
passion threw itself onto that belief, that wish - he was burnt up in this fire. The fact that he did 
not place genius, in its most general sense, at the head of this perfect state, but only the genius of
260See Arendt, HC, chapters 3 and 4.
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wisdom and knowledge, excluding the inspired artist entirely from his state, was a- rigid 
consequence of the Socratic judgment on art, which Plato, struggling against himself, adopted as 
his own. This external, almost accidental gap ought to prevent us from recognizing, in the total 
concept of the Platonic state, the wonderfully grand hieroglyph of a profound secret study o f  the 
connection between state and genius, eternally needing to be interpreted: in this preface we have 
said what we believe we have fathomed of this secret script. - (TGS 185-6)
The way Nietzsche separates the genius of wisdom and knowledge from the artist in this
passage points toward his later realization that the contemplative/theoretical man is not the
“genuine philosopher”. Already, in The Greek State, Nietzsche sees Plato’s mistake as the
failure to make better sense of what the highest freedom requires. Plato, on Nietzsche’s
view, fails to unite philosophy with “life” and “art” according to the “political urge”.
Instead, he ends up with a Socratic “theoretical” type as his highest type. In this passage
there is clear evidence that the unity of the contemplative mode and the active mode, the
unity of philosophy and the world of men, is a very real part of Nietzsche’s framework for
revaluation. Indeed, there is no greater clue to this framework than where he emphasizes
the connection between state and genius.
In his early notes Nietzsche writes:
My general task: to show how life, philosophy, and art have a more profound and congenial 
relationship to each other, in such a way that philosophy is not superficial and the life of the 
philosopher does not become mendacious. It is a splendid thing that ancient philosophers were 
able to live so freely without thereby turning into foo ls and virtuosos. Their freedom of the 
individual was immeasurably great. The false opposition between vita practica  and vita  
contemplativa is something Asiatic. The Greeks understood the matter better. (PT 134)
Of course in this passage Nietzsche is still thinking about philosophy as an aesthetic mode
of life rather than as an extra-moral-aesthetic mode of life. Therefore, at this stage, he has
not yet thought of how he needs to re-value morality (and politics). But what is important
here is that he thinks of the pre-Socratic Greeks as those people who knew the value of the
unity of thought and action in terms of the unity of the contemplative mode and the
practical mode. Nietzsche does not speak about the vita activa as uniquely political here
but nor does he mean the vita practica in terms of “labour” or “work”, since he is thinking
about the philosophical type in terms of his unique “freedom”. Indeed, what he seems to be
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saying is that the truly free way of life requires the unity of thought and action and the pre- 
Socratic philosophers, unlike their post-Socratic descendants, were uniquely capable of 
this type of autonomy.
Later in Nietzsche’s mature period, where he attempts to re-value morality and politics, 
he sees politics as synonymous with herd morality but this does not preclude the likelihood 
that he admired the Greek vita activa as much as Arendt did and for similar reasons. In 
fact in The Greek State, as reproduced above, Nietzsche admires the Greeks for their 
political urge and this urge is appreciated by Nietzsche because it reflects a strong 
capability for independent action and judgment. Thus, Nietzsche does not promote 
philosophy over and against Greek politics. He promotes a new performative conception 
of philosophy over and against political life as he understands it in terms of the morality of 
utility and conformity. Therefore, Nietzsche attempts to liberate philosophy from its 
subservient role as handmaiden to a modem politics which relies on the philosophical 
prejudices of the Platonic tradition. Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy, like Arendt’s 
conception of political action, exists “at the other end from all modern ideology and herd 
desiderata” (BGE 44).
What is implicit in Nietzsche’s project is the dissolution of politics and philosophy as 
binary opposites. Nietzsche’s framework of revaluation dispenses with the categories that 
Arendt maintains and reifies in the process of theorizing a new conception of political 
freedom. Nietzsche’s form of autonomy must be understood as a new form of political- 
philosophical autonomy that makes sense as such only within his revaluation of politics and 
philosophy according to the will to power hypothesis. The only worthwhile conception of 
“political” autonomy Nietzsche can imagine is an extra-moral autonomy, since living 
beyond good and evil requires living beyond the utility-based consciousness of modern 
democratic politics. From a Nietzschean perspective, Arendt wishes to go beyond the
237
realm of utility as well but not the realm of “herd consciousness”. This is evident where 
she continues to describe judgment and conscience in Kantian and Socratic terms.
Where Nietzsche and Arendt also part company is on the question of re-thinking modern 
political institutions. They are both anti-modernists in the sense that they are both against 
the way that politics is generally conducted and understood within a modem context of 
“utility” or “functional values”. However, Arendt needs to be a democratic thinker in order 
to provide an immediate answer to totalitarian evil and Nietzsche simply does not concern 
himself with anything other than the highest form of freedom. In Arendt, her new 
conception of political action and judgment is meant to solve the problem of totalitarianism 
which she sees as a lethal combination of non-thought and “evil” (evil actions). Therefore, 
unlike Nietzsche, there is an objective good which has authority over Arendtian man in the 
world and this explains why she must see the will to power hypothesis as unhelpful.
Having outlined the similarities and differences between Nietzsche and Arendt on the 
meaning of politics and philosophy, it may be helpful to conclude my comparative analysis 
by discussing Arendt’s Socratic influence. This may be considered an appropriate way to 
finish given the very different ways in which Nietzsche and Arendt interpret Socrates’ 
relevance. In presenting Arendt’s Socratic influence, very briefly below, it may also help to 
make sense of her position against Nietzsche’s so-called inverted Platonism.
the Socratic Arendt and Nietzsche’s inverted Platonism
In her essay Thinking and Moral Considerations Arendt describes Socratic midwifery in 
terms of the search for meaning which operates so as to challenge and often destroy 
accepted opinion without imposing a Platonic law of truth. Arendt weighs the virtues and 
dangers of Socratic midwifery against the potential onslaught of nihilism but she 
determines in the end that nihilism “does not arise out of the Socratic conviction that the
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unexamined life is not worth living but, on the contrary, out of the desire to find results 
which would make further thinking unnecessary.”261 On this interpretation Nietzsche’s re­
configuration of the philosophical mode is not very far removed from the examined life 
Socrates’ midwifery presupposes. Yet Arendt accuses Nietzsche of giving in to an 
opposite desire - the desire to make further thinking unnecessary. Thus, she writes:
The quest for meaning which relentlessly dissolves and examines anew all accepted doctrines and 
rules, can at every moment turn against itself, as it were, produce a reversal of the old values, and 
declare those as “new values”. This, to an extent, is what Nietzsche did when he reversed 
Platonism, forgetting that a reversed Plato is still Plato.262
Arendt’s claim here is a strong one and it is impossible to wholly refute. However, in order
to create a space for an alternative rendering of Nietzsche’s status as a political thinker, I
suggest that Nietzsche is “Platonic” only in certain respects. He does introduce a hierarchy
of human types and in elevating a new philosophical mode above the utility-based interests
of the great majority of people he may also be seen to be “Platonic”. However, Nietzsche
is unique because of his “moral” anti-universalism.
Arendt, in her effort to force political thinking upon the likes of Adolf Eichmann, follows 
a universalist Socrates over and against an elitist Plato. Nietzsche clearly follows Plato in 
his elitism but not in the way Arendt claims he does. He does not intend to bring about the 
simple reversal of values which would render further thinking unnecessary. Instead, he 
hopes to elevate the unity of thought and action as active conscience above the conditions 
of modernity that breed non-thinking individuals.
Therefore, what is most significant, in distinguishing Arendt from Nietzsche and 
Nietzsche from Arendt, is the divergent characterization of the “political” or “active” 
conscience as grounded in either universalism or anti-universalism respectively. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche does not distinguish the same mental categories as Arendt. The
261Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Social Research vol. 51 (1984): 26.
262Ibid, p. 25.
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multiple self is, in an important sense, unknowable on Nietzsche’s view and in this way he 
refrains from claiming comprehensive knowledge of how the faculties interact and divide 
up the labour of thinking, judging, and willing. All that Nietzsche claims is that the will, if 
it is efficient, involves commanding and obeying but we can only ascribe unity to thinking 
and willing in terms of a self-overcoming process that understands conscience as a unity 
with respect to value judgments affirmed performatively. In Nietzsche’s case this involves 
living according to one’s own table of values as performative judgments in the world.
What makes this realm of active judgment possible is the hierarchy of types.
Where Arendt posits the universalism of the two-in-one at the level of consciousness, 
Nietzsche hesitates. He hesitates because, as he puts it, “our thoughts are continually 
governed by the character of consciousness - by the ‘genius of the species’ that commands 
it - and translated back into the perspective of the herd” (GS 354). What this means is that 
our performative uniqueness, as a unity, is not expressed in our consciousness per se. Our 
consciousness is an expression of our social or herd nature to a large degree. The two-in- 
one of the soundless dialogue is, on this view, part of our herd nature which cannot 
represent our individual uniqueness. In this way, Nietzsche conceptually divorces active 
conscience from “herd consciousness” and thus attempts to establish the anti-universalism 
of conscience. Arendt, by comparison, retains a traditional framework of moral 
universalism.
From a Nietzschean perspective, Arendt fails to follow the critique of the self through to 
its anti-universalist conclusion because she confers unity upon the self prior to the 
expression of “political”conscience where she claims that everyone has the potential to 
exercise the thinking faculty of the two-in-one at the level of consciousness. As Arendt 
puts it, the two-in-one is “not a prerogative of the few but an ever-present faculty of
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everybody.”263 This claim about “being” compromises the overall meaning of unity and 
uniqueness in performativity.
The significance of performative “unity” is that, as a public, political expression of the 
self, it represents the expression of “uniqueness”. But by establishing the universality of 
conscience prior to performative unity Arendt makes the performative selfless strong than 
it is in Nietzsche. As long as there is a theory of moral universalism that grounds her model 
of performativity, prior to performativity, then her model of performativity is less 
convincing as a model which is intended to overcome Platonic and Kantian conceptions of 
the cognitive self and moral agency.
Nietzsche, contra Arendt, manages to remain more consistent with the model of the self 
as “multiplicity prior to action”/“unity and uniqueness in action” because this multiplicity is 
never theorized by Nietzsche in terms of a universally shared faculty. In other words, 
Nietzsche never gives the multiple self any real form or structure the way Arendt does. 
Arendt follows Socrates in assuming a universality of conscience and thus she thinks about 
plurality in a misleading way since she intends to follow Nietzsche’s critique of the self, 
beyond good and evil, at the same time that she theorizes so as to undermine its anti- 
universalist implications. And, in this way, Arendt’s Socratic influence weakens her 
position as much as her Kantian influence does.
conclusion
Arendt’s theory of political action and judgment provides an excellent framework in 
which to illustrate the relevance of my thesis about the role of philosophy and hierarchy in 
Nietzsche’s political thought. Although Nietzsche and Arendt have very different ways of 
proceeding they both envision a new possibility for autonomy in terms of the unity of
263Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” p. 35.
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thought and action. However, if my argument is correct, Nietzsche’s anti-democratic 
political framework remains more consistent with the critique of the self that both he and 
Arendt rely on to conceptualize a vision of the performative self “beyond good and evil”. 
Arendt is unable to follow Nietzsche’s doctrine of becoming because of her commitment 
to solving the problem of totalitarianism. Therefore, Arendt falls into the trap of theorizing 
the unity of the self beyond good and evil, while at the same time attempting to theorize 
the unity of the self according to the universality of moral conscience which, ironically, 
does not escape the traditional framework of moral agency that negated the pre-Socratic 
model of the self evident in the original vita activa.
Part of Arendt’s problem is that the traditional categories of politics and philosophy 
maintain a hold on her imagination as binary opposites. Nietzsche collapses these 
categories and re-values philosophy as independent value creation and politics as 
hierarchy. This allows him the flexibility to shift from a traditional framework of “being” to 
a future-based framework of “becoming”.
I suggest that the tensions and resonances between Arendt and Nietzsche help to 
illustrate how difficult it is to establish a successful theory of the relationship between 
philosophy and politics if we start from a position that denies the two world theory of 
being and becoming, as Nietzsche does. But this does not mean that I want to conclude by 
re-affirming a neo-Kantian position with respect to moral and political agency. All that I 
want to suggest is that political theorists who attempt to make use of Nietzsche without 
addressing this important problem, and its origins in nihilism, fail to address what is 
uniquely political in Nietzsche. The proponents of the Nietzschean Arendt, like the 
proponents of agonistic democracy, overlook the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s unified 
political philosophy and thus its relevance to many of the issues they themselves would like 
to make better sense of.
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CHAPTER EIGHT - THOUGHTS ON THE PERFORMATIVE SELF
summary
In part one I articulated the role of philosophy and hierarchy within a critique of the 
democratic Nietzsche. In doing so I discussed the limitations of poststructuralist and 
agonist readings of Nietzsche for the purpose of revealing the unique anti-democratic 
framework of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In chapter four I concluded part one by illustrating 
how Walter Kaufmann’s Aristotelian Nietzsche remains an important influence on our 
assumptions about Nietzsche’s relevance within a contemporary theoretical context. And, 
in revealing the weaknesses of Kaufmann’s interpretation, I introduced the idea that 
Nietzsche’s Ubermensch ideal represents a fundamental “anti-universalism” with respect to 
values, making his political framework particularly non-transmissible within a modem 
democratic context.
In part two I traced the development of Nietzsche’s political philosophy from his earliest 
writings to his mature books. In doing so I offered an exegesis that emphasized the unity 
of form and content in Nietzsche’s thought, the notion of tragic philosophy, and the 
peculiar movement of Nietzsche’s ideas about herd consciousness within the context of 
overcoming the two world theory. By describing “philosophy” as a new vision of political- 
philosophical autonomy, I described how Nietzsche interprets “politics” as morality 
according to active hierarchy and, thus, how he advances a notion of extra-moral freedom 
that includes both an “external” discharging of strength in the form of social hierarchy and 
an “internal” discharging of strength in the form of self-overcoming.
In part three, thus far, I have developed a comparative analysis of Nietzsche and Arendt 
on the unity of thought and action. My analysis is meant to demonstrate the usefulness of 
the anti-democratic/anti-universalist reading of Nietzsche concerning issues in modern
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political theory. Thus, I have emphasized the way in which Nietzsche interprets and re­
values “politics” and “philosophy” and how he strives to overcome the limitations that 
moral universalism imposes on autonomy at the highest level of thought and action. One of 
the most interesting elements of this discussion, on my view, is the possibility of 
developing a better, more applicable, performative model of the self. Therefore, to 
conclude this thesis on Nietzsche’s political philosophy, I now turn to some speculative 
thoughts on the significance of the performative model of the self as it may be elaborated 
beyond Nietzsche’s vision of an anti-democratic political-philosophical autonomy.
the performative self.
Although I have argued that what is uniquely political in Nietzsche is not assimilable 
within modem democratic structures of thought, I also suggest, at this point, that the 
performative model of the self that issues from his thinking about moral agency might be 
of interest as the inspiration for a new conception of democratic autonomy, given certain 
provisos. Indeed, what is interesting is the idea of anti-universalism combined with the 
“political-philosophical” nature of performative judging and acting. Borrowing from 
Arendt to some extent, but remaining true to Nietzsche’s anti-universalism, it may be 
possible to re-think anti-universal performativity in a democratic context without falling 
back on traditional philosophical prejudices about “being” that continue to plague theories 
of autonomy and our discussions of them.264
What is attractive about a new form of political-philosophical autonomy is that it moves 
beyond the idea of “difference” as expressing ethnic, gender-based, and socio-cultural 
identities, so-called competing conceptions of the good, and the like. By insisting that
264What I am thinking of here is the ongoing debate, broadly conceived, between so-called 
“difference” theorists and liberal-impartialist theorists like Rawls for example.
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performativity is the best way of expressing difference as uniqueness, I suggest, 
tentatively, that Nietzsche’s vision offers us a new way of thinking the political in a world 
where the demand for “universality” is becoming an ever-increasing, and potentially 
spirit-crushing, imposition on our political and philosophical imaginations. I suggest also, 
therefore, that accepted ways of thinking about “difference” are often misleading ways of 
achieving something truly unique in the world. I believe that Nietzsche’s philosophy, in 
conceiving of difference “hierarchically” and “performatively”, reveals a certain truth 
about how our recent attempts to theorize difference tend to offer only a superficial notion 
of non-conformity, obscuring the fact that, underneath these various “identities”, we all 
share, broadly speaking, the same basic democratic values.
However, in making these observations I do not want to belittle the struggle, on the part 
of individuals and groups, to achieve greater degrees of social justice in the world. What I 
am interested in, beyond the framework of social justice, is the idea of political- 
philosophical “difference” which might be conceived of in an “anti-universalist” sense. 
Indeed, it might be possible to theorize a version of the performative self that begins with 
Nietzsche, taking bits and pieces from other thinkers, and offers us a conception of 
political autonomy that is both anti-universalist and democratic. What such a theory 
would require is getting beyond traditional prejudices about the universality of moral 
agency and at the same time getting beyond the idea that “identity” is a “social” construct. 
Indeed, what a new theory of political autonomy might establish is the idea that one’s 
“identity” is revealed as being truly unique in its “political-philosophical” expression.
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